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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF 
 TURKISH-CHINESE (MILITARY) RELATIONS 
 
 
Ersoy, Eyüp 
MA, Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu 
 
July 2008 
 
 
 
This study has two intertwined objectives. First, this study propounds an analytical 
framework for the analysis of a state’s military relations as an alternative to the 
analytical framework traditionally employed. The new analytical framework is 
devised by segregating the entirety of a state’s foreign military relations into four 
categories according to their distinctive subject matters. As a case study, this study 
scrutinizes Turkish-Chinese military relations within the analytical framework 
propounded, and by doing so, it purports to display the validity of the new analytical 
framework. Second, this study makes an inclusive examination of bilateral relations 
between Turkey and China, mainly in the post Cold War era. It contends that 
Turkish-Chinese relations have yet to develop to levels envisaged and aimed at by 
policymakers and scholars from the two sides. It probes the causes that have thus far 
hindered the development of political, economic, military, and social and cultural 
relations between Turkey and China in separate and consecutive sections. 
   
 
Keywords: Foreign Military Relations, Turkish-Chinese Relations, Turkish-Chinese 
Military Relations, Formal Military Relations, Operational Military Relations, 
Technical Military Relations, Organizational Military Relations 
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
TÜRKİYE-ÇİN (ASKERİ) 
 İLİŞKİLERİNİN BİR ANALİZİ 
 
 
Ersoy, Eyüp 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler 
Tez Danışmanı: Yar. Doç. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu 
 
Temmuz 2008 
 
 
Bu çalışma iç içe geçmiş iki amacı gerçekleştirmeye yöneliktir. İlk olarak, iki ülke 
arasındaki askeri ilişkileri incelemekte kullanılan geleneksel analitik çerçeveye bir 
alternatif olarak yeni bir analitik çerçeve ortaya koymaktadır. Bu yeni analitik 
çerçeve, bir devletin askeri ilişkilerinin bütününün konularına göre dört ayrı 
kategoriye bölünmesi ile tasarlanmıştır. Bu çalışma, Türkiye ile Çin arasındaki askeri 
ilişkileri ortaya konan yeni analitik çerçeve dahilinde irdelemektedir. Böylece bu 
çalışma ortaya konan yeni analitik çerçevenin geçerliliğini gösterme iddiasındadır. 
İkinci olarak, bu çalışma daha çok Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Türkiye ile Çin 
arasında gelişen ilişkilerin kapsamlı bir incelemesini ortaya koymaktadır. Buradaki 
temel sav, iki devlet arasındaki ilişkilerin iki ülke siyasetçileri ve akademisyenlerince 
öngörülen ve hedeflenen seviyeye ulaşmaktan uzak olduğudur. Bu çalışmada, 
Türkiye ile Çin arasındaki siyasi, ekonomik, askeri ve sosyal ve kültürel ilişkilerin 
gelişimini engelleyen sebepler ayrı ve müteselsil bölümlerde incelenmektedir.  
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Dış Askeri İlişkiler, Türkiye-Çin İlişkileri, Türkiye-Çin Askeri 
İlişkileri, Resmi Askeri İlişkiler, Operasyonel Askeri İlişkiler, Teknik Askeri 
İlişkiler, Kurumsal Askeri İlişkiler 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
     Bilateral military relations, cooperative or conflictual,1 continue to be an essential 
component in the formation and implementation of states’ foreign policies since, 
simply, they are considered instrumental in attaining the perceived interests of two 
polities that have forged bilateral military relations. These polities can be city states 
like Athens and Corcyra, empires like the Ottoman Empire and the German Reich, 
nation states like People’s Republic of China 2  and Bulgaria, or international 
organizations like the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). These perceived interests of two different polities are not necessarily 
identical; yet, they can be pursued simultaneously. While Turkish-American military 
relations during the Cold War were to serve the US policy of containment of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), they were also to serve the Turkish 
policy of securing NATO, predominantly American, support and deterring a 
probable Soviet aggression.     
                                               
1
 Conflicts of military nature between two polities can also be considered military relations between 
them. Yet, throughout the thesis, unless otherwise stated, the concept ‘bilateral military relations’ 
denote cooperative military relations between two polities. 
2
 Henceforth, the People’s Republic of China is referred as China and the Republic of China is 
referred as Taiwan. 
 2 
     A parsimonious account of objectives that polities aim at achieving through 
establishing bilateral military relations may include deterring potential aggressors by 
securing the support of another actor, and balancing rivals by boosting the aggregate 
power of collaborating actors. This account may also include coercing adversaries to 
pursue certain policies by displaying the will and intention of collaborating actors to 
execute joint operations when necessity arises, and challenging and, if possible, 
punishing common enemies by carrying out punitive measures. Besides these 
traditional strategic objectives that were observed, for example, in the British foreign 
policy during the Napoleonic Wars, a polity may involve in bilateral military 
relations so as to enlarge its share in the global defense market by securing military 
contracts for their products, to boost its military prowess by procuring additional 
weapon systems, to maintain the readiness of its militaries by conducting joint drills 
with the armed forces of other polities, or to demonstrate its putative concern and 
affection for the security and stability of another polity by allocating and locating a 
portion of its military personnel and equipment in it. 
     Bilateral military relations between states are traditionally examined and 
discussed in an analytical framework that is composed of, and divided into, four 
categories, that are political relations, economic relations, military relations, and 
social and cultural relations. Displaying a tacit graduation, this traditional analytical 
framework suffer several deficiencies as an ideal framework for analyses of bilateral 
military relations, such as overlooking the economic dimension of bilateral military 
relations which unavoidably taints any straightforward classification between 
bilateral economic and military relations. Yet, the traditional analytical framework 
has peculiar advantages; it is, for example, rather appropriate in revealing the 
 3 
imbalances between bilateral political and economic relations, or between economic 
and military relations.  
     On the other hand, Turkish-Chinese relations are gradually improving, especially 
with the momentum of recent activism observed in Chinese and Turkish foreign 
policies. As China increases its sway over international politics, it is considered as a 
prospective candidate pole in the international power structure. Apart from the global 
repercussions of the ‘dragon’s rise’3, its involvement in the regions traditionally 
considered crucial for the protection of Turkey’s security and the advancement of 
Turkish interests4  makes any analysis of the pace and the trajectory of Turkish-
Chinese relations imperative. Besides, in part thanks to the requirements of economic 
development like the quest for new markets, Turkey has recently not only 
rediscovered the Middle East5 but also shifted its attention to other parts of the world, 
as the declarations of 2005 as ‘Africa Year’, and 2006 as ‘Latin America Year’ by 
Ankara indicate. Another region wherein Turkey is gradually becoming more active 
is the Far East. As a huge dynamic East Asian market, and a permanent member of 
the United Nations (UN) Security Council, China appears to be an actor with which 
close economic and political relations would be beneficial in attaining Turkish 
foreign policy objectives. Thus, again, an analysis of the pace and the trajectory of 
Turkish-Chinese relations becomes imperative. 
     Military relations between Turkey and China, on the other hand, are not on a par 
with political and economic relations as they have lost vigor witnessed in bilateral 
military relations in the middle of 1990s. Although bilateral military relations 
                                               
3
 Jasper Becker, Ejder Şahlanıyor: Bugünkü Çin’e İçeriden Bir Bakış [Dragon Rising: An Inside Look 
at China Today] (İstanbul: NTV Yayınları, 2007). 
4
 For Chinese activism in the Middle East, see, for example, Geoffrey Kemp, “The East Moves West,” 
The National Interest, Vol. 84 (Summer 2006), pp. 71-77.  For the Central Asia, see, for example, 
Niklas Swanström. “China and Central Asia: A New Great Game or Traditional Vassal Relations?” 
Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 14, No. 45 (November 2005), pp. 569-584. 
5
 F. Stephen Larrabee, “Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No.4 (July-
August 2007), pp. 103-114. 
 4 
between Turkey and China cannot be confined to their cooperation in the 
modernization of armed forces, Chinese and Turkish comprehensive programs 
diligently implemented to modernize their respective armed forces continue to be an 
impetus for the prevalence of bilateral military relations. Chinese military 
modernization has hitherto elicited considerable international concern due to, in part, 
the exponential increases in annual Chinese defense budgets and, in part, annual 
reports of the US Department of Defense on ‘the military power of the People’s 
Republic of China’, which more often than not designate Chinese military 
modernization efforts as dangers, or at least obstacles, to regional, if not 
international, peace and stability.6 Turkish military modernization has also gained 
momentum in recent years. Even though indigenous development has been 
promoted, international cooperation still constitutes a crucial element in yielding 
favorable results foreseen in official documents.7 Accordingly, an analysis of the 
current situation in bilateral military relations between Ankara and Beijing would be 
helpful in not only revealing and understanding the dynamics of Turkish military 
relations, the desire to achieve a rapid military modernization being a prominent one, 
but also in anticipating the future developments in Turkish-Chinese bilateral military 
relations.  
     Bearing in mind the points stated above, this thesis has three purposes. First, it 
propounds an analytical framework for the analysis of a state’s military relations. 
Second, this thesis makes an inclusive examination of bilateral relations between 
                                               
6
 On Chinese military modernization, see, for example, David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s 
Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). For the 
annual reports of the US Department of Defense from 2002 to 2006, see, “Annual Report to Congress: 
Military Power of the People's Republic of China,” The US Department of Defense, 
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/china.html.  
7
 Savunma Sanayi Müsteşarlığı [Undersecretariat for Defense Industries], “Stratejik Öncelikler 
[Strategic Priorities],” 2007-2011 Stratejik Plan [2007-2011 Strategic Plan], 
http://www.ssm.gov.tr/TR/kurumsal/Documents/SP/sto.html. 
  
 5 
Turkey and China, mainly in the post-Cold War era. Third, it scrutinizes bilateral 
military relations between Turkey and China, within the analytical framework 
propounded in the first section. Thus, this thesis is mainly composed of a theoretical 
discussion, a descriptive examination, and a case study.   
     Chapter 1 is a theoretical discussion. First, it describes the traditional framework 
employed for the analyses of bilateral relations wherein bilateral military relations 
are also examined. This traditional framework is composed of, and implicitly or 
explicitly divided into, four categories, i.e. political relations, economic relations, 
military relations, and social and cultural relations. Second, it introduces an 
analytical framework, which comprises again four categories, i.e. formal military 
relations, operational military relations, technical military relations, and 
organizational military relations. These four categories constitute a state’s foreign 
military relations. 
     Chapter 2 discusses basic characteristics of Turkish foreign policy, which 
constitute the primary and overarching framework for any analysis of any facet of 
Turkish foreign policy. Such a discussion is essential as military relations of a state 
are rather embedded in its general foreign policy. First, fundamental objectives of 
Turkish foreign policy are specified, and the security conception of Turkey is 
discussed. Second, basic parameters of Turkish foreign policy are pointed out. Third, 
players central to the formation and implementation of Turkish foreign policy are 
indicated.  
     Chapter 3 is a descriptive examination of bilateral relations between Turkey and 
China in political, economic, and social and cultural spheres. The main argument 
advanced here is the existence of low level of relations between the two countries; 
additionally, the basic causes that have inhibited the improvement of bilateral 
 6 
relations to higher levels are identified. First, bilateral political relations are to be 
discussed. Issues of convergence and issues of divergence observed in bilateral 
political relations are to be highlighted. Second, bilateral economic relations are to be 
examined stressing again the factors adversely affecting the development of 
economic relations between Ankara and Beijing. Third, social and cultural relations 
between Turkey and China are to be assessed.  
     Chapter 4, which is the case study, is an examination of bilateral military relations 
between China and Turkey within the general framework of Turkish military 
relations established in the first chapter. The main argument set forward in this 
chapter is that the low level of development witnessed in other realms of bilateral 
relations is also noticeable for bilateral military relations between the two states. 
First, bilateral military relations between two states are examined with reference to 
each of the four categories that constitute a state’s foreign military relations. Second, 
factors that have been influential in the improvement of bilateral military relations, 
and other factors that have so far curbed the level of this improvement are discussed.  
     Conclusion summarizes the main points explained and clarified throughout the 
study. Subsequently, it highlights some additional points. First, it underlines that 
which of the main actors of Turkish foreign policy will advance Turkey’s relations 
with China in the future is a crucial issue that is waiting to be clarified by Turkish 
scholars and policymakers. Second, it contends that the future of Turkey’s relations 
with China seems to be inauspicious since geopolitics is not just as ‘will and 
representation’ but it is rather as ‘will, representation, and capability’. Third, it points 
out that diverging positions and policies of Turkey and China on issues of common 
concern could probably bedevil their relations in the future. Fourth, it stresses that it 
would be vital for Turkey to bolster its somewhat dormant relations with South 
 7 
Korea and Japan since close relations with South Korea and especially Japan could 
strengthen the position of Turkey in its relations with China. And, it concludes. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
BILATERAL MILITARY RELATIONS: AN ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
     Bilateral military relations between two states are in general examined in two 
different ways; either an exclusive analysis directly related to military relations 
between two states is set forth or bilateral military relations is examined within a 
general framework employed to examine bilateral relations between two states. This 
analytical framework is composed of, and implicitly or explicitly divided into, four 
categories, i.e. political relations, economic relations, military relations, and social 
and cultural relations.  
     In this chapter, first, a particular dimension of the exclusive analyses directly 
related to bilateral military relations is to be presented, which is the presence of 
peculiar contexts in each study. These peculiar contexts are constituted by general 
bilateral relations between two specific states in a particular period of time. Second, 
the traditional framework generally employed for the analyses of bilateral relations, 
wherein bilateral military relations are also examined, is to be discussed. Third, as a 
case study, the way this traditional framework is applied to the analyses of Turkish-
Chinese relations is to be examined. Consequently, another analytical framework, 
 9 
which comprises again four categories, i.e. formal military relations, operational 
military relations, technical military relations, and organizational military relations is 
to be introduced.  
 
2. 1. Bilateral Military Relations: The Traditional Analytical 
Framework 
     Without special consideration to analytical frameworks, a state’s military relations 
with another state, or even with a region,8 can be examined. In fact, it is.9 Although 
an analytical framework is not employed in these studies, they are not devoid of any 
context in which bilateral military relations are analyzed. There usually exists a tacit 
context within which bilateral military relations are examined.10 This context is in 
nature peculiar to relations between two specific states, and in general is limited to a 
particular time frame.11 In other words, in these studies, general bilateral relations 
between two states in a particular period of time appear to constitute a tacit context 
wherein bilateral military relations are analyzed. However, so as to achieve a 
thorough analysis which entails a broader context, two factors are also incorporated 
                                               
8
 Kenneth W. Allen, “China’s Foreign Military Relations with Asia-Pacific,” Journal of 
Contemporary China, Vol. 10, No. 29 (2001), pp. 645-662; Rachel Utley, “Franco-African Military 
Relations: Meeting the Challenges of Globalization?” Modern &Contemporary France, Vol. 13, No. 
1 (February 2005), pp. 25-40.  
9
 For studies on contemporary bilateral military relations, see, for example, Sarah E. Mendelson, 
“U.S.-Russian Military Relations: Between Friend and Foe,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 
1 (Winter 2002), pp. 161-172; Renato Cruz de Castro, “The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security 
Relations,” Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 6 (2003), pp. 971-988; Kurt Campbell and Richard Weitz, 
“The Limits of U.S.-China Military Cooperation: Lessons from 1995-1999,” The Washington 
Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Winter 2005-06), pp. 169-186; Christopher T. Holinger, “Improving 
Military-to-Military Relations with Russia,” Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 45, Second Quarter (2007), 
pp. 58-61.   
10
 Yet, in some studies, the first chapter is devoted to describe the context wherein bilateral military 
relations take place. See, for example, Leonid I. Polyakov, U.S.-Ukraine Military Relations and the 
Value of Interoperability (Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), pp. 3-21,  
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB590.pdf. 
11
 See, for example, Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Broadening Philippine-Australia Defense Relations in the 
Post 9/11 Era: Issues and Prospects,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2003), pp. 473-
488; Jing-Dong Yuan, “Sino-US Military Relations since Tiananmen: Restoration, Progress, and 
Pitfalls,” Parameters, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 51-67. 
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into analyses in these studies. One is the effects of third parties on bilateral military 
relations between two states, and the other is the effects of non-military issues on 
bilateral military relations between two states.    
     Relations with third parties have always been influential in the emergence, 
development, resurgence, or attenuation of bilateral relations between two states. 
Accordingly, third parties are frequently referred as significant factors in analyses of 
bilateral military relations. For example, while examining US-Taiwan military 
relations Peter Brooks states that “the views of the [Bush] Administration regarding 
the U.S.-Taiwan-PRC [People’s Republic of China] trilateral relationship are an 
important foundation for U.S. defense policy toward Taiwan.”12 On the other hand, 
after enumerating “several potentially momentous developments that suggest…a 
major change in the overall strategic environment in which the U.S.-Japan 
partnership operates,”13  Kurt M. Campbell, in his analysis of US-Japan security 
partnership, indirectly highlights the salience of third parties as important factors in 
bilateral military relations by stating that 
The United States must convince China that it does not seek to contain its 
rise, and it must persuade Japan that Washington will continue to be a reliable 
and steady partner. Japan must convince China that it will sincerely deal with 
the issue of history and persuade the United States that it will continue to 
support the burden of the U.S. forward presence, both materially and 
politically. China must convince the United States that it sees Asia as big 
enough for both of them, now and in the future, and it must accept an 
increased Japanese role in the security affairs of Asia. It is hard to imagine a 
continuing future of peace and stability in Asia unless these three powers can 
negotiate a kind of strategic modus operandi.14 
 
                                               
12
 Peter Brooks, “U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relations in the Bush Administration,” Heritage Lectures, No. 
808 (November 14, 2003), p. 2, 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/upload/52476_1.pdf. Emphasis is mine. 
13
 Kurt M. Campbell, “Energizing the U.S.-Japan Security Partnership,” The Washington Quarterly, 
Vol. 23, No. 4 (Autumn 2000), pp. 125-134, p. 128. 
14
 Ibid., p. 130. Emphasis in original. 
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In short, the relations of two states with other parties serve to constitute a tacit 
context in which these relations take place, and are analyzed. 
     The second factor incorporated into the analyses of bilateral military relations is 
non-military issues. Even tough the emphasis is invariably on military relations, 
political and economic dimensions of bilateral relations are frequently referred so 
long as, expectedly, they are instrumental in buttressing arguments pertaining to 
military relations. For instance, explaining the emergence of military-to-military 
relations between South Korea and Japan marked by, for example, the first defense 
summit in May 1996 and the first joint search-and-rescue exercise in 1999, Jason U. 
Manosevitz asserts that “security cooperation for Japan and South Korea is neither 
country-specific nor designed for containment [of North Korea] nor rooted in shared 
comprehensive political objectives.”15 Instead, “effectively policing the waters where 
both have interests” against, for example, the “rise in oil tanker accidents, an increase 
that was wrecking havoc on the environment and growing costly” has been the prime 
motive for their naval cooperation and air force agreement. 16  In short, shared 
economic concerns serve to form a basis on which military cooperation between 
South Korea and Japan has emerged.  
     A noticeable feature of the exclusive analyses directly related to bilateral military 
relations is the absence of an explicit and a universally valid contextualization in 
them. Each context in these analyses is in nature peculiar to relations between two 
specific states, in general is limited to a particular period of time, and incorporates 
different third parties and various non-military issues. Accordingly, each context 
becomes unique. Notwithstanding their explanatory power, the presence of ad hoc 
contexts in each study would render any study inchoate since, basically, they do not 
                                               
15
 Jason U. Manosevitz, “Japan and South Korea: Security Relations Reach Adolescence,” Asian 
Survey, Vol. 43, No. 5 (2003), pp. 801-825, p. 813. 
16
 Ibid., p. 813, p. 816. 
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provide universally valid analytical frameworks in which changes in contexts can 
also be traced and examined.  
     On the other hand, an explicit and universally valid analytical framework is 
traditionally employed to examine bilateral relations between two states, wherein 
bilateral military relations are also examined. This analytical framework is composed 
of, and implicitly or explicitly divided into, four categories, i.e. political relations, 
economic relations, military relations, and social and cultural relations. It should be 
emphasized here that this traditional analytical framework is not employed for the 
analysis of bilateral military relations per se but it is a general framework wherein 
bilateral military relations between two states are also examined. It should also be 
noted that one or two of the categories of bilateral relations are sometimes omitted in 
analyses of bilateral relations between two states.17 
     The traditional framework can be implicitly applied to analyses of bilateral 
relations through the examination of each sort of relations in the continuation of the 
text instead of discussing each kind of relations in distinct consecutive sections.18 
That is, military, economic and social relations are indeed given attention and 
examined but usually treated as epiphenomenal to political relations. This implicit 
and quite nebulous categorization seems to be the result of the fact that the trajectory 
of the bilateral relations is mainly set by political relations and, economic and 
military relations are generally referred to explain certain aspects of political 
relations. For example, bilateral military relations between Turkey and the USA are 
                                               
17
 There seem to be three main reasons for omissions. First, the writer seems to consider a particular 
sort of relations negligible for the sake of the argument at hand. Second, a particular sort of relations 
does not exist indeed. And third, the writer himself is negligent. 
18
 See, for example, Çağrı Erhan, “Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin Mantıksal Çerçevesi [ The Logical 
Framework of Turkey-USA Relations],” in İdris Bal, ed., 21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası [Turkish 
Foreign Policy in the 21st Century] (Ankara: 2006, Ankara Global Araştırmalar Merkezi), pp. 139-
151;  Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, “Türk-Rus İlişkileri: Düşmanlıktan Fiili Yakınlaşma’ya [Turkish-Russian 
Relations: From Enmity to De Facto Rapprochement],” in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı, eds., 
Türkiye’nin Yeni Dünyası: Türk Dış Politikasının Değişen Dinamikleri [Turkey’s New World: 
Changing Dynamics of Turkish Foreign Policy] (İstanbul: 2002, Alfa Yayınları), pp. 125-156.   
 13 
referred by George Harris in his analysis of US-Turkish relations, first, as a possible 
source of friction, then as a reason for the continuation of the Turkish-US alliance, 
and finally a likely setback in the realm of security cooperation in the future.19  
     On the other hand, explicit application of the traditional framework to analyses of 
bilateral relations between states, that is, dividing bilateral relations into separate 
categories and discussing each kind of relations in distinct consecutive sections, is 
not rare.20 It appears that the traditional framework is explicitly employed in cases 
where bilateral relations between two states are not so developed and complicated, 
and it is relatively easy to draw lines between different realms of relations.  
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19
 George Haris, “A.B.D. – Türkiye İlişkileri [The USA-Turkey Relations],” in Alan Makovsky and 
Sabri Sayarı, eds., Türkiye’nin Yeni Dünyası: Türk Dış Politikasının Değişen Dinamikleri [Turkey’s 
New World: Changing Dynamics of Turkish Foreign Policy] (İstanbul: 2002, Alfa Yayınları), pp. 
255-273, p. 263, pp. 267-268, p. 271-272. 
20
 See, for example, Yaşar Kalafat and Araz Aslanlı, “Türkiye-Azerbaycan İlişkileri [Turkey-
Azerbaijan Relations],” in İdris Bal, ed., 21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası [Turkish Foreign Policy in 
the 21st Century] (Ankara: 2006, Ankara Global Araştırmalar Merkezi), pp. 407-424; Genelkurmay 
ATASE ve Denetleme Başkanlığı [Presidency of ATASE and Supervision of Chief of Staff], Tarihte 
Türk-Rumen İlişkileri [Turkish- Romanian Relations in History] (Ankara: 2006, Genelkurmay 
Basımevi), pp. 168-176; Okan Mert, Türkiye’nin Kafkasya Politikası ve Gürcistan [Turkey’s Caucasia 
Policy and Georgia] (İstanbul: 2004, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık), pp. 252-264;; Atay Akdevelioğlu 
and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, “İran’la İlişkiler [Relations with Iran],” in Baskın Oran, ed., Türk Dış 
Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar [Turkish Foreign Policy: Facts, 
Documents, Observations since the War of Liberation], Vol. 2 (İstanbul: 2005, İletişim Yayınları), pp. 
579-586. 
 14 
 
 
 
Figure I: The Traditional Analytical Framework in Which Bilateral Military 
Relations are Examined 
A: Foreign Policy of State X 
B: Bilateral Relations between States X and Y 
C: Bilateral Military Relations between States X and Y 
 
     There are two main advantages of the traditional analytical framework for 
analyses of bilateral military relations. First, since it is composed of all realms of 
bilateral relations, the traditional analytical framework is appropriate to indicate the 
interplay among these realms, which is frequently influential in bilateral military 
relations between two states. For example, political relations between Turkey and 
France were severely strained in the fall of 2006 when the lower chamber of the 
French Parliament, the French National Assembly, passed a controversial bill on 
October 12, 2006, which sanctioned imprisonment and a fine for the ‘denial’ of the 
so-called Armenian ‘genocide’ of 1915. 21  Ensuing political tension subsequently 
culminated in the suspension of military relations with France as General İlker 
Başbuğ announced one month later.22 As a further “concrete response”, the Turkish 
Ministry of Defense did not invite Michele Alliot Maire, the then French Minister of 
Defense,  to the eight International Defense Fair (IDEF 2007), which were to take 
                                               
21
 For the original text of the bill, see, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/ta/ta0610.asp. “Threat to 
Free Speech,” Financial Times, October 13, 2006, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/be916c64-5a57-11db-8f16-0000779e2340.html?nclick_check=1. 
22
 “Turkey Suspends Military Ties with France over Armenian Genocide Bill,” International Herald 
Tribune, November 15, 2006, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/11/15/europe/EU_GEN_Turkey_France_Military.php. 
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place in May 2007 in Ankara.23 In sum, understanding developments in bilateral 
military relations between two states requires at least a quick glimpse at the bilateral 
political relations, which the traditional analytical framework provides.  
     Second, since it is composed of all realms of bilateral relations, the traditional 
analytical framework is suitable to reveal the imbalances between the levels of 
different sorts of relations. For example, sporadic disputes notwithstanding, political 
relations between Ankara and Washington are advanced enough to make US 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice proclaim that there is a “tremendously strong 
friendship” and a “strategic relationship” between Washington and Ankara and issue 
a statement of the strategic vision for Turkish-US relations.24 Economic relations, on 
the other hand, are not rosy. In the words of Mark Parris, an erstwhile US 
ambassador to Turkey from 1997-2000, “mutual investment in bilateral trade and 
investment that was one of the prime movers behind ‘strategic partnership’ in the 
nineties is missing in action,” and stagnation in bilateral commerce prevails. 25 
Concurring with Parris, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has recently 
dubbed the trade volume between two countries ‘ridiculous’.26 Military relations are 
of paramount import in Turkish-US relations since, inter alia, “the US has been the 
leading supplier of defense goods and services to Turkey,” a relationship that has 
                                               
23
 Aydın Hasan, “Fransız Bakan Fuara Çağrılmadı [French Minister was not Called to the Fair],” 
Milliyet, November 17, 2006, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/11/17/siyaset/siy03.html. Yet, the 
Turkish response cannot amount to a “concrete response” as argued by the reporter since French 
defense companies were allowed to participate in IDEF 2007 and the number of visitors from France 
was the second highest after Germany. See the official web page of IDEF 2007, 
http://www.idef07.com/idef.php?main=ist07. 
24
 Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks with Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Gül after Their Meeting,” U.S. 
Department of State, July 5, 2006, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/68577.htm. For the text of 
the statement of the strategic vision, see, “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the 
Turkish-American Strategic Partnership,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/68574.htm. 
25
 Mark Parris, “Allergic Partners: Can US-Turkish Relations be Saved?” Turkish Policy Quarterly, 
Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 2005), pp. 49-57, p. 55. 
26
 Bülent Aydemir, “Statejik Ortağız, 10 Milyar Dolar Ticaret Komik Oluyor [We are Strategic 
Partners, $ 10 Million Trade Happens to be Ridiculous!],” Sabah, September 26, 2007, 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/2007/09/26/haber,FB840855992E4D4A91936B8DC66E4B6D.html. 
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weathered “the end of formal security assistance, periodic crises over arms transfers” 
and Turkish “efforts at diversification.”27 In sum, having incorporated each sort of 
bilateral relations into account, the traditional analytical framework, when applied, 
most probably reveals the evenness of or imbalances between bilateral military 
relations and other bilateral relations as the very brief discussion of Turkish-US 
relations above indicates. 
 
2. 2. The Traditional Analytical Framework: A Case Study      
     Turkish-Chinese relations have yet to advance to a full-fledged phase of bilateral 
relationship and thus, scholars generally opt to apply the traditional framework to 
analyses of bilateral relations between Turkey and China by examining political, 
economic, military, and social and cultural relations in separate consecutive 
sections. 28  Accordingly, analyses of Turkish-Chinese relations provide clear 
distinctions to identify the subjects discussed and examined in these separate 
sections.     
      The first issue discussed under political relations is generally the development of 
historical relations between Turkey and China, usually starting with the 
establishment of the first Turkish diplomatic mission in Nanjing in 1929, which 
culminated in the official recognition of the People’s Republic of China by Turkey 
                                               
27
 F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (Santa 
Monica: RAND Corporation, 2003), p. 172 
28
 See, for example, Nuraniye Hidayet Ekrem, Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti Dış Politikası (1950-2000) 
[Foreign Policy of People’s Republic of China (1950-2000)] (Ankara: 2003, ASAM Yayınları), pp. 
160-182; Barış Adıbelli, Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Türk-Çin İlişkileri [Turkish-Chinese Relations since 
the Ottoman Empire] (İstanbul: 2007, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık), pp. 238-277; John C. K. Daly, 
“Sino-Turkish Relations Beyond the Silk Road,” China Brief, Vol. 7, No. 4 (February 21, 2007), pp. 
10-13; Reşat Arım, “Çin: Uzak Doğu’nun Yükselen Gücü ve Türkiye [China: Rising Power of the Far 
East],” in İhsan D. Dağı, Türk Dış Politikasında Gelenek ve Değişim [Tradition and Change in 
Turkish Foreign Policy](Ankara: 1998, Siyasal Kitabevi), pp. 115-127, pp-126-127. 
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on August 4, 1971.29 Subsequently, reciprocal high level visits of state officials are 
specified. Statements of state leaders are usually discussed as indications of official 
state policies on issues of common concern.30 In addition, protocols and agreements 
on political matters signed and ratified by the two states are also specified. 
Furthermore, several issues that have influenced the development of bilateral 
relations and that will probably affect the future of these relations are examined. 
Among them are the question of East Turkestan-Xinjiang and Chinese response to 
Turkish treatment of the subject, the future of Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) and Chinese activism in the Central Asia, the procurement and transfer of the 
energy resources of the Central Asia and the Caspian Basin, and finally the prospects 
of cooperation on international issues, such as international terrorism and the 
proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction.31  
     Economic relations pertain to the issues of bilateral trade between Turkey and 
China, and reciprocal investments in respective economies. First, as constituents of 
the legal framework of bilateral economic relations between Turkey and China, 
protocols and agreements signed on economic matters are specified. 32  The 
development of bilateral trade with a mounting trade deficit for Turkey is always 
scrutinized. Turkish exports to China and Turkish imports from China are examined 
                                               
29
 Till 1971, Turkey officially recognized the Republic of China located in Taiwan and led by Chinese 
Nationalist Party, or the Kuomintang of China (KMT) as the sole representative of the Chinese 
Nation. See, Nuraniye H, Ekrem, “Türkiye-Çin İlişkilerinin Boyutları ve Engelleri [Dimensions and 
Setbacks of Turkey-China Relations],” Stratejik Analiz, Vol. 1, No. 1 (May 2000), pp. 11-14, p. 11. 
30
 As an example, for a detailed discussion of the visit and statements of the previous Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin to Turkey, see, Barış Adıbelli, Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Türk-Çin İlişkileri 
[Turkish-Chinese Relations since the Ottoman Empire], pp. 223-230. 
31
 See, for example, R. Kutay Karaca, Dünyadaki Yeni Güç: Çin [New Power in the World: China] 
(İstanbul: 2004, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık), pp. 179-188. Also, see,  Wang Youming, “Çin ve 
Türkiye Arasındaki Siyasi İlişkiler [Political Relations between China and Turkey],” in Atilla 
Sandıklı, Elnur Osmanov, Ufuk Tepebaş, Arzu Yorkan, eds., Türkiye ve Asya Ülkeleri: Siyasi ve 
Ekonomik İlişkiler [Turkey and the States of Asia: Political and Economic Relations] (İstanbul: 2006, 
Tasam Yayınları), pp. 255-258. However, the writer surprisingly does not refer to the issue of 
Uyghurs in relations neither as a source of conflict nor as an area of cooperation.  
32
 See, for example, Nuraniye Hidayet Ekrem, Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti Dış Politikası [Foreign Policy of 
People’s Republic of China], p. 168-169. However, the list seems to be carelessly prepared as it also 
includes agreements on tourism, sanitation, and culture.  
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on yearly basis, and the progress in the balance of trade is pointed out.33 In some 
studies, the main chapters of imports and exports, and their proportions to total 
volume of imports and exports are also discussed in detail.34  
     On the other hand, bilateral direct investment, meager as it may be in comparison 
with the total trade volume between the two states, is pointed out.35  Moreover, 
several issues that have influenced the development of bilateral economic relations 
and that will probably affect the future of these relations are highlighted. Among 
them are the intense competition between the Turkish industry and the Chinese 
industry for the marketing of similar goods and products in both the Turkish market 
and the global market, China’s WTO membership and its implications for the future 
of Turkish economy especially for the textile industry, the setbacks militating against 
the development of bilateral economic and commercial relations, and finally the 
probable areas of economic cooperation between Turkey and China.36 
     The bulk of the bilateral military relations between Ankara and Beijing is 
constituted by reciprocal visits of military personnel. In general, visits of the Turkish 
and Chinese chiefs of general staff, generals from different branches of the armed 
forces, and delegations that are composed of military personnel from various 
echelons and institutions of respective armed forces, particularly military academies, 
are discussed. So are the remarks of these visiting personnel on issues of common 
                                               
33
 Atilla Sandıklı and İlhan Güllü, “Gelişen Çin Ekonomisi ve Türk Dış Ticaretine Etkileri 
[Developing Chinese Economy and Its Impacts on Turkish Foreign Trade],” in Atilla Sandıklı and 
İlhan Güllü, eds., Geleceğin Süper Gücü Çin: Uzakdoğu’daki Entegrasyonlar ve Şangay İşbirliği 
Örgütü [Superpower of the Future, China: Integrations in the Far East and Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization] (İstanbul: TASAM Yayınları, 2005), pp. 289-320, pp. 311. 
34
 See, for example, R. Kutay Karaca, Dünyadaki Yeni Güç: Çin [New Power in the World: China], 
pp. 188-194. 
35
 Mehmet Öğütçü, Yükselen Asya [Asia Rising] (Ankara: 1998, İmge Kitabevi), p. 137; John C. K. 
Daly, “Sino-Turkish Relations Beyond the Silk Road,” pp. 10-13, p. 11. 
36
 See, for example, Çağdaş Üngör, “Yakın Tarihten Bir Uzaklık Öyküsü: Türkiye-Çin İlişkileri [A 
Story of Distance from Recent History: Turkey-China Relations],” in Atilla Sandıklı, Elnur Osmanov, 
Ufuk Tepebaş, Arzu Yorkan, eds., Türkiye ve Asya Ülkeleri: Siyasi ve Ekonomik İlişkiler [Turkey and 
the States of Asia: Political and Economic Relations] (İstanbul: 2006, Tasam Yayınları), pp. 343-352, 
pp. 346-348; Mehmet Öğütçü, “Turkey and China,” Perceptions, Vol. 1, No. 3 (September/November 
1996), p. 155-179, pp. 164-179. 
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concern during the meetings. 37  Besides, bilateral military relations on defense 
production and procurement, and educational exchanges of military personnel 
between military schools of Turkish and Chinese armed forces are indicated.38 Issues 
that have influenced the development of bilateral military relations and that will 
probably affect the future of these relations are also discussed. Among them are the 
low level of bilateral relations in general, the dependence of Chinese military 
technology on foreign sources, mainly Russian, that is, its inadequacy to provide 
state-of-the-art military technology, and finally the advantageous position of other 
sources, mainly Western, as producers and suppliers of cutting-the-edge weapon 
systems required for the modernization of Turkish armed forces.39   
     Social and cultural relations are limited to a small number of subjects. Reciprocal 
visits of Turkish and Chinese ministers of culture, agreements on cultural exchanges 
between Turkey and China, educational exchanges between the two countries, the 
presence of a few departments of Chinese and Turkish languages in their respective 
universities, and the declaration of sister cities in Turkey and China are all pointed 
out under social and cultural relations.40  
 
2. 3. Bilateral Military Relations: Another Analytical Framework 
     In general, a state engages in a myriad of relations of military nature with other 
states and, also with international organizations. Viewed in their entirety, these 
                                               
37
 See, for example, Barış Adıbelli, Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Türk-Çin İlişkileri [Turkish-Chinese 
Relations since the Ottoman Empire], pp. 270-275. 
38
 John C. K. Daly, “Sino-Turkish Relations Beyond the Silk Road,” p. 12; Barış Adıbelli, 
Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Türk-Çin İlişkileri [Turkish-Chinese Relations since the Ottoman Empire], 
pp. 268-269, p. 275. 
39
 Armağan Kuloğlu, “Geleceğin Güç Odağı Çin ve Bu Ülkenin Türkiye ile Olan İlişkileri [China, the 
Power Center of the Future, and the Relations of This Country with Turkey],” Global Strateji, Vol. 3, 
No. 11 (Sonbahar 2007), pp. 49-57, pp. 53-54 
40
 Reşat Arım, “Çin: Uzak Doğu’nun Yükselen Gücü ve Türkiye [China: Rising Power of the Far East 
and Turkey],” p. 127; Nuraniye Hidayet Ekrem, Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti Dış Politikası [Foreign Policy 
of People’s Republic of China], p. 169; Çağdaş Üngör, “Yakın Tarihten Bir Uzaklık Öyküsü: Türkiye-
Çin İlişkileri [A Story of Distance from Recent History: Turkey-China Relations],” pp. 350-351. 
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relations constitute a state’s foreign military relations.41 A framework for analyses of 
bilateral military relations can be devised by segregating the entirety of a state’s 
foreign military relations into four categories according to their distinctive subject 
matters. These four categories can be called as formal military relations, operational 
military relations, technical military relations, and organizational military relations.  
     Formal military relations constitute the general foundations of bilateral military 
relations and determine the contours of their official conduct. The establishment of a 
military/defense attaché office as a part of a state’s diplomatic mission abroad seems 
to represent a strong political will to forge bilateral military relations with another 
state. It is a threshold below which it is rather difficult to speak of genuine bilateral 
military relations. On the other hand, a variety of agreements between two states 
dealing with matters of military nature, or simply military agreements, officially 
define the areas of cooperation between two states, and thus, as starting points, 
determine main routes for the conduct of military relations in the future. Besides, 
reciprocal visits between two states of senior military personnel from high-ranking 
officer cadres of their armed forces, together with the visits of delegations of low 
profile from different branches of armed forces, constitute the principal conduit for 
military-to-military contacts. Finally, indicative of a higher level of interaction 
between two armed forces, student exchanges between military education institutions 
of two states can be considered under formal military relations.42  
                                               
41
 Even though ‘external military relations’ as a phrase used in some academic studies and official 
documents to denote the entirety of a state’s military relations with other states and international 
organizations, the usage of ‘foreign military relations’ seems to be more common. See, for example, 
Kenneth W. Allen and Eric A. McVadon, China’s Foreign Military Relations (Washington DC: 1999, 
Henry L. Stimson Center); Björn Hagelin, “Military Dependency: Thailand and the Philippines,” 
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 25, No. 4 (December 1988). The Federal Research Division of the 
US Library of Congress also uses ‘foreign military relations’ in several of its country profiles, such as 
Bulgaria, Philippines, Romania, Sudan and Turkey. See, http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/.  Following 
these examples, the phrase ‘foreign military relations’ is to be used throughout this text. 
42
 Other kinds of interaction between military forces of two states are dismissed here as they are 
deemed of symbolic value. These are, for instance, establishment of military hotlines, exchanges 
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     Cooperative or conflictual relations between two states that involve the 
employment of weapon systems constitute operational military relations.43 Port visits 
of a state’s naval warships to another state signify a certain level of cordial military 
relations between these two states, and thus deserve close attention. 44 In addition, the 
conduct of bilateral joint military exercises with the active participation of military 
units from the armed forces of two states continues to be an integral part of military 
cooperation between states. Finally, military installations established in the territory 
of a particular state but appropriated for the use of the military forces of another one 
through agreements have been an enduring component of bilateral military relations 
among several states.   
     Bilateral military relations between two states that pertain to the military 
modernization of the armed forces of at least one of the two states constitute 
technical military relations. For the purposes of their military modernizations, states 
may opt for direct procurement of military equipment from foreign sources, unless 
they indigenously or collaboratively manufacture it. In addition, states may prefer 
establishing due mechanisms to manufacture military hardware of common or 
individual need through cooperative projects with one another as well. 
     Relations of states with international organizations in military matters that are 
directly related to the states’ internal or external military affairs constitute 
                                                                                                                                     
between army museums, and sports contests among armed forces of countries. As examples, for sports 
activities of Turkish Armed Forces, see, http://www.tsk.mil.tr/cism/eng/index.htm. For, Armed Forces 
Sports Program of the US Department of Defense, see, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/armedforcessports/index.html.  
43
 Any discussion of conflictual military relations, or hot conflicts, between two states is beyond the 
extent of this work, and thus omitted. 
44
 Trivial as it may seem, port visits do occasionally come to the front in international politics due to 
several reasons. A prominent one is the convenience of port visits to convey implicit messages to a 
specific audience. For example, by dispatching the USS Missouri to Turkey on March 22, 1946, which 
carried the remains of Turkish Ambassador Münir Ertegün aboard, “Washington had not so subtly 
reminded the Soviet Union and others that the United States was a great military power and that it 
could project this power abroad, even to shores far distant.” See, Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. 
Kaplan, “U.S. Military Forces as a Political Instrument Since World War II,” Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 94, No. 2 (Summer 1979), pp. 193-209, p. 3. This point is to be further discussed in 
chapter 3.   
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organizational military relations.45 More to the point, engaging in a relationship with 
another state, particularly in military matters, under the aegis or within the 
framework of international organizations appears to exert noticeable influences on a 
state’s bilateral relations, in general, and bilateral military relations, in particular, 
with another state.46  In short, organizational military relations have two aspects: 
relations of a state with a specific international organization, and relations of a state 
with another state within specific international organizations. 
 
Table I: Foreign Military Relations: A Typology  
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 Military Agreements 
 Visits of Military Personnel 
 Exchanges between Military Education Institutions 
                                               
45
 For example, UN Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Mine-Ban Convention), or simply Ottawa Treaty, 
effects a state’s both internal and external military affairs as it proscribes, on the one hand, the usage, 
development, production, stockpiling, retainment and, on the other hand, procurement and transfer of 
anti-personnel mines. For the full text of the Convention, see, http://disarmament2.un.org/rdb/apm-
mbc-text.html.  
46
 With respect to the common membership of two states whose bilateral military relations are 
examined, international organizations taken into consideration may change. In other words, while for 
an analysis of Chinese-Israeli military relations United Nations (UN) is taken into account, for 
Chinese-Russian military relations Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is taken into account in 
addition to the UN. The point is to be further discussed in chapter 3. 
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     It is worth propounding this analytical framework for analyses of bilateral 
military relations for three primary reasons. First, by segregating the entirety of a 
state’s foreign military relations and plainly identifying each and every possible 
realm of its bilateral military relations with another state, this analytical framework 
enables the researcher to define and describe each sort of existing military relations 
between two states, and thereby expose the exact nature of their military relations. 
                                               
♣
 As indicated earlier, hot conflicts between two states are not to be discussed here. 
♠
 Universal membership, with a few exceptions like Taiwan, entails the incorporation of the UN in all 
analyses of foreign military relations of a state or bilateral military relations between two states. X and 
Y denote other international organizations to which any two states whose bilateral military relations 
are discussed are common members  
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Against the possibility of neglecting some facets of bilateral military relations 
between two states for the sake of a specific argument set forth in an analysis, this 
analytical framework constrains the researcher to take each sort of relations into 
consideration and, thus induces him to achieve and present a rigorous account of 
bilateral military relations between two states. 
       Second, situating bilateral military relations in a state’s foreign military 
relations, this analytical framework provides the opportunity to discern the precise 
level of bilateral military relations of a state. In other words, for example, the type, 
number and content of military agreements of state X with state Y can be compared 
to all the military agreements of state X. Hence, a quite clear picture of the level of 
military relations between state X and Y, albeit with regard to military agreements. 
By the same token, this analytical framework is suitable for comparative analyses of 
bilateral military relations. The type, number and content of military agreements of 
state X with state Y can be compared to type, number and content of military 
agreements of state X with state Z. In so doing, the relative level of state X’s military 
relations with state Y vis-à-vis state Z can be manifested, again albeit with regard to 
military agreements. 
     Third, this analytical framework incorporates relations of a state in military 
matters with international organizations to analyses of a state’s foreign military 
relations. Therefore, it paves the way for detecting the effects of these relations on 
bilateral military relations between two states. Simply, for instance, Ankara’s 
relations with NATO have repercussions for its bilateral military relations with 
another member of NATO. In short, the implications of common membership to 
international organizations need to be considered to achieve a panoptic analysis of 
military relations between two states.   
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Figure II: The Analytical Framework in Which Bilateral Military Relations can be 
Examined 
A: Foreign Policy of State X 
B: Foreign Military Relations of State X 
C: Bilateral Military Relations between States X and Y 
 
     Capitalizing on the advantages of both analytical frameworks, this thesis employs 
a concentric method in its analysis of bilateral military relations between Turkey and 
China. The second chapter delineates the basic characteristics of Turkish foreign 
policy. The third chapter examines bilateral relations between the two states 
excluding military relations. The fourth chapter analyzes bilateral military relations 
between Turkey and China wherein bilateral military relations between Ankara and 
Beijing are situated in the general context of Turkish military relations through 
employing the typology propounded above.     
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CHAPTER III 
 
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: A GENERAL SURVEY 
 
 
 
     Foreign military relations of a state are essentially embedded in its foreign policy. 
For example, the nexus between Turkish foreign policy and its bilateral military 
relations is made evident when İlker Başbuğ, Commander of the Turkish Land 
Forces, stated in June 2007 during his visit to Beijing that “there is a great similarity 
between Turkey and China in assessing the problems of the world,” and “there is a 
great similarity between the threats and risks” faced by both Turkey and China.47 The 
implication in these words seems to be that convergence in basic foreign policy 
attitudes of Turkey and China is favorable to the development of their military 
relations. As a corollary, it seems indispensable to elucidate, at the very least, the 
basic characteristics of a state’s foreign policy for a profound analysis of its bilateral 
military relations.  
      This chapter presents a descriptive general survey of Turkish foreign policy, 
which constitutes the primary and overarching framework for an analysis of Turkish 
                                               
47
 Barış Adıbelli, “Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanı Başbuğ’un Çin Ziyareti [Visit of the Commander of 
Land Forces Başbuğ to China],” Cumhuriyet Strateji (July 2, 2007), quoted in 
http://www.kemalistpolitika.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=142. To Adıbelli, 
Başbuğ’s stress on convergent attitudes of Turkey and China in international politics “demonstrates 
that Turkish Armed Forces has employed a multilateral opening [policy] in the military sphere.” See, 
Ibid.  Also see, “Çin ile Türkiye’nin Düşmanı Aynı [Enemy of China and Enemy of Turkey are the 
Same],” Aydınlık, No. 1038 (June 10, 2007), pp. 4-5. 
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foreign military relations. First, fundamental objectives of Turkish foreign policy are 
specified, and the security conception of Turkey is discussed. Second, basic 
parameters of Turkish foreign policy are pointed out. Third, players central to the 
formation and implementation of Turkish foreign policy are indicated.  
 
3. 1. Objectives of Turkish Foreign Policy 
     An apparent consensus on how and according to which criteria the objectives of 
foreign policy are categorized has yet to be achieved in international relations 
literature. 48  According to Kalevi J. Holsti, self-preservation of a political unit, 
defense of areas considered strategically vital, and preservation or realization of 
ethnic, religious, or linguistic unity constitute short-range objectives of a state. On 
the other hand, satisfying welfare demands and needs via international action, 
increasing a state’s prestige in the international system, and material and/or 
ideological self-extension constitute middle-range objectives. Finally, there are long-
range objectives, which are “plans, dreams, and visions concerning the ultimate 
political or ideological organization of the international system, rules governing 
relations in that system, and the role of specific nations within it.”49 On the other 
hand, Kim R. Nossal identifies six main foreign policy objectives. “The classical trio 
of goals” comprises security, wealth, and prestige but it “does not cover all the 
                                               
48
 Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Uluslararası Politika ve Dış Politika Analizi [International Politics and 
Foreign Policy Analysis] (İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 2005), p. 270.  
49
 Kalevi J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (New Jersey: Prentice/Hall 
International, 1977), pp. 138-163, p. 151. However, according to the controversial thesis of Francis 
Fukuyama, that is, the end of history, as a logical conclusion, no state in the international system but 
“the developed states of the West” can aspire to have long-range objectives as, thanks to “the ultimate 
triumph of Western liberal democracy,” a struggle between rival systems is by no means a 
determining tendency of the contemporary era. See, Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” The 
National Interest, (Summer 1989), http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm. Also, see, Francis Fukuyama, 
The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books, Inc., 1992). However, the debate 
continues. For an analysis of global politics of the Chinese efficacious development model and how 
this has rendered it ‘a threat to the West’ because of threatening the US hegemony, see, Randall 
Peerenboom, China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model for the Rest? (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
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important goals and objectives of global actors” since there also are, he asserts, 
independence, justice, and community as foreign policy objectives.50  
     Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs proclaims that “the primary objective of 
Turkish foreign policy is to help secure and nurture a peaceful, stable, prosperous 
and cooperative regional and international environment that is conducive to human 
development at home as well as in the neighboring countries and beyond.” 51 
Likewise, Defense White Paper 2000, published by the Ministry of Defense, posits 
the principle of ‘peace at home, peace in the world’ as the framework for Turkish 
national goals, which are “to establish peaceful principles, to provide stability and to 
realize socioeconomic development in an environment of peace in her region.”52   
     These peaceful declarations notwithstanding, the fundamental objectives and 
duties of the Turkish state, and by extension the Turkish foreign policy, are, 
according to Article 5 of the Turkish Constitution, “to safeguard the independence 
and integrity of the Turkish Nation, the indivisibility of the country, the Republic and 
democracy; to ensure the welfare, peace, and happiness of the individual and 
society.”53 Besides, the same Defense White Paper 2000 also highlights the Turkish 
conception of national security, expressed in Law No. 2945 as “the preservation and 
protection against all kinds of internal and external threats to the constitutional order 
                                               
50
 Kim R. Nossall, The Patterns of World Politics (Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1998), pp. 65-
81. As quoted by Nossall, the classical trio was most succinctly summarized by Thomas Hobbes when 
he claimed that “the principal causes of quarrel between human beings” were competition, diffidence, 
and glory: “The first, maketh men invade for gain; the second for safety; and the third for reputation.” 
See, Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: Touchstone, 1997), p. 99. 
51
 “Synopsis of the Turkish Foreign Policy” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 
17, 2007, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Synopsis/SYNOPSIS.htm. However, the 
Ministry adds later in the text making Turkey an integral part of Europe as the other foreign policy 
objective which, together with the first one, drives “Turkey’s foreign policy vision for the future.” 
See, Ibid.   
52
 “Defense White Paper 2000,” http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Turkey_English2000.pdf. 
53
 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (Ankara: BYEGM Matbaası, 1990), p. 5. In addition to 
these, Article 5 entrusts the Turkish state “to strive for the removal of political, social and economic 
obstacles which restrict the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual in a manner 
incompatible with the principles of justice and of the social state governed by the rule of law; and to 
provide the conditions required for the development of the individual’s material and spiritual 
existence.” Ibid., p. 5. 
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of the state, her national existence, her integrity and all her political, social, cultural 
and economic interests and contractual rights in the international arena.”54  
     The incumbent Turkish government, displaying a desire to implement proactive 
foreign policy, has set “being a regional power and a global actor” which is “an 
arbiter able to drive the developments” as the objective of Turkish foreign policy. It 
states that “the primary condition to achieve this objective is the formation of a circle 
of security and welfare around” Turkey by “consolidating economic, cultural, and 
political bonds with neighboring countries.” 55  In sum, even if there are some 
harbingers of an assertive foreign policy seeking more than security, the ultimate 
objective of Turkish foreign policy, it seems, is the preservation of security through 
peace and stability both at home and in its vicinity.56 That the policies of Turkish 
state to achieve this objective heavily depend on its understanding of security calls 
for a closer examination of Turkey’s security conception.   
 
3.2. Security Conception of Turkey     
     There is no consensus on the focus of interest, that is, the referent point of 
security, in international relations literature. Generally defined, referent objects of 
security “are things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have 
legitimate claim to survival.”57 Therefore, as Brian L. Job argues, “in principle, four 
                                               
54
 For the full text of the Law 2945, see, “Milli Güvenlik Kurulu ve Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel 
Sekreterliği Kanunu [Law of the National Security Council and the Secretariat General of the National 
Security Council],” Resmi Gazete, No. 18218 (November 11, 1983), pp. 3-10, p. 3. 
55
 “60. Hükümet Programı [The Program of the 60th Government],” Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık, 
August 31, 2007, www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/docs/hukumetprg.doc, p. 65. 
56
 The declaration of Turkish General Staff seems to support this conclusion: “Turkey carries out a 
policy [defense] aiming to find a solution to the crises peacefully or to stop the conflicts as well as 
provide fair and permanent peace. To that end, she makes contributions to all activities supporting 
stability.” See, “Turkey’s Defense Policy,” Turkish General Staff, December 30, 2007, 
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/eng/genel_konular/savunmapolitikasi.htm. 
57
 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Vilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: 
Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 36. In other words, “the referent object is that to which one can say, ‘it has 
to survive, therefore it is necessary to…”. Ibid., p. 36.  
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or more distinct securities may be at issue simultaneously: the security of the 
individual citizen, the security of the nation, the security of the regime, and the 
security of the state.”58 
     Even though the Turkish constitution declares “the welfare, peace, and happiness 
of the individual and society” as a referent point of Turkey’s security in addition to 
territorial integrity of the country, independence of the state, and constitutional order 
of the state, the same approach, it seems, has not been endorsed by both the military 
and civilian institutions of the state. Designated for the implementation of Turkish 
defense policy, the military, or specifically the Turkish General Staff, is 
understandably interested in the protection and the preservation of “national 
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and vital interests of the country,” 
excluding non-state referent points of security.59 The incumbent Turkish government, 
on the other hand, has proclaimed that during its first five-year in office it has 
“considered national security of Turkey from a broader perspective and displayed the 
resolution in realizing internal and external security through considering military, 
diplomatic, cultural and societal dimensions of security in its totality.”60 Yet, all the 
referent points of security it refers pertain to the state: indivisible integrity of the 
country, national unity and integrity, unitary nature of the state, boundaries of the 
                                               
58
 Brian L. Job, “The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World,” 
in Brian L. Job, ed., The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 1992), p. 15. 
59
 “Turkey’s Defense Policy,” Turkish General Staff. Still, retired generals of the Turkish military 
forces are inclined to insert non-state referent points of security in their discussions of the security of 
Turkey.  According to Nezihi Çakar, a retired general and advisor of the then President of Turkey 
Süleyman Demirel, referent points of Turkish security include national welfare and security, and 
economic development, in addition to constitutional principles and values, and freedom, independence 
and integrity of the country. See, Nezihi Çakar, “Turkey’s Security Challenges,” Perceptions, Vol. 1, 
No. 2 (June/August 1996), p.20. For Şadi Ergüvenç, a retired brigadier general, “defence of legitimate 
rights, sovereignty and freedoms” is as important as the “protection of territorial and national 
integrity” in constituting the context of “Turkey’s vital security interests.” See, Şadi Ergüvenç, 
“Turkey’s Security Perceptions,” Perceptions, Vol. 3, No. 2 (June-August 1998), pp. 32-42, p. 39. 
60
 “60. Hükümet Programı [The Program of the 60th Government],” Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık, 
p. 13. 
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state, and independence. 61  In short, state, with its attributes, appears to be the 
overriding, if not the only, referent point of security in Turkey’s security policy.   
     Security against what is another question awaiting a unanimous answer in 
international politics. While maintaining the centrality of state as a referent point, a 
broad definition is suggested by Richard H. Ullman: 
A threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) 
threatensdrastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the 
quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to 
narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to 
private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the 
state.62 
 
     Considering what constitutes a threat, the Turkish Constitution seems to adopt a 
broader perspective as well. “An activity contrary to Turkish national interests, the 
principle of the indivisibility of the existence of Turkey with its state and territory, 
Turkish historical and moral values or the nationalism, principles, reforms and 
modernism of Atatürk” seems to provide a general definition of a threat as “no 
protection shall be accorded to” it.63 However, particular definitions of an activity 
deleterious to Turkey’s security are not impervious to changing circumstances.  
     Writing in the Cold War years, Fahir Armaoğlu, a renowned Turkish historian, 
contended that Turkey was confronted by four types of threats, which were Greek 
imperialism, international communism, separatist activities, and sectarian clashes in 
                                               
61
 Ibid., p. 13. Indeed, the Government mentions “social and economic development” of Eastern and 
Southeastern regions of Turkey. However, the government apparently conceives this policy just as a 
means of “strengthening national unity and integrity through satisfying the hopes, demands, and 
expectations of the people of the region to the utmost extent”. See, Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
62
 Richard H. Ullman, “Redefining Security,” International Security, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer 1983), 
pp. 129-153, p. 133. 
63
 Quotation is from the Preamble of the Constitution. See, “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası 
[Constitution of the Republic of Turkey],” TBMM, http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/Anayasa.htm. Of note, 
this sentence was amended on October 3, 2001. Prior to the amendment, the sentence reads as follows: 
“The determination that no protection shall be afforded to thoughts or opinions…” Emphasis is mine. 
See, The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (Ankara: BYEGM Matbaası, 1990), p. 4. 
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the region [the Middle East].64 On the other hand, in the mid-1990s, Şükrü Elekdağ, 
a former Turkish ambassador to Washington, proposed ‘two and a half war 
campaigns’ strategy for Turkey, that is, a strategy designed to effectively conduct 
“two full scale operations simultaneously along the Aegean and southern fronts while 
at the same time being prepared for a ‘half war’ that might be instigated from within 
the country,” as, to Elekdağ, main threats against Turkish security were “Greek 
designs”, Syria as “a natural ally of Greece”, and PKK terrorism.65 According to 
Halil Şimşek, a retired brigadier general, among the external factors effecting 
Turkish national security strategy, globalization is salient and involves considerable 
risks, if not threats, to Turkish security.66  
     Besides personal evaluations are the officially acknowledged threats to Turkey’s 
security. It is widely accepted that Turkey’s “security horizons are now much wider 
than they were during the Cold War,” when Ankara was heavily preoccupied with 
the possibility of a Soviet aggression.67 Turkish General Staff proclaims that today 
“Turkey’s basic security concerns are focused on terrorism, the threat of long-range 
missiles and weapons of mass destruction, religious extremism, [and] regional 
conflicts.” 68  Defense White Paper 2000, on the other hand, asserts that “the 
traditional concept of threat has now started to contain new threats and risks 
emerging in the form of:  
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 Fahir Armaoğlu, Türkiye Cumhuriyetini Yıkmaya Matuf Siyasi ve İdeolojik Oyunlar [Political and 
Ideological Plots Aimed to Subvert the Republic of Turkey] (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma 
Enstitüsü, 1986), pp. 21-31. 
65
 Şükrü Elekdağ, “2 ½ War Strategy,” Perceptions, Vol. 1, No. 1 (March/May 1996), pp. 33-57. 
66
 Halil Şimşek, Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi [National Security Strategy of Turkey] 
(İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2002), pp. 49-51. Şimşek refrains from making an explicit 
reference to Turkey though. Yet, considering the context, his implication is evident. For an elaborate 
discussion from a critical perspective of changing security conceptions in Turkey, see, Pınar Bilgin, 
“Turkey’s Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge of Globalization,” European Journal of 
Political Research, Vol. 44, No.1 (January 2005), pp. 175-201. 
67
 Ian O. Lesser, “Turkey in a Changing Security Environment,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 
54, No. 1 (Fall 2000), pp. 183-198, p. 197. 
68
 “Turkey’s Defense Policy,” Turkish General Staff. 
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regional and ethnic conflicts, 
political and economic instabilities and uncertainties in the countries, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, 
religious fundamentalism,  
smuggling of drugs and all kinds of weapons, and 
international terrorism.”69   
 
3.3. Parameters of Turkish Foreign Policy      
     According to Mustafa Aydın, the interplay of two basic sets of variables is 
observed in the process of foreign policy formation of a state. Structural variables, on 
the one hand, are “continuous, fairly static and not directly related to the international 
political medium and the daily events of foreign politics.”70 Conjunctural variables, 
on the other hand, are “dynamic, made up of a web of interrelated developments in 
domestic politics and international relations, and subject to change under the 
influence of domestic and foreign developments.” 71  While Aydın identifies the 
legacy of Ottoman Empire, geographical realities, and the impact of Kemalism as the 
‘structural determinants’ of Turkish foreign policy,72 for Oral Sander ‘the forces of 
continuity’ in Turkish foreign policy are Atatük’s legacy, geopolitics, and economic 
considerations.73 Moreover, to Ferenc Vali, there are three ‘foundations’ of Turkey’s 
foreign policy, which are geopolitical foundations, ethnic foundations, and 
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 “Defense White Paper 2000,”. Although the document does not explain the traditional concept of 
threat, the implication is that it was about the USSR. It should also be noted that despite the deliberate 
evasion of identifying particular states as threats to Turkey’s security in official documents, the only 
contingency that Ankara considers as casus belli in advance is the Greek extension of its territorial 
waters in the Aegean Sea beyond the present six miles. See, Şükrü Elekdağ, “2 ½ War Strategy,” p. 
39. 
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 Mustafa Aydın, “The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkey’s European Vocation,” 
The Review of International Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Winter 2003), pp. 306-331, p. 307. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Mustafa Aydın, Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis (Ankara: Center for Strategic 
Research, 2004), pp. 11-44. 
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 Oral Sander, Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası [Foreign Policy of Turkey] (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi 
Yayınları, 1998), pp. 71-97. 
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ideological foundations.74 In general, geographic location, historical experiences, and 
dominant ideology among policy makers are considered as the basic parameters of 
Turkish foreign policy.  
     Geographic position of a state can facilitate the implementation of its foreign 
policy. Still, it can cause complications as well. In short, regarding its foreign policy, 
it can be both an asset and a liability for a state. As an asset, Turkey, thanks to its 
“very important geostrategic location,”75 which borders the Caucasus, the Middle 
East and the Balkans/Europe as well as the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, “has 
been able to play a role in world politics far greater than its size, population, and 
economic strength would indicate.”76  By the same token, owing to its particular 
geographical position, Turkey is the only state which is a member of NATO, the 
Organization for Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO) and Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), and Developing-
8 Countries (D-8) all at the same time.77  
     Membership to several international organizations contributes to the conduct of 
multilateral diplomacy in Turkish foreign policy, and multilateral diplomacy can be 
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 Ferenc Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey (Baltimore: Johns 
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 This fact is frequently stressed in Turkish official documents and also in scholarly studies. See, for 
example, Leonard A. Stone, “Interpreting the Interpretation: Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy,” 
Perceptions, Vol. 2, No. 1 (March/May 1997), pp. 24-30, p. 27. 
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capitalized on to achieve foreign policy objectives. For instance, in an attempt to 
present Turkey as a ‘civilizational peace broker’ and thereby buttress its stature both 
in the EU and in regional politics, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
“has repeatedly noted the major role Turkey could perform in enhancing the 
civilizational dialogue between Christian and Islamic communities.” 78  In fact, 
membership to both the EU and OIC provided Turkey the opportunity to perform 
such a role when, for instance, Turkey hosted OIC-EU Joint Forum in February 2000 
in Istanbul.79 
     On the other hand, depending on political circumstances, geographic location of a 
state can be a liability. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Turkey’s unique location 
makes it a “geopolitical pivot”, a state “whose importance is not derived from its 
power and motivation but rather from its sensitive location” and “which is able to 
deny access to areas or resources to a significant player.”80 However, in addition to 
magnifying the influence exerted by Turkish policy makers, this geographical 
peculiarity has historically generated anxiety in Turkish foreign policy. As an 
example, on the one hand, Istanbul and the Turkish Straits historically provided an 
invaluable base for Turkish people “from which they were able to exercise control in 
all directions, the Balkans and Central Europe, the Black Sea region, the Aegean and 
Mediterranean, Mesopotamia and Arabia, Syria and North Africa.”81 They provided 
the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic “a resource that could not be 
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duplicated in manpower to influence the actions of the U.S.S.R.,”82 and, it can be 
argued, the Russian Federation.   
     On the other hand, recurrent conflicts with foreign powers, especially Russians, 
for the control of these vital waterways have had ramifications for Turkish security 
perceptions as well as for Turkish foreign policy. When Joseph Stalin demanded 
bases on Bosphorus along with territorial concessions on March 15, 1945, Turkey 
sought a formal alliance with the West in the form of membership in NATO, which 
was to heavily influence its foreign policy orientation. 83  Ahmet Davutoğlu, a 
prominent Turkish scholar and currently a foreign policy advisor to Turkish Prime 
Minister, on the other hand, seems to implicitly display the Turkish concern over the 
Turkish straits by discussing how “politics of alliances and blocs” historically 
affected the status of the Straits and mentioning that there exists “a parallelism 
between the decrease in the position of Ottoman State in international power 
hierarchy and its gradual loss of the control over the straits.”84 That is, the Turkish 
Straits are historically a focus of interest in the foreign policies of great powers 
waiting for a proper time to act in pursuit of their interests. 
     Furthermore, it is asserted that multiplicity of neighbors may increase a state’s 
sense of insecurity, and indirectly influence its foreign policy, since “a nation that 
borders on a large number of other nations faces a particularly high risk that it may 
be threatened or attacked by at least some of its neighbors” and “confronts its 
neighbors with uncertainty because it must protect and defend itself against many 
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potential opponents.” 85  However, the main factor aggravating a state’s sense of 
insecurity seems to be not the sheer number of neighboring countries but the absence 
of coordinated state policies to address its existent problems with neighboring 
countries. Coping with the problems at least with some of the neighboring countries 
may not necessarily decrease the sense of insecurity but definitely increases foreign 
policy options of a state.86  
     In addition, Turkey’s peculiar geographic position poses “the dangers of 
involvement in regional conflicts that do not represent immediate threats to her 
borders.”87 The Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, the subsequent first Gulf war 
and the ensuing civil war in Iraq, Bosnia and Kosovo crises in the Balkans, the 
conflicts over Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya and Abkhazia in the Caucasus, and the 
American invasion of Iraq are just some of the crises and the conflicts that have 
taken place within the immediate vicinity of Turkey. Ankara has been able to refrain 
from interfering in these conflicts to a great extent by, for example, resisting to the 
“emergent internal public pressures for a more interventionist policy on behalf of 
ethnic minorities in Turkey’s vicinity”88  subjected to suppression and sometimes 
ethnic cleansing. Yet, the risk of involvement in regional conflicts for Turkey still 
exists.89 
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     History is another basic parameter of Turkish foreign policy. In general, there 
appear to be two main reasons of why “the past is never dead” in foreign affairs.90 
First, historical analogies are widely employed by both policy makers and scholars to 
make sense of social events. 91  Second, historical legacies occasionally plague 
relations between countries. 92  With regard to Turkey, “the legacy of history is 
discernible in its relations with neighboring countries as well as its Western allies.”93 
On the one hand, the absence of historical contentions between Turkey and another 
state is conducive to the inception and the smooth continuation of relations. For 
example, a scholar explains the initiation of the mainly cordial relationships between 
Turkey and the US in part with the fact that “the US carried none of the historical 
baggage associated with the wars of the Great European Powers…that caused the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and led to the establishment of the modern 
Turkish Republic.”94  
     On the other hand, modern Turkish Republic was established in “the heartland of 
the Ottoman Empire, with its advantages as well as complications and the legacy of 
its problematic relations.”95 One complication pertains to Turkish-Middle Eastern 
relations. The rule of the Ottoman Empire in the region “left an enduring legacy on 
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all sides and contributes to Turkey’s generally cool relations with its Arab 
neighbors.” 96  Since most of the founders of the modern Turkey fought in the 
Ottoman army against collaborating Arab and Western armies, the feeling that “the 
Arabs stabbed Turkey in the back during World War I, contributing to the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire,”97 especially witnessed in the military-bureaucratic elite, is 
quite widespread in Turkish society. Arabs, on the other hand, are prone to support 
the “understanding linking Arab underdevelopment to the centuries-old ‘Ottoman 
Imperialism’,”98 and also consider “Kemalist westernization as a political project that 
took place at the expense and denial of Turkey’s Islamic heritage.”99 These mutually 
prejudicial convictions tend to impede the development of genuine relations between 
Turkey and Arab countries. Nevertheless, there are some efforts to ameliorate 
Turkey’s relations with the Arab World especially since the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) took office in Turkey in 2002.100  
     Another complication generated by the historical legacy pertains to the Turkish 
sensitivity to the alleged collaboration of external actors with internal sources of 
threats. Tensions emerged over the trials of Christian subjects in the Ottoman Empire 
resulted in foreign interventions of the Western powers over the ‘violations of the 
rights’ of these subjects. Since external powers, “playing protector to one of its many 
minorities, were able to meddle with the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire 
                                               
96
 Ian O. Lesser, “Turkey in a Changing Security Environment,” Journal of International Affairs, p. 
190. 
97
 Cengiz Çandar and Graham E. Fuller, “Grand Geopolitics for a New Turkey,” Mediterranean 
Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 22-38, p. 26.  
98
 Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özlem Tür, “From Distant Neighbors to Partners: Changing Syrian-
Turkish Relations,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 37, No. 2 (June 2006), pp. 229-248, p. 231. 
99
 Dietrich Jung, “Turkey and the Arab World: Historical Narratives and New Political Realities,” 
Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2005), pp. 1-17, p. 3. 
100
 See, for example, Özlem Tür, “Türkiye ve Ortadoğu: Gerilimden İşbirliğine [Turkey and the 
Middle East: From Tension to Cooperation],” in Zeynep Dağı, ed., Doğu’dan Batı’ya Dış Politika: 
AK Partili Yıllar [Foreign Policy from the East to the West: Years with JD Party] (Ankara: Orion 
Yayınevi, 2006), pp. 141-166. 
 40 
during its declining years”101  Turkey has developed a high degree of sensitivity 
towards external concerns over its internal issues so as not to let anyone “create 
further vulnerabilities for the integrity and survival of the state.”102  
     Besides, as another imperial legacy, “in its most extreme manifestation, the sense 
of isolation and distrust of outsiders culminates in what has been called the Sevres-
phobia - the conviction that the external world is conspiring to weaken and divide up 
Turkey,” 103  named after the Treaty of Sevres which “provided the partition of 
Ottoman territories among the European powers after the First World War.”104 The 
high level of suspicion was manifested, for instance, in the words of former Turkish 
President Süleyman Demirel. Evaluating the Western pressure to carry out political 
solutions to the ‘Kurdish problem’, Demirel claimed that the West is “trying to 
involve the Sevres Treaty to set up a Kurdish state in the region…and that was what 
they [the Western States] meant by political solutions.” 105  Furthermore, alleged 
Western devious plans are referred by Abdülkadir Akçin to advocate alternative 
foreign policy strategies for Turkey: 
In the new world order, the Turkish Republic must monitor especially well 
the scenarios that the Western states are struggling to stage over the unitary 
structure of Turkey, and play well the cards related to the Central Asia, the 
Far East and the Third World countries as a requirement of the alternative 
strategy.106     
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     The third basic parameter of Turkish foreign policy is the fundamental ideology 
of the governing elite. Turkish government adopted the essential characteristics of 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s foreign policy, which is succinctly summarized in the 
precept ‘Peace at Home, Peace in the World [Yurtta Sulh, Cihanda Sulh], as “the 
basic principle determining the national security policy of Turkey.” 107 
Karaosmanoğlu indicates that “this [precept] implied a policy based on the 
maintenance of the status quo and on the survival of a relatively homogenous 
national state with a clear Turkish identity.”108 Concurring with Karaosmanoğlu, to 
Oral Sander, there is a close connection between the two parts of the precept. 
Attempts to “establish ‘peace at home’ through the initiation of social and economic 
adjustments” required ‘peace abroad’ that “should have been insulated from 
adventurism, exaggerating ideological differences among states, and keeping the past 
enmities alive.”109 In short, continual concern over the probable fallouts of external 
tensions and instabilities on domestic stability has made Atatürk’s dictum a basic 
parameter of Turkish foreign policy.110 
     In addition, according to Mustafa Aydın many of ‘the principles of Atatürk,’ 
which are nationalism, secularism, republicanism, populism, statism, and reformism, 
“had foreign policy implications” for Turkey, especially in its founding years. 111 He 
contends that, for  example, while “republicanism was against the totalitarian 
tendencies and revisionist and imperialist notions of being an Empire” and thereby 
contributed to the adoption of a status quo policy, secularism facilitated the 
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termination of centuries of enmity with the Western states, and by representing the 
dismissal of “the idea of the state as the protector of Islam” it paved the way for the 
establishment of “the basis for peaceful relations with Western Christian 
countries.”112  
     However, to what extent Atatürk’s principles have bearings on contemporary 
Turkish foreign policy seems to be a matter of debate. For instance, with the rise of 
AKP in the Turkish political system, religious identity has commenced to play an 
important role in Turkish foreign policy for two main reasons.113 First, it is perceived 
by the AKP government as a catalyst to improve relations with the Arab and Muslim 
world.114 Second, it is perceived by the Turkish statesmen and some foreign policy 
makers alike as an asset to present Turkey, a ‘Muslim democracy,’ as a role model in 
the Muslim world.115 According to Soner Çağaptay, AKP‘s emphasis on religious 
attributes in Turkish foreign policy and its strong interest in relations with the 
Muslim countries is tantamount to the erosion of secularism. According to Çağaptay: 
…the AKP has taken an avid interest in Middle Eastern Muslim causes. 
Because the AKP government has not supported Turkish foreign policy 
moves paralleling those of the country’s Western allies, instead putting a 
premium on Turkey’s ties with Muslim countries and emphasizing solidarity 
with Muslim causes, the Turks are turning to the Muslim Middle East…Five 
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years of AKP rule has undermined not only the Turks’ commitment to the 
West but also Turkish secularism. Pro-Western foreign policy and secularism 
are the Siamese twins of Turkish politics.116 
 
    
3. 4. Actors in Turkish Foreign Policy 
     According to Malik Mufti, there are four distinct domestic sources of Turkey’s 
foreign policy, which are the government, unelected bureaucracies in the ministries 
and the military, the legislative, i.e., Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), and 
public opinion conveyed through civic associations and the media.117 Philip Robins, 
on the other hand, offers a more detailed classification. To him, primary players are 
the government, the presidency, the foreign ministry, and the security establishment. 
Secondary players are parliament, the media, interest groups, ethnic pressure groups, 
and public opinion.118 It seems that primary players are those that are involved in 
Turkish foreign policy making and implementation, and secondary players are those 
that are influential, in varying degrees, in Turkish foreign policy making.119     
       As the executive branch of the Turkish state politically accountable to the 
electorate, the Turkish government is in charge of, and responsible for, the policy of 
the state, including foreign policy. Turkish governments lay down their particular 
foreign policy orientations in their government programs, of course within the 
general framework of official state principles ordained in fundamental state 
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documents like the Constitution.120 The minister of foreign affairs is the principle 
minister in the cabinet responsible for foreign affairs.  
     The Turkish President, as the head of the Turkish State elected by TGNA, 
exercises several powers related to the foreign policy, including “to accredit 
representatives of the Turkish state to foreign states and to receive the representatives 
of foreign states appointed to the Republic of Turkey,” “to ratify and promulgate 
international treaties,” and “to decide on the mobilization of the Turkish Armed 
Forces.”121 Depending on circumstances, the role and the power of presidency in 
Turkish foreign policy may change. According to Alan Makovsky, the power of 
presidency “increases proportionally to the weakness and passivity of the popularly 
elected government.”122 The assertiveness of the President himself is another factor 
in affecting the sway of the presidency over foreign policy. Erstwhile Turkish 
President Turgut Özal, “challenged the orthodox foreign policy understandings, 
structure, methodology and style in Turkey,” and arguably “left great important 
imprint on an increasingly activist and internationalist approach to Turkish foreign 
policy.”123 On the other hand, regarding foreign policy issues, “although [they are] 
Özal’s successors, Süleyman Demirel and then Ahmet Necdet Sezer, used their 
powers with more restraint than their predecessor.”124 
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     The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the main state institution responsible 
for day-to-day conduct of Turkish foreign relations. Among its responsibilities are 
“to implement the foreign policy in accordance with the basics designated and 
determined by the Government, and to conduct relations of the Turkish Republic 
with foreign states and international organizations,” and “to follow the developments 
in foreign states and international organizations, and interrelations among these.”125 
Even though it is a part of state machinery, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
enjoys relative autonomy in state structure thanks to, for example, the nature of 
diplomacy as a profession and the high degree of the quality of the personnel.126  
     In spite of the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “retains significant 
influence”, the military is so potent an actor in Turkish foreign policy that, in the 
words of Makovsky, “a policy strongly advocated by the military will almost 
certainly be implemented; a policy strongly opposed by the military almost certainly 
will not.”127 In fact, the military is a foreign policy actor. For instance, “Turkey’s 
rapprochement with Israel was initiated and led by the military.”128 According to 
İlhan Uzgel, the role of the Turkish military as a “foreign policy practitioner” is also 
visible in its involvement in the regional missions, its relations with the US, its vocal 
approach to the issues related to Turkish-Greek disputes, its relations with Israel, and 
its stance on the ‘Kurdish problem.’129  
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     National Security Council (NSC) is the central medium of the military’s 
involvement in foreign policy making.130 Although its main function is to submit “to 
the Council of the Ministers its views on the advisory decisions that are taken,”131 “in 
practice it is virtually unheard of for cabinets and parliaments publicly to question its 
views.”132 Besides, “the NSC is also responsible for coordinating the drafting and 
then the approval of the National Security Policy Document,”133 which “lists the 
threats to national security, sets out priorities, lays down policy guidelines, and 
provides a detailed framework of foreign and security policies for governments and 
state institutions.”134 However, with the recent amendments in the Law No. 2945, the 
role of the military in the NSC is curbed.135 
     Finally, the Turkish Assembly, TGNA, has responsibilities pertaining to the 
ratification of international treaties, declaration of state of war, and authorization to 
deploy armed forces of Turkey to abroad, and armed forces of foreign states to 
Turkish territory. 136  It also includes Foreign Affairs Commission, currently 
comprising 25 members of parliament.137 TGNA has recently played a decisive role 
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in Turkey’s refusal to permit the passage of American troops for the invasion of Iraq 
by not admitting the so-called March 1 bill.138 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
TURKISH-CHINESE RELATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
     Today, it is arguably no prophecy and no secret that “the rise of China - and Asia 
- will, over the next decades, bring about a substantial reordering of the international 
system. The center of gravity of world affairs is shifting from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific.”139 On the other hand, in the contemporary world order, founded, sustained 
and dominated by the US, China is regarded by most of the scholars as the foremost 
candidate for a superpower status, which is expected to alter the unilateral world 
order and challenge the US hegemony.140  
     This conception of China as the prospective challenger to the US hegemony and a 
rising power incrementally expanding its influence in world politics is also prevalent 
in Turkey. For example, R. Kutay Karaca asserts that “the only country which can 
intrepidly challenge and position against the unilateral world order that the US has 
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recently formed is China.”141 To Mehmet Öğütçü, China is as important as, perhaps 
more important than, the US, the EU, and Japan for Turkey due to its present-day 
position and its future potential.142  
     Accordingly, persistent arguments for the diversification and intensification of 
Turkey’s relations with East Asia, in general, and China, in particular, are put 
forward. For Deniz Ülke Arıboğan, “it will be a grave mistake if [Turkish] foreign 
policy makers insist on maintaining a Euro-American approach without taking into 
account Far East Asia as a region of future international importance.”143  Hasret 
Çomak expressed as early as 1996 that “increasing cooperation and providing new 
chances of cooperation with this country [China], which is expected to become the 
superpower of the world by 2025, is an indispensable opportunity for Turkey.”144    
     Despite relentless arguments about the urgency of improving relations with 
China, Turkish-Chinese relations have yet to display a high level of development. 
Contrary to the general inclination to make prospective analyses of Turkish-Chinese 
relations, this chapter engages in a retrospective analysis of bilateral relations 
between Ankara and Beijing and examines the causes of the modest level of 
development in relations. Bilateral political relations, bilateral economic relations, 
and bilateral social and cultural relations are discussed separately and in consecutive 
order. 
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4. 1. Turkish-Chinese Political Relations 
4. 1. 1. A Short History 
     Even tough diplomatic relations between Turkey and China were established on 
August 4, 1971, historically relations between two countries date back to the late 
Ottoman times. Unable to assist the Turkestan Khanates, Bukhara, Khiva, and 
Khokand, in their struggles against the advancing Russian imperial forces due to 
several reasons, Ottoman Sultan Abdülaziz (1830-1876) decided to respond to the 
insistent pleas of the Kashgar Khanate, which was established by Yakub Beg in 1867 
in the territory of today’s Xinjiang.145 The Sultan ordered the dispatches of several 
types of weapons, including German-made cannons, and military specialists to 
Kashgar.146  And in return, in 1870, Yakub Beg “recognized Sultan Abdülaziz as 
their [people of Kashgar] Caliph, minting coins with his image and delivering the 
special sermon (hutbe) in the mosque citing his name.”147 Until being invaded and 
annexed by the Chinese forces in December 1877, Kashgar Khanate were to be the 
last Turkestan Khanate in Central Eurasia, which was under Ottoman suzerainty for 
seven years, albeit nominally. 
     While the main concern in Abdülaziz’s Far East (Aksa-ı Şark) policy was to 
distract Russian efforts from the immediate borders of the Ottoman Empire and 
occupy Russians in Central Eurasia, the main concern in the Far East policy of the 
successor Ottoman Sultan, Abdülhamid II (1842-1918), was Western European 
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states, primarily the British.148 “His objective was to keep the European states busy 
in the Far East and to ensure that they were not struggling with the Ottoman 
State.”149 To that end, owing to the title Caliph, Abdülhamid II welcomed the request 
of German Kaiser William II (1859-1941) to send ‘counsel missions’ to China to 
mollify Chinese Muslims, who had participated in the violent Boxer Rebellion, 
because to Abdülhamid II “China, with a Muslim population of 70 million, could be 
a political weapon against the Western world demonstrating the political activism of 
the Caliph.”150 Ottoman activism in the region was to vanish with the dethronement 
of Abdülhamid II and the advent of the subsequent wars, especially World War I, 
which resulted in the total collapse of the Ottoman Empire. 
     Although Ottoman Empire ceased to exist, the triumph of Turkish nationalists 
under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal in Turkish War of Liberation, and the 
subsequent modernization efforts of the newly established Turkish state had 
repercussions in Chinese politics. In the deliberations taken place between the 
imperial powers of the time and Chinese nationalists (Kuomintang or KMT) in the 
mid 1920s over the issues of extraterritoriality, tariff autonomy, and concessions, one 
of the two events “which greatly stiffened the attitude of the Chinese nationalists 
towards the powers” was “the cavalier manner with which the Turkish Nationalists 
had treated the Powers and practically compelled them to sign the Treaty of 
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Lausanne.”151 Adamant to abrogate extraterritorial rights enjoyed in China by the 
citizens of several powers, The National Government invoked the Turkish experience 
in its correspondences with other states and, for example, “pointed out how light-
heartedly the same Powers had renounced their rights under the capitulations with 
Turkey.”152 
     Furthermore, Zeng Qi, leader of the Chinese Youth Party, which was the largest 
party in the 1930s and 1940s in China after Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), advocated political liberalization in the single-
party system of Chinese governance by drawing attention to Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk’s rule in Turkey. According to Zeng Qi, “although [Mustafa] Kemal had 
been authoritarian at the beginning, he later attempted to establish a Western 
parliamentarian system, and yet he did not lose control of the government because an 
opposition had been institutionalized.”153 Accordingly, “Zeng saw no reason why the 
Nationalists should not follow the Turkish model by encouraging a responsible 
opposition that would impose efficiency and accountability on the government.”154 
Chinese communists, on the other hand, attentive to the developments in Turkey, 
became very critical against Turkey as it became evident that Turkish domestic 
reforms and its foreign policy were irreversibly Western oriented. In 1940, Mao 
Zedung called Atatürk’s rule that had recently ended in Turkey as “feeble Kemalist 
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dictatorship of the bourgeoisie,” and called Turkey as “pseudo-colony,” and “a part 
of the retrogressive imperialist world.”155 
     Ten years later, on July 25, 1950, Turkish government was to announce its 
decision to dispatch Turkish troops to Korea, which were to fight Chinese soldiers 
from People’s Volunteer Army in several encounters, including the Battle of Wavon, 
the Battle of Sinnam-ni, the Battle of Kaechon, the Battle of Sunchon, and the Battle 
of Kumyangjang-ni.156 Turkish and Chinese forces suffered heavy casualties in their 
fights against each other. For instance, in the bloody clashes taken place around the 
infamous Kunuri Pass, Chinese forces suffered nearly ten thousand casualties, mostly 
bayoneted by the Turkish troops, while the losses of Turkish forces amounted to 
nearly three hundred (218 dead, 94 missing).157  
     “One of the exceptional cases of Republican era Turkish history” for several 
reasons,158 Turkish participation to Korean War was to have ongoing implications in 
Turkish politics. With particular reference to Turkish-Chinese relations, according to 
Çağdaş Üngör, the narratives on the Turkish participation in the Korean War, 
including war memoirs, journalistic accounts, and newspaper articles, “became an 
early influence in setting the new parameters for understanding the East Asian 
countries and particularly ‘Red’ China.”159 Besides, to Üngör, “the depiction of the 
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Chinese soldier as the evil enemy, pitiable war prisoner, or a naïve (brainwashed) 
believer in Communism helped to build a long-lasting image of this little-known land 
and people in Turkey.”160   
     Turkey was to wait for two decades after the Korean War to finally recognize 
People’s Republic of China. Till 1971, Turkey officially recognized the Republic of 
China located in Taiwan and led by the Chinese Nationalist Party, or the Kuomintang 
of China (KMT) as the sole representative of the Chinese Nation.161 On August 4, 
1971, Turkey recognized People’s Republic of China governed by the Communist 
Party of China (CPC), in an official ceremony held at the Turkish Embassy in 
Paris.162 When Turkey established diplomatic relations with People’s Republic of 
China in 1971, the first Nihat Erim Government was in office and Turkish Minister 
of Foreign Affairs was Osman Olcay.163  
     Turkish government’s decision to recognize the ‘Red China’ was to evoke 
criticisms from some members of the right-wing Justice Party in the Turkish Senate. 
For instance, for Süleyman Demirel, leader of the Justice Party who was to visit 
People’s Republic of China when he became the President, it was of no use for 
Turkey to recognize the ‘Red China’ and also, implicitly recalling the Turkish fight 
in Korea against Communism, he stated that “it was regrettable to break relations 
with the Nationalist China (Taiwan) which struggled against the Communist 
expansion in the Southeast Asia for nearly 25 years.”164  
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     Bilateral relations between Ankara and Beijing were to improve with several 
reciprocal high-level visits of the statesmen of two countries, and a host of low-level 
visits of members of parliaments, delegations from respective ministries, and other 
state agencies.165 For example, in 2007, more than 70 bilateral high-level visits at 
ministerial level took place.166 In addition, numerous agreements have been signed 
on various subjects.167  
 
Table II: High Level Bilateral Visits Between Turkey and China168  
 
Outgoing Turkish Leaders Incoming Chinese Leaders 
(P) Kenan Evren (12-17 December 1982) 
(P) Süleyman Demirel (23-27 May 1995) 
 
(P) Li Xiannian (13-19 March 1984) 
(P) Jiang Zemin (18-21 April 2000) 
(PM) Turgut Özal (30 June-7 July 1985)  
 
(PM) Zhao Ziyang (17-23 July 1986) 
(PM) Zhu Rongji (15-19 April 2002) 
(MFA) İsmail Cem (14-20 February 
1998) 
(MFA) Qian Qichen (3-7 September 
1990) 
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(MFA) Abdullah Gül (1-5 February 
2005) 
(MFA) Tang Jiaxuan (6-9 February 
2001) 
 
       
4.1.2. An Appraisal      
     Turkish and Chinese policy makers have expressed in several occasions to 
improve bilateral relations and cooperation between two countries. For example, 
“vowing to push the bilateral friendly cooperative ties to a new high,” Abdullah Gül, 
the then foreign minister of Turkey, stated in Beijing in February 2005 that “Turkey 
will further cooperation with China.” 169  On the other hand, vowing “to further 
strengthen cooperative relations in various fields between the two countries,” 
Chinese State Councilor Hua Jianmin, recently elected to the Central Committee of 
CPC, stated in Ankara in April 2006 that “China is willing to carry out international 
cooperation with Turkey.”170  
     While official statements of policy makers foreshadow smooth continuation of 
bilateral relations, ardent calls for improving Turkey’s relations with China to higher 
levels are also prevalent. For instance, according to Mehmet Öğütçü, instead of 
limiting “itself to single-level interaction with the EU and the US,” Turkey, with 
patience and perseverance, “needs to work now to develop a strategic partnership 
with China” 171  since, to Öğütçü, “forging an effective and long-term Turkish-
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Chinese partnership has become an urgent task” for Turkey172. Despite official and 
non-official calls for furthering Turkish-Chinese relations, it seems that bilateral 
relations between two countries have ‘made process but not progress’.173 Relatively 
low level of bilateral relations can be observed, for example, in Chinese designation 
of its relations with Turkey, and relatively low level of Turkish interest to its 
relations with China.  
     Nuraniye Hidayet Ekrem, in her analysis of official Chinese designation of its 
relations with other states, asserts that “Turkey’s position in Chinese multilateral 
foreign policy is tertiary in degree.” 174  While China endorses a relation of 
“constructive strategic partnership” with the US and Russia, and a relation of 
“comprehensive strategic partnership” with England and France, it endorses a 
relation of “friendly cooperation” with Turkey, without conveying any interest to 
forge a strategic relation with Turkey.175 By the same token, it seems that China 
attaches more importance to its relations with Greece than its relations with Turkey 
as Chinese President Hu Jintao has recently expressed Beijing’s desire to build “an 
all-round strategic partnership” with Athens.176 
     Although interest in different aspects of Chinese politics, such as, its foreign 
policy, economic development, or military modernization, has gradually increased in 
Turkey, bilateral relations between Ankara and Beijing hardly find a place in Turkish 
foreign policy agenda. A quick survey of election manifestos of main political parties 
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that are currently represented in the Turkish Assembly seems to be sufficient to give 
a hint on the place of Turkish-Chinese relations on the political agendas of Turkish 
policy makers.  
     Nationalist Action Party (MHP), currently the third largest party in the Assembly, 
declared that improving Turkey’s relations with Japan, Russian Federation, and 
People’s Republic of China in all areas has an important place among its priorities.177 
Republican Peoples Party, currently the second largest party in the Assembly, 
declared that it would rapidly develop Turkey’s relations with Russia, China, Japan, 
India, and countries of Far East in addition to countries of Latin America and 
Africa.178 Justice and Development Party (AKP), currently the ruling party, declared 
that Turkey’s relations with important Asian countries, such as China, India and 
Japan were to be accelerated. 179  That China is specifically mentioned in each 
manifesto is indicative of importance attached to Turkey’s relations with China. 
However, any special attention is not given to Turkey’s relations with China, and 
China is considered within the general category of countries of significance.180    
     Relatively low level of interest in bilateral relations on both sides 
notwithstanding, there are mainly two factors that have facilitated the continuation of 
bilateral relations, that is, ‘making process’, between Ankara and Beijing since the 
inception of diplomatic relations. First, as pointed out by Atilla Sandıklı, foreign 
policy principles endorsed by China in its relations with other states are almost 
identical to those of Turkey and, it can be argued, it is difficult to consider them 
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inimical to Turkey’s security considering the security conception of Turkey 
discussed in the previous chapter.181 Since 1954, successive Chinese governments 
have proclaimed that the so-called five principles of peaceful coexistence are adhered 
in the conduct of Chinese foreign policy.182 These principles are “mutual respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each 
other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence in 
developing diplomatic relations and economic and cultural exchanges with other 
countries.” 183  It appears that dissimilar to, for example, the EU’s approach 
characterized by promotion of ‘ethnic rights’ or amendment of certain articles in 
Turkish Penal Code, Chinese approach to bilateral relations characterized by five 
principles of peaceful coexistence has been conducive to the smooth continuation of 
relations between Ankara and Beijing.184  
     Second, successive Turkish governments and Turkish statesmen have never 
expressed any desire or intention to recognize or support ‘Taiwanese independence,’ 
and announced in every occasion that they espouse one-China policy. For instance, 
Devlet Bahçeli, the then Vice-Prime Minister and currently leader of the right-wing 
                                               
181
 Interview with Colonel (Ret.) Atilla Sandıklı, who was the General Director of Turkish Asian 
Center for Strategic Studies (TASAM) located in İstanbul, July 14, 2007. For the full text of the 
interview, see, Eyüp Ersoy, “Atilla Sandıklı: Türkiye ile Çin'in Dış Politika İlkeleri Örtüşüyor 
[Foreign Policy Principles of Turkey and China are Overlapping],” USAK,  
http://www.usakgundem.com/uamakale.php?id=299. 
182
 “The Five Principles per se are first found in the text of a treaty between India and the People's 
Republic of China on Tibet signed in Peking on April 29, 1954… They were reaffirmed in a 
communiqué of the two Asian leaders in New Delhi on June 28, 1954, and the following day they 
received further approval in a joint statement by Premiers U Nu and Chou En-lai in Rangoon.” See, 
Russell H. Fifield, “The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence,” The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 52, No. 3 (July 1958), pp. 504-510, pp. 504-505. 
183
 “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China,” People’s Daily, March 22, 2004, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html. 
184
 The EU’s approach to its relations with Turkey is every now and then castigated in Turkey from 
the security perspective. For instance, according to Armağan Kuloğlu, Principal Advisor to Ankara-
based Turkish think-tank Global Strategy Institute, it is observed that “EU is continuously demanding 
concessions from Turkey on issues adversely militating against Turkey’s security.” Furthermore, “the 
EU’s demands from Turkey against state security with an approach of human rights, freedom, and 
more democracy, and its endeavor to dispel the understanding of nation-state…is perceived as a 
threat.” See, Armağan Kuloğlu, “Geleceğin Güç Odağı Çin ve Bu Ülkenin Türkiye ile Olan İlişkileri 
[China, the Power Center of the Future, and the Relations of This Country with Turkey],” Global 
Strateji, Vol. 3, No. 11 (Autumn 2007), pp. 49-57, p. 51, p. 56. 
 60 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP), “stressed that Turkey has consistently adhered to 
the ‘One-China’ principle and supported China’s reunification.”185 Being extremely 
sensitive to other states’ approaches to ‘the Taiwan Province’ 186 , Chinese 
government and policy makers have expressed in every occasion their appreciation 
of the unwavering position of Turkish state on the issue. For instance, in January 
2003, Zhu Rongji, the then Chinese Premier, “expressed gratitude to the Turkish 
government…for its one-China policy and respect for China’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity” in his meeting with Tayyip Erdoğan in Beijing even though 
Erdoğan held no official position in the Turkish government at that time.187 In short, 
Taiwan has never been a source of friction in bilateral relations between Ankara and 
Beijing dissimilar to, for example, relations between Beijing and Washington. 
     These two main factors that have facilitated the smooth continuation of Turkish-
Chinese relations notwithstanding, there are mainly three factors that seem to have 
hindered the development of bilateral relations to higher levels, that is, have caused 
relations ‘not to make progress’. First, the issue of East Turkestan/Xinjiang is so 
delicate a common concern between Ankara and Beijing that different approaches to 
the issue have caused complications in bilateral relations especially in the first half of 
the 1990s. It is a widespread conviction in the Turkish public that “Turkey has a 
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direct interest in the welfare of this 10-million strong Uighur community, the oldest 
and first literate Turkic people of the world, with a strong community in Turkey.”188 
     Fervent remarks championing the independence of East Turkestan and virulent 
reproaches against Chinese policies in the region are not uncommon in the Turkish 
public. There are three main approaches to the issue. First, the issue is deemed as a 
religious cause. According to Rahim Er, “the jihad of East Turkestan is to bury 
Chinese Communism in the history as the jihad in Afghanistan buried Soviet 
Communism in the ground.”189 To Er, East Turkestan cannot be considered as an 
internal problem of China since it is not only a problem of Turkey but the entire 
Muslim world, and “with and without the support of Turkey, the Mujahideen of East 
Turkestan is to attain their independence.”190 Second, it is deemed as a national 
cause. The Voice of Turkestan, a quarterly journal founded by the famous Uyghur 
nationalist İsa Yusuf Alptekin in 1983, is the primary advocate of Uyghur 
nationalism, and is replete with nationalist comments espousing the independence of 
East Turkestan. For instance, to Erkin Emet, “the entire Uyghur nation believes in 
the independence of East Turkestan. One day, the right cause is to succeed regardless 
of the strength of China.”191  Third, the issue is deemed a case of human rights 
violations. According to Şatlık Amanov, China has tightened its policy of 
assimilation of Uygur people and its repressive attitude towards the Uyghur 
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population, and “the most dreadful human rights violations carried out by the 
Chinese government are witnessed in East Turkestan.”192 
     The Turkish government, on the other hand, has gradually abandoned its policy of 
supporting ‘the East Turkestan cause’ observed in the first half of the 1990s. In 
March 1992, to the chagrin of the Chinese government, the Turkish President Turgut 
Özal while receiving İsa Yusuf Alptekin stated: “I have taken delivery of the Eastern 
Turkestani cause. The Turkic republics under former Soviet rule have all declared 
their independence. Now it is Eastern Turkestan's turn. It is our desire to see the 
ancient homeland of the Turkic peoples as a free country.”193 However, seven years 
later, following the visit of Turkish President Süleyman Demirel to China in 1995, 
the Turkish government was to issue a confidential circular signed by Prime Minister 
Mesut Yılmaz. The circular, pointing out that the Chinese government was uneasy 
about the activities of associations established by Turkey’s citizens of Uyghur origin, 
demanded any minister or civil servant not participate in the meetings of these sorts 
of associations.194  
     In April 2000, receiving the Chinese President Jiang Zemin in Ankara, President 
Demirel elucidated Turkey’s position on the issue. For Demirel, Turkey’s interest in 
the events in East Turkestan/Xinjiang is normal as Uyghur Turks are relatives of 
Turkish people. On the other hand, Turkey’s policy is the preservation of territorial 
integrity of China and non-interference in its internal affairs. In short, “Uyghur Turks 
are a valuable part of China as loyal citizens. They are the bridge of friendship 
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between our countries [Turkey and China].”195 In addition, the then Turkish Foreign 
Minister Abdullah Gül did not include East Turkestan/Xinjiang in his itinerary 
during his visit to China in February 2005, a decision construed by the Turkish media 
as a deliberate negligence.196 In sum, Ankara has modified its policy on the issue of 
East Turkestan/Xinjiang over time and has arguably become inclined to downplay it 
in its relations with Beijing.197  
     The Chinese government, once very critical against Turkey in its alleged role in 
the separatist activities in Xinjiang, has incrementally changed its position on the 
issue. In 1992, implying Turkey, Jiang Zemin, the then General Secretary of CPC 
Central Committee who was to become Chinese President one year later, reportedly 
stated that China should take into account the efforts of some international political 
powers to divide China by assisting the separatists fleeing abroad and by using 
slogans like Pan Turkism and Pan Islamism.198 However, with the steps taken China 
has abandoned its criticisms, if not suspicions, against Turkey. The paramount step 
was the signing of ‘Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Transnational Crimes’ 
on February 14, 2000 which, according to Mehmet Öğütçü, “dispersed to some 
extent the clouds and the atmosphere of distrust in bilateral relations.” 199  For 
instance, in April 2002, the then Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, in his meeting with the 
then Turkish Prime Minister in Ankara, stated that China hoped to further 
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cooperation with Turkey and “leave no single opportunity for East Turkestan forces 
to damage Sino-Turkish relations.”200  
     Despite the two governments’ efforts and declarations to prevent the East 
Turkestan/Xinjiang issue from impairing bilateral relations, this issue of common 
concern, it seems, has been a complicating factor, and it will possibly continue to be 
so for two main reasons. First, Turkey hosts arguably “the most influential Uyghur 
lobby in the world” and also “a public sensitive to the developments in the region 
due to ethnic and cultural bonds.”201 Public sensitivity, as indicated above, emanates 
from religious feelings, ethnic ties, and concerns over human rights, and it can be 
observed in several areas. For example, all over the Turkey, there are large numbers 
of streets and public gardens named after important Uyghur personalities like İsa 
Yusuf Alptekin and Mehmet Emin Buğra. Inauguration of a park in Kayseri in 1995 
named after İsa Yusuf Alptekin was protested by the Chinese Ambassador Wu 
Koming, who in person went to Kayseri and requested to meet the governor and the 
major of Kayseri to make them change the name of the park, but his request was 
refused by both the leaders.202  
     Activities of ‘the Uyghur Diaspora’ in Turkey, which constitutes an inseparable 
part of the Turkish public, have been a serious concern for the Chinese government. 
For instance, China reportedly exerted diplomatic pressure on the Turkish 
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government for the closure of the East Turkestan Center established in Istanbul in 
1998. Finally, being subjected to restrictions of the Turkish Government, the Center 
was to move to Munich, Germany.203 In sum, activities of ‘the Uyghur Diaspora’ in 
Turkey have caused concerns for the Chinese government. These activities spoiled 
bilateral relations especially in the first half of the 1990s, a time when Turkey was 
struggling to improve its relations with the non-Western world. Only through the 
cooperative attitudes of the Turkish governments, beginning in the second half of the 
1990s, deterioration in bilateral relations over the East Turkestan/Xinjiang issue has 
been averted.204 
     Second, approaches of the two states to the East Turkestan/Xinjiang issue have 
differed. For Turkey, the issue is mainly about the welfare and well being, definitely 
not the independence, of a community with which it shares historical, linguistic, 
ethnic and religious ties and which could serve as ‘a bridge of friendship’ in bilateral 
relations. However, for China, it is mainly about the prevention of separatist 
activities of rebellious people from an ethnic community, who, in the words of a 
Chinese Premier, are “a handful of people inside and outside China [that] have 
planned and organized a series of violent incidents in Xinjiang with the aim of 
setting up a state of ‘East Turkestan’.”205 In addition, after 9/11, Chinese leaders has 
changed their rhetoric, decided to designate separatist activities as ‘terrorist 
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activities,’ and began to emphasize ‘common concerns in fighting against terrorism’ 
in meetings with Turkish leaders. Besides, the Chinese government has never 
expressed any intention to consider Uyghur population as ‘a bridge of friendship.’ 
While East Turkistan/Xinjiang has been a permanent issue in bilateral relations, a 
permanent concern for the governments, divergence of positions on it, it can be 
argued, has been a factor indirectly precluding the development of bilateral relations 
to higher levels.  
     The second main factor that seems to have hindered the development of bilateral 
relations to higher levels pertains to history. History, a basic parameter of Turkish 
foreign policy as indicated in the previous chapter or, in the words of Mustafa Aydın, 
a ‘structural determinant,’ seems to have constrained the development of Turkish-
Chinese relations in three ways. First, even though commercial transactions had been 
taking place, diplomatic relations between Ankara and Beijing were established 
belatedly in 1971. The dates presented below conspicuously reflect the impact of the 
structural constraints of the Cold War on the establishment of diplomatic relations. 
Being in the different, if not diametrically opposing,206 ‘camps’ of the Cold War 
prevented an early advent of diplomatic relations between Turkey and China. 
Absence of an early initiation of diplomatic relations arguably deprived Turkish-
Chinese relations of any substantial background of historical relations, or ‘historical 
depth’. According to Deniz Ülke Arıboğan, that “their relations developed primarily 
without, heavily influenced by the American initiatives,” is a reason of why 
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“relations between Turkey and China failed to develop as successfully as they should 
have.”207 
 
Table III: The Dates When Turkey Established Diplomatic Relations with East Asian 
States  
China Japan South Korea 
1971, August 4 1952, June 6 1957, March 8 
   
Table IV: The Dates When China Established Diplomatic Relations with Some 
States Neighboring Turkey 
Turkey Bulgaria Greece Iran  Syria 
1971, August 4 1949, October 4 1972, June 5 1971, August 16 1956, August 1 
 
      
     Second, history of the Turkish-Chinese relations has not been lacking in setbacks. 
From the grim experiences of the Korean War to the harsh reciprocal accusations 
over the East Turkestan/Xinjiang issue to the ruthless rivalry in similar industries, 
especially the textile industry, there have been problems in bilateral relations that 
have from time to time stalled the progress in political relations between Ankara and 
Beijing.   
     Third, historical experiences of Turkey itself have an effect on bilateral relations 
between Turkey and China. For instance, according to Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, 
founders of the new Turkish Republic “felt the need to protect the domestic order 
predicated on western ideas and models of socio-political organization against 
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internal turbulence, or worse yet from direct challenges from the outside” and, she 
continues, domestic exigencies of the new Republic induced the political elite to 
redefine the priorities of Turkish foreign policy orientation. 208  These redefined 
priorities were unequivocally Western oriented. Furthering the argument, Arıboğan 
asserts that “promoting westernization policies both domestically and as an 
international security tool, and isolating herself from the Islamic East, Turkey could 
neither look to the Far East as a separate entity nor differentiate between her interests 
in the Near and Far East.”209 Concurring with Arıboğan, Çağdaş Üngör contends that 
“identity as a Western state wherein Turkey has situated itself has affected to a great 
extent [Turkey’s] outlook to the world, and accordingly to China.” 210  Üngör 
concludes that this entrenched perception is closely related to the rupture in Turkish-
Chinese relations, which has been observed in the modern era.211 In short, it seems 
that Turkish foreign policy orientation based on Turkey’s historical experiences and 
preferences has had an adverse effect on Turkish-Chinese relations. 
     The third main factor that seems to have hindered the development of bilateral 
relations to higher levels pertains to geography. Geography, a basic parameter of 
Turkish foreign policy as indicated in the previous chapter or, in the words of 
Mustafa Aydın, a ‘structural determinant,’ seems to have constrained the 
development of Turkish-Chinese relations in two interrelated ways. First, due to the 
sheer geographical distance between Turkey and China, coupled with the relative 
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inability or deliberate inaction of the two states to exert influence beyond their 
immediate vicinities, areas wherein the two states have been traditionally active have 
yet to intersect. 212  The only area that Ankara and Beijing both have displayed 
considerable foreign policy activism seems to be the Central Asia. However, in the 
Central Asia their interests are more likely to diverge than to converge as indicated 
by several scholars. To Çandar and Fuller, “an expansionist authoritarian China 
represents a challenge to Turkish interests in the region [Central Asia],” and “it is not 
in Turkey’s interest to see China become the dominant force in Central Asia.”213 
Furthermore, it is contended that “nowhere do Turkish and Chinese interests diverge 
more sharply than in their attempts to secure reliable sources of energy.”214 This 
divergence is also more likely to cause contention than cooperation between Ankara 
and Beijing in the Central Asia. In short, there appears to be no solid geostrategic 
ground for Turkey and China on which the wheels of bilateral relations, which have 
hitherto spun more but moved less, can turn forward; a situation that can be 
attributed in part to the geographic distance between the two countries. 
     Second, contrary to the assumptions of ‘geographical indeterminism’, that is, the 
approach to foreign relations which takes ‘geographical’ out of geopolitics, Turkey’s 
geographical location has been influential in shaping its foreign policy not just 
because of Turkey’s own geopolitical calculations but also because of the 
geopolitical calculations of other states. “Turkey is at the center of American 
geopolitical calculations because of its location at the crossroads of the Balkans, 
eastern Mediterranean, Caucasus, Central Asia, and Middle East, with its Arab-
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Israeli problems.” 215  The same observation with different regional specifications 
seems to be also valid for other non-neighboring states like Russia and Israel. First, 
since China has never been as active as other non-neighboring states like the US, 
Russia or Israel in the vicinity of Turkey, it has never gained as higher a place as that 
of other states in Turkish foreign policy agenda. Second, the importance of relations 
with the West in Turkish foreign policy agenda in part emanates from the activities 
of the Western states in Turkey’s vicinity, even sometimes within Turkey. 
Accordingly, successive Turkish leaders from Ottoman Sultans to the Presidents of 
the Turkish Republic have treated Turkey’s relations with East Asian states as a 
function of relations with the West. This approach is always prevalent in Turkey and 
is frequently advocated. For instance, to Mehmet Öğütçü, “viewing China sometimes 
as a balancing power [and] sometimes as a complementary power in our [Turkey’s] 
relations with the West is of critical significance…in the global economic and 
geopolitical order.”216 That Turkey’s relations with China have been a function of 
Turkey’s relations with the West can be attributed in part to the geographical position 
of Turkey on which the West has been a good deal more active than the East, 
particularly China. 
 
4. 2. Turkish-Chinese Economic Relations 
     Tacitly highlighting the vast market opportunities in China, President Kenan 
Evren wittily stated in his visit to Beijing in December 1982: “I wish we sell orange 
to every Chinese.”217 Since then, bilateral trade relations between Turkey and China 
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have immensely developed. For instance, total trade volume between the two 
countries increased 1566, 99 % between 1996 and 2006. 
 
Table V: Changes in Turkey’s Trade Volume with East Asian States from 1996 to 
2006 218       
China Japan South Korea 
1566, 99 % 118, 91 % 352, 03 % 
 
Indeed, the increase is immense. Yet, it has not yielded exceptional results. For 
example, Turkey’s trade with China, the second largest economy in the world 
according to International Monetary Fund (IMF), represents just 2, 74 % of its total 
foreign trade.219 Besides, Turkey’s trade relations with China are not exceptional in 
comparison to the trade relations of some states with China that are neighboring 
Turkey. For instance, in 2005, Greece’s trade with China represented 2, 74 % of its 
total foreign trade, exactly the same as Turkey, while China occupied a great deal 
higher place in Iran’s foreign trade. 
 
Table VI: Place of China in Foreign Trade of Some States Neighboring Turkey in 
2005 220 
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Turkey Armenia  Bulgaria Greece  Iran  
2, 74 % 0, 83 %  2, 14 %  2, 74 % 18, 44 %  
 
     It is contended in 1998 that economic relations between Turkey and China “are 
far from reflecting the true potential of the two countries.”221 Bilateral economic 
relations have displayed significant development thereafter. Still, the development in 
bilateral economic relations is mainly driven by uneven commercial relations with a 
mounting trade deficit for Turkish economy. Furthermore, economic relations in 
other areas like direct investments have yet to display notable progress. Besides, 
there appear to be setbacks that have hampered the smooth advancement of bilateral 
economic relations between Turkey and China to higher levels. 
     This part is an analysis of Turkish-Chinese economic relations. First, legal 
foundations of the economic relations, that is, agreements and protocols, are to be 
indicated. Second, main components of relations, simply imports, exports, and direct 
investments, are to be examined in detail. Third, the principal factors that have 
adversely affected the development of bilateral economic relations between Turkey 
and China are to be discussed. These factors are mainly the absence of a suitable 
economic environment for bilateral economic activities, the existence of economic 
areas wherein the two sides compete, and the problems encountered by Turkish 
businessmen in the Chinese market. 
     The legal foundation of Turkish-Chinese economic relations is constituted by four 
agreements and eighteen protocols.222 All of the four agreements were signed in 
                                                                                                                                     
http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers; National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/. Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan are excluded in 
figures.  
221
 Mehmet Öğütçü, Yükselen Asya [Asia Rising], p. 139. 
222
 “Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti [People’s Republic of China],” T.C. Başbakanlık Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı 
[Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry, Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade], September 2006, p. 3, 
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Beijing. The first agreement was the ‘Trade Agreement between the Government of 
the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the People’s Republic of China’ that 
was signed on July 16, 1974, and was composed of seven articles. 223  The 
governments expressed their desire “of promoting commercial relations between the 
two countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.”224 The second agreement 
was the ‘Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China on Economic, Industrial, and 
Technical Cooperation,’ which was signed on December 19, 1981, and was 
composed of again seven articles.225 Article 5 stipulated the establishment of a Mixed 
Commission that would meet annually with the tasks of, for example, “examining 
any problems arising from the implementation of this Agreement and putting forward 
proposals.”226 Mixed Commission was to meet 15 times in 29 years, the last of which 
was convened in Ankara in June 16-18, 2007.227 
     The third agreement was the ‘Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the 
People’s Republic of China Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments’ which was signed on March 11, 1993, and was composed of eleven 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmadmin/upload/ANL/AsyaDb/chc.doc; “2006 Yıllık Raporu [Annual Report 
2006],” T.C. Pekin Büyükelçiliği Ticaret Müşavirliği [Republic of Turkey, Embassy in Beijing, Trade 
Consultancy], 2006, p. 75, http://www.musavirlikler.gov.tr/upload/CHC/YILLIK%20RAPOR2006-
SON.doc. Of note, all of the four agreements were signed in Beijing. 
223
 For the full text of the Agreement, see, “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti 
Hükümeti Arasında Ticaret Anlaşması [Trade Agreement between the Government of the Republic of 
Turkey and the Government of the People’s Republic of China],” Resmi Gazete, No. 15112 (January 
8, 1975), pp. 1-2. 
224
 Ibid., p. 1. 
225
 For  the full text of the Agreement, see, “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti 
Hükümeti Arasında Ekonomik, Sınai ve Teknik İşbirliği Anlaşması [Agreement between the 
Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Peoples Republic of China on 
Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation],” Resmi Gazete, No. 17607 (February 16, 1982), 
pp. 1-4. 
226
 Ibid., p. 4. 
227
 “Türkiye-Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti Hükümetlerarası Karma Ekonomik Komisyon 15. Dönem 
Toplantısı [15th Session of Turkey-People’s Republic of China Intergovernmental Joint Economic 
Commission],” Asya Pasifik’te Gündem [Agenda in Asia-Pacific], No. 7 (August 6, 2007), pp. 1-8, p. 
7, http://www.bahcesehir.edu.tr/UserFiles/bulten/Aspas_07.pdf. 
 74 
articles. 228  Articles cover some issues related to investments like expropriation, 
repatriation, subrogation, preclusion and taxation. The fourth agreement was the 
‘Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the People’s Republic of China for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
Respect to Taxes on Income’ which was signed May 23, 1995, and composed of 29 
articles.229  
     Within this legal framework, bilateral economic relations have taken place, and 
developed rapidly. The bulk of the economic relations between Turkey and China is 
constituted by bilateral trade. 
 
Table VII: Main Data on Bilateral Trade between Turkey and China since 2000 
(1000 $) 230   
 
Year Exports 
Place in 
Turkey’s 
Total 
Exports 
(%) 
Place in 
China’s 
Total 
Imports 
(%) 
Imports 
Place in 
Turkey’s 
Total 
Imports 
(%) 
Place in 
China’s 
Total 
Exports 
(%) 
Trade 
Volume 
Trade 
Balance 
2000 96.010 0,35 0,04 1.344.731 2,48 0,54 1.440.741 -1.248.721 
2001 199.373 0,64 0,09 925.620 2,24 0,35 1.124.993 -726.247 
2002 268.229 0,74 0,10 1.368.317 2,65 0,42 1.636.546 -1.100.088 
2003 504.626 1,07 0,12 2.610.298 3,77 0,60 3.114.924 -2.105.672 
2004 391.585 0,62 0,07 4.476.077 4,58 0,75 4.867.662 -4.084.492 
2005 549.764 0,75 0,08 6.885.400 5,89 0,89 7.435.164 -6.335.636 
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 For the full text of the Agreement, see, “Türkiye ile Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti Arasında Yatırımların 
Karşılıklı Teşviki ve Korunmasına İlişkin Anlaşma [Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and 
the People’s Republic of China Concerning The Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments],” Resmi Gazete, No. 21921 (May 1, 1994), pp. 1-21. 
229
 For the full text of the Agreement, see, “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti Arasında 
Gelir Üzerinden Alınan Vergilerde Çifte Vergilendirmeyi Önleme ve Vergi Kaçakçılığına Engel Olma 
Anlaşması [Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the People’s Republic of China for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on 
Income],” Resmi Gazete, No. 22863 (December 30, 1996), pp. 168-228.  
230
 “Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti [People’s Republic of China],” T.C. Başbakanlık Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı 
[Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry, Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade]. For the figures from 1996 
to 2006, see, Appendix III. 
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2006 693.038 0,81 0,09 9.588.249 6,98 0,99 10.281.287 -8.895.211 
 
     Turkish-Chinese commercial relations are booming mainly due to the rapid 
increase in Turkish imports from China. In six years, from 2001 to 2006, Turkish 
imports from China witnessed a tremendous leap of 935, 87 %. Accordingly, while 
China was absent in the list of the first ten countries in Turkish imports in 2001, it 
entered the list and ranked 10th in 2002, 8th in 2003, 6th in 2004, 4th in 2005, and 3rd 
in 2006 just behind Russia and Germany.231 Apart from substantially influencing 
bilateral economic relations between Turkey and China, immense increase in Turkish 
imports from China has also become a fundamental factor in the changes observed in 
Turkish foreign imports. For example, China’s forceful entry, with Iran, in the list 
indicated above seems to be the primary factor behind the fall of Japan, with Algeria, 
from the list.232 
     Commodities mainly from six sectors constitute the bulk of Turkish imports from 
China. These sectors are office machines and communication devices (22 %), 
consumer goods (16 %), electrical machines (12 %), textiles and garments (11 %), 
half-manufactured goods (10 %), and non-electrical machines (9 %).233 In particular, 
motorbikes, parts for printing machines, phones, anthracite, toys, air conditioners, 
polyvinyl chloride (PVC), video cameras, footwear, and suitcases and purses are the 
main commodities imported from China.234   
     Turkish exports to China, on the other hand, have not increased as remarkably as 
the imports. From 2001 to 2006, Turkish exports to China increased 207, 61 %. 
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 Source: Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı [Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade], 
http://www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmadmin/upload/AB/EuromedEntegrasyonDb/Turkiye_pay.xls. For the lists 
of 2001 and 2006, see, Appendix IV. 
232
 See, Appendix IV. 
233
 “Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti [People’s Republic of China],” T.C. Başbakanlık Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı 
[Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry, Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade]. 
234
 Ibid. This report of Turkish Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade written in Turkish includes a 
meticulous list of commodities imported from and exported to China.  
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While in 2006 Turkish imports from China represented nearly 7 % of its total 
imports, Turkish exports to China could not amount to even 1 % of its total exports. 
Thus, China has never entered the list of the first ten countries in Turkish exports as 
opposed to its place in Turkish imports. In 2006, Turkish exports to China ranked 
24th in Turkish total exports, with China being behind the countries, such as United 
Arab Emirates, Poland, and Denmark.235 
     Turkish exports to China are not as diversified as its imports therefrom. 
Commodities mainly from four sectors constitute the bulk of Turkish exports to 
China. These sectors are mine ores and mineral waste (51 %), chemicals (17 %), 
machines and transportation vehicles (12 %), and agricultural products (8 %).236 In 
particular, marble and travertine, chromium ore, boron compounds mainly disodium 
tetraborate, also known as borax, scrap copper, motor vehicles, and zinc are the main 
commodities exported to China.237   
     Bilateral commercial relations have constantly been associated with a growing 
trade deficit for Turkey since 1995. In absolute terms, the trade deficit increased 
1135, 95 % in six years, from 2001 to 2006. In relative terms, the result is no less 
striking. The ratio of trade deficit to total trade volume peaked in 1999 with 92, 13 
%, then decreased in 2001 to 64, 56 %, and then again increased to 86, 62 % in 
2006.238 In 2006, China ranked second after Russia in the list of countries with which 
Turkey had the largest trade deficit.239 It can be argued that imbalance in bilateral 
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 Source: Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı [Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade], 
http://www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmadmin/upload/EAD/IstatistikDb/eko08.xls. 
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 “Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti [People’s Republic of China],” T.C. Başbakanlık Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı 
[Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry, Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade]. 
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 Ibid: 
238
 My calculations that are based on the figures provided by Turkish Statistical Institute. See, 
Appendix III. 
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 Source: Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı [Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade], 
http://www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmadmin/upload/AB/EuromedEntegrasyonDb/Turkiye_acigi.xls. Of note, 4 of 
the 15 polities are East Asian polities, which are China (2nd), South Korea (5th), Japan (7th), and 
Taiwan (12th).  
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trade is more about the ratio of trade deficit to total trade volume than the sheer 
quantity of trade deficit itself. In that sense, Turkish-Chinese commercial relations 
are quite imbalanced, even in comparison to Turkish commercial relations with states 
with which Turkey has experienced the largest trade deficits.  
      
 Table VIII: The Ratio of Turkish Trade Deficit to Its Total Trade with Countries 
with which Turkey Experienced the Largest Trade Deficits in 2006 240 
China Russia Germany Iran  South Korea  
86, 62 % 69, 23 % 20, 78 %  68, 12 % 91, 60 % 
    
     
     Despite unprecedented, albeit uneven, development of bilateral commercial 
relations, meager increase has been observed in bilateral direct investments. As of 
September 2007, 305 Chinese firms have been operating in Turkey.241 It appears that 
Chinese firms have shown growing interest in the flourishing Turkish market as the 
number of Chinese firms operating in Turkey increased threefold in six years, from 
101 in 2002 to 305 in 2007. 242 Sill, as of September 2007, Chinese firms represents 
only 1, 69 % of the foreign firms operating in Turkey.243 On the other hand, as of 
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 My calculations that are based on figures provided by Turkish Statistical Institute. See, Türkiye 
İstatistik Kurumu [Turkish Statistical Institute], 
http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=624, and 
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 “Uluslararası Doğrudan Yatırım Verileri Bülteni [Data Bulletin on International Direct 
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242
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Undersecretariat of Treasury], p. 31, 
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Investment],” TC Başbakanlık Hazine Müsteşarlığı [Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry, 
Undersecretariat of Treasury], p. 9. Total number of foreign firms operating in Turkey is 18.028. By 
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February 2008, according to Turkish-Chinese Business Council, the number of 
Turkish firms operating in China is reportedly around 500.244 The coastal Chinese 
city Shanghai is the main destination for Turkish firms as 36 of the 66 Turkish firms 
specified in a report published in 2006 by The Office of the Commercial Counselor 
of Turkish Embassy in Beijing is located in Shanghai.245   
     In 2005, Turkey attracted $ 8.538 million in foreign direct investment and 
“Chinese investment in Turkey was only slightly more than $ 1 million.”246 This 
negligible amount of Chinese direct investment notwithstanding, recent Chinese 
provision of $ 720 million credit for Ankara-İstanbul High Speed Train Project 
marked a huge leap in Chinese activism in the Turkish economy and signified 
growing Chinese attention to investment opportunities in Turkey. 247  Turkish 
investments in China, on the other hand, amounted to nearly $ 22 million in 2005, 
representing only 0, 037 % of foreign direct investment that China attracted in that 
year.248 Still, Turkish investments were greater than the direct investments in China 
of each country bordering Turkey, indicative of the greater economic activism of the 
Turkish businessman in the Chinese market than that of Greek or Iranian.249 
 
                                                                                                                                     
comparison, for example, German firms represent 17, 20 %, American firms 4, 63 %, British firms, 
10, 04 %, and Iranian firms 4, 93 %.  
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  “Sarımsak İşlemek İçin Bile Çin’e Giden Türk Şirketi Var [There is Even Turkish Company That 
Goes to China to Process Garlic ],” Zaman, February 6, 2008, 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=648355. 
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 Mesut Çevikalp and Osman Erol, “Çin Büyükelçisi: Türk Mallarına Öncelik Veririz [Chinese 
Ambassador: We would Prioritize Turkish Commodities],” p. 34. 
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 Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 2006, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2006/indexeh.htm. 
According to Chinese statistics, China attracted $ 60.324.590.000 in foreign direct investment in 
2005. Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 2006, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2006/indexeh.htm.  
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The figures are as follows: Armenia – N/A, Azerbaijan - $ 740.000, Bulgaria – $ 230.000, Georgia – 
N/A, Greece - $ 1.840.000, Iran - $ 4.200.000, Iraq - $ 3.110.000, Syria - $ 960.000. Ibid. 
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Table IX: Turkish Investments in the Chinese Market from 2000 to 2005 (1.000 $) 
250
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
After 2005, on the other hand, Turkish investments in the Chinese market have 
considerably increased with the ventures of several Turkish firms. For example, in 
2007, Sabancı Group bought 99, 5 % of IQNE Qingdao Nylon Enterprise operating 
in Tianjin, a subsidiary firm of the US-based Invista Group, for $ 70 million while 
Dönmez Leatherworking, an İzmir-based Turkish firm, made an investment of about 
$ 15 million in Shandong in a joint venture.251   
     As a matter of fact, Turkish-Chinese economic relations have been characterized 
by a steady, modest development. However, there have been factors that seem to 
have adversely affected the development of economic relations between Turkey and 
China, which are to militate against the development of bilateral economic relations 
in the future if not dealt with in a proper manner.  
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 Source: Several editions of the Statistical Yearbook of China, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2006/indexeh.htm; 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/yb2004-e/indexeh.htm; 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/YB2002e/ml/indexE.htm. 
251
 “Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti Ülke Bülteni Eylül 2007 [People’s Republic of China Country Bulletin, 
September 2007],” Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu [Foreign Economic Relations Board], September 
2007, p. 19, http://www.deik.org.tr/Lists/Bulten/Attachments/61/Microsoft%20Word%20-
%20bulteneylul2007_TR.pdf; Mesut Çevikalp and Osman Erol, “Çin Büyükelçisi: Türk Mallarına 
Öncelik Veririz [Chinese Ambassador: We would Prioritize Turkish Commodities],” p. 36. For more 
information on  main Turkish firms operating in China and their activities in the Chinese market and 
on main Chinese firms operating in Turkey and their activities, see, “Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti Ülke 
Bülteni Eylül 2007 [People’s Republic of China Country Bulletin, September 2007],” Dış Ekonomik 
İlişkiler Kurulu [Foreign Economic Relations Board], pp. 17-20. 
Year Quantity 
2000     1.480 
2001     3.370 
2002     2.430 
2003     12.700 
2004     7.450 
2005     22.160 
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     The first of these factors is the absence of a suitable economic environment for 
bilateral economic activities. Absence of Turkish construction companies in the 
Chinese market is an illustrative example. As early as the mid-1990s, Turkish 
commentators were indicating vast market opportunities in the Chinese infrastructure 
market for Turkish contracting firms. For instance, Mehmet Öğütçü argued that 
“Turkey, no matter how competitive the market will be, may step in to establish a 
reasonable presence in this booming infrastructure market,” and “Turkish contracting 
firms will enhance their prospects if they can afford to undertake a few prestigious 
projects in China.”252  
     Even though Turkish contracting companies have made a strong presence in the 
world contracting market thereafter 253 , “there is not any tender undertaken by 
Turkish contractors in People’s Republic of China” as of September 2006.254 Indeed, 
lucrative and booming Chinese market presents a suitable economic environment for 
the foreign contracting companies. However, in the context of Turkish-Chinese 
economic relations, it does not present a suitable economic environment for Turkish 
contracting companies due to several reasons. A principal reason pertains to 
financing. In general, foreign companies, first, have to finance their projects 
themselves which requires the possession of a considerable amount of capital in 
advance to invest. Then, they have to sell their completed constructions to make 
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Contracting Services Country Profile],” TC Başbakanlık Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı [Republic of 
Turkey, Prime Ministry, Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade], September 2006, p. 9, 
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profit which involves financial risks.255 This is why, according to M. Göktuğ Bayrı, 
Commercial Attaché at the Shanghai Consulate of Turkey, “there are not so many 
opportunities for Turkish contractors [in the Chinese market].”256 In short, financial 
constraints and market risks have rendered the Chinese market unsuitable for the 
Turkish contracting firms.257   
     The second factor that seems to have adversely affected the development of 
bilateral economic relations is the existence of economic areas wherein the two sides 
compete. First, Turkish goods are in severe competition with the imported goods 
from China in the Turkish domestic market and, to the chagrin of the Turkish 
manufacturers, the market share of Turkish goods in several sectors have been 
diminished due to the exponential flow of Chinese goods into the Turkish domestic 
market. According to a report prepared by Ankara Chamber of Commerce that 
examined the market shares of imported goods from China in thirty different sectors, 
Chinese goods constitute 95 % of the toy sector, 90 % of the cellular phone 
accessories sector, 55 % of electronics sector, 55 % of medical devices sector, and 50 
% of wearing glasses sector.258 According to the same report, which persistently 
refers the exponential inflow of Chinese goods as ‘the Chinese infestation’, 140 out 
of 160 manufacturing Turkish firms were closed down in just one year in the wearing 
glasses sector.259  
     Therefore, vociferous appeals for the immediate implementation of protective 
measures against Chinese goods that are undercutting Turkish goods and shrinking 
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their market shares have been constantly uttered. For example, to Sinan Aygün, 
Chairman of Ankara Chamber of Commerce (ATO), “[Turkish] Government has to 
protect and look after the Turkish industrialists. Each vessel that is laden with 
Chinese goods and is approaching to Turkish ports closes one factory in Turkey. 
Turkey is exactly face to face with a Chinese infestation.”260   
     Consonant with these sorts of appeals, several reports and academic articles have 
meticulously examined the types of protective measures which the Turkish 
government can implement efficaciously against the inflow Chinese goods 
considered inimical to the Turkish industry. For example, a report prepared by 
Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodities Exchanges (TOBB) states that “it is 
noticed that importation from China is effecting domestic production and domestic 
market seriously and in significant measures. Accordingly, taking necessary 
measures to avert problems that this situation has yielded constitute an article of 
primary importance in the agenda.”261 Subsequently, the report specifies and explains 
ten different types of protective measures that can be implemented by the Turkish 
government “to compete with Chinese goods in world markets and in the [Turkish] 
domestic market.”262 By the same token, Rezan Tatlıdil and Keti Ventura argue that 
“while it is necessary to lift trade barriers in international trade and realize free 
competition, it is also necessary to protect domestic industry against external 
competition to realize economic development of countries.”263 Then, they identify 
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six types of protective measures that can be implemented by the Turkish government, 
mainly against “importation from China that is to bring about unfair competition.”264    
     In fact, successive Turkish governments have adopted a myriad of protective 
measures against imports from China. Turkish Official Gazette is replete with 
notifications from the Turkish Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade (DTM) related to 
implementation, prolongation, amendment, and abrogation of different sorts of 
protective measures against imports from China, including quotas and anti-damping 
duties, and especially regarding the textile industry.265 Although protective measures 
are adopted to sustain a favorable environment for Turkish domestic industry, they 
are unfavorable to Turkish-Chinese commercial relations as they limit total trade 
volume between the two countries. Besides, and in particular, business relations of 
Turkish importers with China are inevitably impaired, or at least restricted. 
Furthermore, adoption of protective measures carries the potential of being a cause of 
contention between Turkey and Chine due to possible Chinese frustration over the 
effects of these protective measures.   
     Second, Turkish goods are in serious competition with Chinese goods in world 
markets. “In the international market, China is in a position of being a major rival of 
Turkey in textiles, food, and contraction sectors.”266 The underlying reason of this 
troubling competition in the international market is the fact that “like China, Turkey 
is attempting to expand its footprint in the global marketplace via a combination of 
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expertise and low labor costs.”267 Concurring with the existence of a competition but 
disagreeing with its severity, Sun Guoxiang, Chinese Ambassador to Turkey, states 
that “contrary to what is experienced in the world, there is an agreeable, cordial 
competition between us [Turkey and China]. There is an agreeable competition 
between Turkey and China. Indeed, competition between friendly countries is a 
friendly one.”268   
    Still, especially with the Chinese membership in World Trade Organization 
(WTO) on December 11, 2001, and the subsequent lifting of global textile quotas on 
January 1, 2005, the competition with Chinese goods in the international market has 
become more intense for Turkish manufacturers. Accordingly, against the frightful 
prospect of being overrun in its traditional export markets in a short period of time 
due to the unrestricted inflow of relatively cheaper Chinese goods, Turkey endorsed 
‘Istanbul Declaration’ in March 2004 and, with other signatories, “call[ed] upon the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) to act immediately to extend the deadline for 
implementation of the final integration stage to December 31, 2007” due to “the 
threat of massive trade and economic disruption associated with the ending of the 
current textile regime on January 1, 2005.”269  As it is indicated, these sorts of 
Turkish initiatives, especially those in WTO, have had a negative impact on Turkish-
Chinese relations.270 For instance, in July 2005, subsequent to a “proposal tabled by 
Turkey on establishing a work program in the Goods Council of the WTO to fully 
and periodically review global textile,” Chinese officials argued that the proposal 
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was “one-sided and unacceptable” and “Turkey was attempting to make China a 
scapegoat by using dubious figures and hasty generalizations.”271 
     The third factor that seems to have adversely affected the development of 
economic relations between Turkey and China pertains to structural problems 
observed in the Chinese domestic market. Principal problems militating against 
Turkish economic activities in the Chinese market are the violation of intellectual 
property rights and forgery, opaqueness of the Chinese regulations and regional 
variations thereof, problems related to entry into the domestic market, problems 
related to standardization, and problems related to commercial banking 
procedures.272 In addition, according to Bekir Aslaner, former Commercial Attaché 
of Turkey at the Beijing Embassy, Turkish exportation efforts are negatively affected 
by additional factors, such as protectionist proclivities in the Chinese market and 
difficulty to obtain reliable information on the market.273      
 
4. 3. Turkish-Chinese Social and Cultural Relations 
     Social and cultural relations between Turkey and China appear to be the least 
developed realm of bilateral relations. The first Chinese-Turkish dictionary has been 
published in 2007, that is, 36 years after the establishment of diplomatic relations, 
which is conspicuously indicative of the low level of social and cultural relations.274 
Still, precursory developments in social and cultural relations can be discerned, 
especially considering educational issues and tourism.   
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     Several agreements have been signed by the Turkish and Chinese governments on 
issues related to social and cultural relations. As an example, on November 9, 1993, 
‘Cultural Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China’ was signed according to which “The 
Two Contracting Parties agree, in accordance with the principles of equality and 
mutual benefit, to promote exchanges and cooperation between the two countries in 
the fields of culture, education, science, sport, publication, the press and 
broadcasting.” 275  Furthermore, several steps, which are basically of symbolic 
significance, have been undertaken by the two governments. For example, Beijing, 
Shanghai, Tianjin, Xi'an, Rizhao, Anshan, Nanjing, Bengbu, Zhenjiang and Panjin 
are declared sister cities with Ankara, İstanbul, İzmir, Konya, Trabzon, Bursa, 
Mersin, Sican (?), İzmit and Yalova. 276  In addition, state-owned China Radio 
International has maintained its Turkish programs for half a century since their 
inception on October 21, 1957.277      
      It should be underscored that the Turkish public seems to be more enthusiastic 
about forging and promoting relations with China than its Chinese counterpart. 
Several centers and associations, such as Association of Social and Economic 
Cooperation with Pacific Countries (PASİAD) and Turkish-Chinese Friendship and 
Solidarity Association (TÜÇİAD), and branches thereof have been established in 
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main Turkish cities.278 On the other hand, there is not any association or foundation 
established by Turkish people in China.279 
     Educational relations have yet to flourish because of several reasons. One of the 
main reasons is probably the absence of undergraduate courses on different aspects 
of Chinese politics in Turkish universities, which would have induced some Turkish 
students to embark on graduate studies or researches on China. None of the five most 
renowned Turkish universities, i.e., Bilkent University, Boğaziçi University, İstanbul 
Bilgi University, Koç University, and Middle East Technical University, offers any 
course on China in their undergraduate curricula. Only Boğaziçi University offers a 
course entitled ‘Politics in Asia and the Pacific’ and another course on Japan entitled 
‘Japanese Political and Economic Dynamics’.280 On the other hand, three Turkish 
universities have departments on Chinese language and literature. Ankara University 
hosts the Department of Sinology, Erciyes University, located in Kayseri, hosts the 
Department of Chinese Language and Literature, and Fatih University, located in 
İstanbul, hosts the Department of Chinese Language and Literature. 281  On the 
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Chinese part, Beijing Foreign Studies University has a Turkish Program under its 
Afro-Asian Languages Department.282 
     Currently, about 60 Turkish students are enrolled in Chinese universities, which 
constitute a very small portion of foreign students studying in China, and also a very 
small portion of Turkish students studying abroad.283  Chinese government has a 
policy of assigning annual scholarships for Turkish students. In 2007, only 5 
scholarships were assigned to Turkish students.284 According to Zheng Jinfa, Ankara 
representative of the state-owned Xinhua News Agency of China, this number should 
have been increased as the Chinese economy was improving.285 In line with Zheng 
Jinfa’s suggestion, the Chinese government has increased the number of scholarships 
available to Turkish students to 9 in 2008.286   
     Tourism is another area wherein bilateral relations between Turkey and China 
have shown some level of development. The immense number of Chinese tourists 
visiting abroad has already attracted the attention of Turkish policymakers and 
businessmen alike. In his meeting with the then Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, Bülent 
Ecevit, the then Turkish Prime Minister, expressed his desire “to see…more Chinese 
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tourists visiting his country [Turkey].”287 It is a general conviction in Turkish public 
that “with Chinese tourists, our [Turkey’s] tourism sector is to soar.”288 Even tough 
the number of Chinese tourists visiting Turkey has steadily increased over the recent 
years, it has yet to reach remarkable levels.  
 
Table X: Visitors from China to Turkey from 1999 to 2007 289  
 
On the other hand, the number of Turkish people visiting China was reportedly 
around 63.000 in 2006.290 That the number of Turkish tourists visiting China was 
higher than the number of Chinese tourists visiting Turkey is indicative of the greater 
interest in the Turkish public to China, given the greater number of Chinese tourists 
visiting abroad.291  
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CHAPTER V 
 
TURKISH-CHINESE MILITARY RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
     Turkish-Chinese military relations yielded quite substantial results in the second 
half of the 1990s when Turkey signed million dollar agreements with China for 
advanced weapon systems. However, thereafter bilateral military relations between 
Turkey and China have not engendered additional substantial results despite several 
developments in other areas of military cooperation, such as signing new military 
cooperation agreements and several bilateral visits of high level military personnel. 
     Being a thorough examination of bilateral military relations between Turkey and 
China, this chapter is composed of two main parts. The first part employs the 
typology propounded in the first chapter for an analysis of bilateral military relations. 
Accordingly, it describes in detail the developments observed in each area of 
bilateral military relations between Turkey and China in order to reveal the exact 
nature and the precise level of these relations. The second part argues that even 
though the two sides have been willing to advance military cooperation, Turkish-
Chinese military relations have displayed a low level of development due to several 
reasons. First, the factors that have induced Ankara and Beijing to sustain and to 
improve bilateral military relations are analyzed. Second, the factors that have 
precluded them from advancing their military relations are sc
 91 
 
5. 1. Bilateral Military Relations: The Situation  
     Turkey engages in a myriad of relations of military nature with other states and, 
also with international organizations. Viewed in their entirety, these relations 
constitute a state’s foreign military relations. The analytical framework propounded 
in Chapter 1 can be employed for an analysis of bilateral military relations between 
Turkey and China through segregating the entirety of foreign military relations into 
four categories according to their distinctive subject matters. These four categories 
can be called as formal military relations, operational military relations, technical 
military relations, and organizational military relations.  
 
5. 1. 1. Formal Military Relations 
     Formal military relations constitute the general foundations of bilateral military 
relations and determine the contours of their official conduct. First of all, the 
establishment of a military/defense attaché office as a part of a state’s diplomatic 
mission abroad seems to represent a strong political will to forge bilateral military 
relations with another state. The mutual establishment of military/defense attaché 
offices appears to be an indispensable threshold for the military relations of two 
states below which it is rather difficult to speak of genuine bilateral military 
relations. 
     Military attachés, in general, “are responsible for representing their service with 
the host country and within the diplomatic corps, explaining [home country’s] 
defense policy, gathering information on military affairs, and arranging and escorting 
visiting delegations.”292 It seems plausible to argue that the number of a particular 
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state’s military attaché offices abroad demonstrates correspondingly the extent of the 
military relations of that particular state around the world. For example, while in 
1987 China had military attaché offices in 60 countries, the number rose to 99 in 
1998.293 In 2006, “China has established military ties with over 150 countries and 
military attaché offices in 107 countries.”294 On the other hand, as of March 2008, 
Turkey has military attaché offices in 52 countries.295 China is evidently much more 
active than Turkey in its bilateral military relations around the world. In terms of 
Turkish-Chinese military relations, Turkey established a military attaché office at its 
Beijing Embassy in 1973. Currently, Staff Colonel İsmail Gürgen is serving as 
Turkish military attaché in Beijing.296 On the other hand, Chinese military attaché 
office at its Ankara Embassy has been active since 1977.297  
     Second, a variety of agreements between two states dealing with matters of 
military nature, or simply military agreements, officially define the areas of 
cooperation between two states, and thus, as starting points, determine main routes 
for the conduct of military relations in the future. Among a variety of military 
agreements, some are considered more significant than others for the military 
relations of two states. Mutual security and defense treaties are of paramount 
importance which formally signify an alliance. For example, today, the US-led 
alliance system is the predominant security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region. 
“This system is commonly referred to as the “hub and spokes” model, with the 
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United States serving as the hub of a wheel with each of the five bilateral alliances 
(Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand) serving as the 
spokes.”298 The foundations of US alliances, and thus the basis of the US-led alliance 
system in Asia-Pacific, are the security and defense treaties that the US signed with 
each of the five countries.299  
     In addition, the number of military agreements signed between two states is 
indicative of the level of their bilateral military relations. According to Haydar 
Çakmak, Turkey has signed 20 military agreements of various sorts with Germany, 
14 with Pakistan, 13 with Israel, 9 with Russia, 8 with France, 7 with England.300 As 
a corollary, for example, it can be argued that Turkish-Pakistani military relations are 
broader in scope than Turkish-British military relations. However, the numbers given 
by Çakmak seem to be inconclusive since Turkey, according to the information given 
by Turkish General Staff, has signed 47 military agreements with Azerbaijan and 45 
military agreements with Georgia.301  
     Displaying a low level of bilateral military relations, Turkey has so far signed 
three military agreements with China. The first agreement is ‘Defense Industry 
Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the 
Government of People’s Republic of China’, which was signed on May 29, 1997 by 
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Turkish Ministry of Defense.302 The second agreement is ‘Cooperation Protocol on 
Military Education between the General Staff of the Republic of Turkey and 
People’s Liberation Army [PLA] of the People’s Republic of China’, which was 
signed by Turkish General Staff on May 28, 1999, and then ratified by the Turkish 
Cabinet on June 30, 1999.303 The third agreement is ‘Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) on Turkish Naval Special Warfare Basic Training Course between the 
General Staff of the Republic of Turkey and the General Staff of People’s Liberation 
Army [PLA] of the People’s Republic of China’, which was signed by Turkish 
General Staff on April 30, 2003, and then ratified by the Turkish Cabinet on June 2, 
2003.304  
     Contrary to the two previous agreements, the content of the last agreement on 
naval special warfare basic training course is made public. The agreement is 
composed of 22 articles and one annex.305 That Turkey is the side that provides the 
training seems to reveal the Chinese appreciation of the Turkish competency on 
naval special warfare and its desire to avail its armed forces of Turkish experience 
and training. According to the agreement, “the Chinese Trainee Personnel to attend 
the Course should have a good command of the written and spoken Turkish 
language” (Article 6) and also it is specified that “the price of the course for the per 
Chinese Trainee Personnel is USD 7.000” (Article 11).306 On the other hand, the 
agreement is temporarily in effect since “the duration of this MOU is as long as that 
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of the duration of the Turkish Naval Special Warfare Basic Training Course to be 
provided to the 11 Chinese Trainee Personnel” (Article 20).307  Even though the 
number of Chinese military personnel trained under this MOU is not officially made 
public, it is reported that, for example, two Chinese military personnel, along with 
sixteen military personnel from Turkey and one from Georgia, successfully 
completed their training in 2004-2005 School Year.308   
     Furthermore, deliberations between Turkey and China to sign three more military 
agreements are underway. The first is an agreement on mutual protection of 
confidential information and material exchanged within the framework of defense 
industry cooperation. The second is a memorandum of understanding on cooperation 
in the area of defense research and technology. The third is also a memorandum of 
understanding on mutual education of officers at Turkish War Academies and 
Chinese National Defense Universities.309    
     Third, reciprocal visits between two states of senior military personnel from high-
ranking officer cadres of their armed forces, together with the visits of delegations of 
low profile from different branches of armed forces, constitute the principal conduit 
for military-to-military contacts. First of all, the first visit of a high ranking military 
personnel, mostly the chief of general staff, paid to another state is generally 
highlighted and considered as the advent of a new era in bilateral relations, 
particularly in bilateral military relations. For example, the visit of İsmail Hakkı 
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Karadayı to Israel in February 1997 has been frequently referred in analyses of 
Turkish-Israeli relations as it was the first visit of a Turkish Chief of Staff ever paid 
to Israel.310  
     Moreover, high frequency of bilateral visits of high level military personnel 
between two states can possibly be considered as an indication of quite strong 
military relations between these states. At least, frequent bilateral visits can be 
considered as an indication of a strong will to develop bilateral military relations. For 
instance, Chinese sources specify ‘major international exchanges of the Chinese 
military.’ According to these sources, from 2001 to 2006, there were 10 major 
international exchanges between the armed forces of Turkey and China. By 
comparison, there were 13 major military exchanges between China and Greece, 7 
between China and Syria, 5 between China and Bulgaria, 2 between China and Iran, 
2 between China and Armenia, and 1 between China and Georgia.311 Accordingly, it 
can be concluded, China and Greece displayed stronger will to develop their bilateral 
military relations. 
     Another important point related to reciprocal military visits is the timing of their 
taking place. Habitual ones aside, the timing of high level military exchanges bears 
some significance in understanding and analyzing bilateral military relations, in 
particular, and bilateral relations, in general, between two states. For example, the 
timing of the visit of Dan Halutz, former Israeli Chief of Staff, to Turkey that took 
place in December 2005 has generally been called attention as the visit of Israeli 
Chief of Staff followed previous visits to Turkey of Robert Mueller, Director of the 
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FBI, and Porter J. Ross, former Director of the CIA, and it took place at a time when 
there was a widespread speculation on a possible Israeli assault against Iranian 
nuclear facilities.312 
     Regarding Turkish-Chinese military relations, Yang Dezgi, Chinese Chief of 
General Staff, visited Turkey in October 1985 and it was reciprocated by the visit of 
Necdet Üruğ, Turkish Chief of General Staff in November 1986. After a long 
interval, Turkish Chief of General Staff Doğan Güreş visited China in 1993, and it 
was reciprocated by the visit of Chinese Chief of General Staff in 1995. The 
following year Yu Zhen Wu, Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force 
(PLAAF) visited Turkey. And, in 1999, Turkish Commander of Land Forces Atilla 
Ateş paid a visit to China.313 
     It is recently observed that five high level military exchanges took place in 2001, 
which invigorated bilateral military relation to some extent. However, the following 
years till 2005 were to witness a sudden decrease in the number of high level military 
exchanges. In three years, from 2002 to 2004, only one visit was to take place. 
Recent reciprocal visits of Turkish and Chinese commanders seem to have brought 
about a moderate dynamism to bilateral military relations between Ankara and 
Beijing. 
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Table XI: High Level Military Exchanges between Turkey and China from 2001 to 
2008 314 
 
Outgoing Turkish Military Personnel Incoming Chinese Military Personnel 
2001 April - İlhami Erdil - Commander of 
the Navy 
2001 June - Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu - Chief of 
General Staff 
2002 April - Halil İbrahim Fırtına - 
Commander of Turkish War Colleges 
2006 July - Aydoğan Babaoğlu - 
Commander of Turkish War Colleges 
2007 June - İlker Başbuğ - Commander of 
Land Forces 
2001 March - Liu Shunyao - Commander of  
PLA Air Force 
2001 April - …- Commander of the National 
Defense University 
2001 May - Shugen Quian - Deputy Chief of 
General Staff 
2005 May - Liang Guanglie - Chief of 
General Staff 
2006 October - Qiao Qingchen - 
Commander of PLA Air Force  
2007 December - Zhang Li - Deputy Chief 
of General Staff 
 
 
     In addition to high level military exchanges, several visits of delegations of low 
profile from different branches of Turkish and Chinese armed forces and their 
respective armed industries have been taking place. For example, in 2002, a Chinese 
delegation headed by Guohong Xia, President of the China Aerospace Science and 
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Industry Corporation (CASIC), paid a visit to Military Electronics Industry 
(ASELSAN), a Turkish multi-product electronics company founded by Turkish 
Armed Forces Foundation in 1975.315 Yet another recent example is the visit of a 
Chinese delegation in April 2007 headed by Chen Qiufa, Vice Minister of 
Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) 
paid to Turkish Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM).316  Through these 
sorts of visits of delegations, it can be argued, Turkish and Chinese armed forces 
have been able to have close acquaintance with each other and to observe and to 
discuss possible areas of cooperation.  
     Fourth, student exchanges between military education institutions of two states 
constitute an important, if not essential, part of formal military relations.317 Kristen 
Gunness, Deputy Director of the CNA Corporation's China Studies Center, argues 
that “professional military education exchanges through the PLA’s [People’s 
Liberation Army] professional military education system” constitutes an integral part 
of China’s military diplomacy.318 According to Chinese sources, in 2005 and 2006, 
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“over 500 military personnel have been dispatched to study in more than 20 
countries, and over 2.000 military personnel from more than 140 countries have 
come to China to study in military schools.”319 Turkey, on the other hand, “has 
hitherto trained 20.034 MAP [Visiting Military Personnel] from 49 friendly and 
allied states.”320 In 2007-2008 School Year, 971 visiting military personnel from 29 
different states are educated and trained in Turkish military educational 
institutions.321 
     With regard to bilateral military relations between Ankara and Beijing, military 
students have been exchanged between the military institutions of the two states in 
line with the provisions of the aforementioned ‘Cooperation Protocol on Military 
Education’ signed by Turkey and China. However, it is stated by the Turkish General 
Staff that the number of the students reciprocally trained at the military institutions of 
Turkey and China cannot be made public according to Article 15/2 of the 
‘Cooperation Protocol on Military Education.322  
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5. 1. 2. Operational Military Relations 
     Cooperative or conflictual relations between two states that involve the 
employment of weapon systems constitute operational military relations.323 First of 
all, port visits of a state’s naval warships to another state signify a certain level of 
cordial military relations between these two states, and thus deserve close attention. 
Historically speaking, for example, the foundation of the cordial relations between 
Turkey and Japan was cemented by a port visit of an Ottoman frigate, Ertuğrul, 
which paid a visit to the Port of Yokohama on June 7, 1890 and subsequently sunk in 
a storm on Japanese waters on September 16, 1890.324  
     Trivial as it may seem, apart from habitual ones, port visits do occasionally come 
to the front in international politics due to several reasons. A prominent one is the 
convenience of port visits to convey implicit messages to a specific audience. For 
example, by dispatching the USS Missouri to Turkey on March 22, 1946, which 
carried the remains of Turkish Ambassador Münir Ertegün aboard, “Washington had 
not so subtly reminded the Soviet Union and others that the United States was a great 
military power and that it could project this power abroad, even to shores far 
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distant.”325 Another way of conveying implicit messages to international audience is 
a refusal of home state to grant access to the warships of a particular state for a port 
visit. Recently, in November 2007, in three separate occasions, Chinese authorities 
denied the requests of American warships, including the USS Kitty Hawk carrier 
group, to dock at the Port of Hong Kong. According to some commentators, with 
these events, “a precedent has been established in which Chinese authorities [had] 
proven themselves willing to cancel longstanding commitments to harbor and 
support U.S. military crafts” and “Washington's ability to project national power 
[had] been diminished.”326 
     Furthermore, the first visit of a naval warship of a state to the ports of another one 
is generally highlighted and considered as the advent of a new era in bilateral 
relations, particularly in bilateral military relations. For instance, in November 2007, 
Chinese “missile destroyer Shenzhen dropped anchor off Tokyo Bay… the first time 
a People's Liberation Army (PLA) ship has called at a Japanese port.”327 Opining on 
the event, Eiji Yoshikawa, Chief of the Japan Maritime Self Defense Forces, stated 
that Japanese looked forward to Chinese visit, “which [would] open a new page in 
the history of Japan-China military exchanges” and “Cui Tiankai, Chinese 
                                               
325
 See, Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, “U.S. Military Forces as a Political Instrument 
since World War II,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 94, No. 2 (Summer 1979), pp. 193-209, p. 193. 
326
 Richard Komaiko, “China’s Decision to Deny U.S. Warships from Port of Hong Kong,” PINR, 
December 5, 2007, http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=730&language_id=1. 
Even though he does not totally agree with it, Komaiko cites the opinion of other observers: “Some 
observers view these events as the prelude to an era of increased friction and decreased cooperation 
between the two governments and their respective militaries.” Ibid. Eventually, in January 2008, 
China “allowed a United States warship to make a port call in Hong Kong, two months after it turned 
away an American aircraft carrier battle group and set off a diplomatic dispute between the countries.” 
David Lague, “China Allows U.S. Port Call in Hong Kong,” The New York Times, January 29, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/29/world/asia/29ship.html. 
327
 “In a First, PLA Ship Docks at Japan Port,” People’s Daily, November 29, 2007, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6311615.html. 
 103 
ambassador to Japan, also stressed the significance of the visit in bilateral relations.” 
328
 
     With regard to Turkish-Chinese military relations, in total, there have been 4 
unofficial port visits between the two countries all requested for the recreation of the 
military personnel of respective warships. Therefore, it can be argued, they are of 
almost no significance for bilateral military relations between Ankara and Beijing. 
 
 Table XII: Port Visits between Turkey and China 329 
Name of the Ship 
Board 
Number 
Type Harbor Aim of Visit 
Date of 
Arrival 
Date of 
Departure 
[Turkey] 
TCG Turgutreis 
241 FFGH Shanghai Unofficial 12.06.2000 14.06.2000 
[China] Taicang 575 AOR Aksaz Unofficial 20.06.2002 23.06.2002 
[China] Qingdao 113 DDG Aksaz Unofficial 20.06.2002 23.06.2002 
[China] Taicang 575 AOR Bozcaada Unofficial 23.06.2002 30.06.2002 
 
     Second, armed forces of states periodically engage in joint military exercises with 
the armed forces of other states. For instance, apart from national exercises, Turkish 
Armed Forces (TAF) conduct a range of joint military exercises including NATO 
exercises, NATO/PFP [Partnership for Peace] exercises, special exercises [bilateral 
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and multilateral], invitation exercises (INVITEX), and passage exercises 
(PASSEX).330 In general, according to official sources, the rationale of conducting 
joint military exercises is “to determine and test the level of training which is 
achieved in peacetime” and “to enhance peace, friendship and cooperation” between 
the two states participating in the exercise. 331  In particular cases, however, the 
objectives of joint military exercises may vary. For instance, Turkish Chief of Staff 
declared the objective of Turkish-Rumanian Joint Commando Exercise conducted in 
June 2007 as “to promote relations and interoperability between the land forces of 
two countries and to reinforce the existing friendship and trust [between the two 
countries].”332 In another example, the Chinese Navy (PLAN) declared the objective 
of its first joint naval exercise with the Indian Navy in 2003 as to ensure “the safety 
of maritime trade and improving coordination in search and rescue at sea.”333 
     There seem to be three important points regarding bilateral military exercises. 
First of all, the first bilateral military exercise ever held between two states is 
generally considered as the advent of a new era in bilateral relations, particularly in 
bilateral military relations, between these two states participating in the exercise, and 
thus it invariably attracts international attention. For instance, Russia and China 
conducted their first ever bilateral military exercise, dubbed Peace Mission 2005, 
between the dates of August 19-25, 2005, which was also “the largest joint exercise 
China has ever conducted with any foreign military.”334 This unprecedented joint 
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exercise between Beijing and Moscow received widespread international attention. 
The general consensus among the observers was that “the games [military drills] 
were symbolic of the growing cooperation between the two powerful states.”335 It 
was also interpreted as “a show of force calculated to dissuade the US from 
presuming a dominant role in global security,”336 as “a logical step in an attempt by 
the two countries to balance American ‘hegemony’ as a ‘unipolar’ world power,”337 
and also as an “old fashioned power politics at work, aimed squarely at the 
governments in Pyongyang and Tokyo, to pressure North Korea to go back to the six 
party nuclear talks and Japan over its border claim to the Kurils.”338 
     Another important point regarding joint military exercises is the timing of their 
taking place. Habitual ones aside, the timing of joint military exercises between two 
states bears some significance in understanding and analyzing bilateral military 
relations, in particular, and bilateral relations, in general, between the two states. For 
example, Turkey launched its first naval exercise with Israel, with the participation 
of the US, called as Operation Reliant Mermaid, in January 1998 at a time when it 
was experiencing severe problems in its relations with its southern neighbors, 
especially with Syria, and its relations with Israel were advancing. Even though “the 
exercises…included only search-and-rescue maneuvers,” revealing a certain level of 
disquiet, “the Syrian Foreign Ministry spokesman characterized them as ‘war 
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games’.” 339  Besides, according to Bolukbasi, through these naval maneuvers “a 
higher stage in Turco-Israeli military cooperation was reached.”340 
     Yet another important point regarding bilateral military exercises is the total 
number of military personnel participating in the joint exercises. The size and the 
scope of military exercises, it can be argued, conveys the importance the partaking 
countries attach to the exercises. A related point pertains to the changes in the 
number of military personnel taking part in successive joint exercises. As an 
example, the number of the US military personnel participating in the joint US-
Philippine Balikatan [shoulder-to-shoulder] annual military exercises more than 
doubled between 2000 and 2006.341  Joint exercises were officially declared as a part 
of the US counterterrorism policy in the region, and it is not so easy to delineate 
increasing US involvement as against China. However, according to Robert S. Ross, 
“the focus of the exercises has expanded beyond antiterrorist activities to include 
U.S. participation in amphibious exercises in the vicinity of the Spratly Islands,”342 
over which the Philippines and China have conflicting claims.343  
     People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China has demonstrated a good deal of 
enthusiasm to conduct joint military exercises with the armed forces of other states. 
From 2002 to 2007, China “held 16 joint military exercises with 11 countries,” such 
as, Russia, Pakistan, India, Thailand, Tajikistan, and the US. 344  In addition to 
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multilateral ones, bilateral military exercises continued in 2007 with the joint 
exercises between the different branches of the PLA and the armed forces of India, 
Thailand, Russia, Britain, France, Spain, Australia, and New Zealand.345 
     Turkey, on the other hand, has been an active participant of joint military 
exercises. In 2007, for example, Turkey conducted and participated in 27 joint 
bilateral and multilateral military exercises.346 From 2004 to 2008, in addition to a 
host of multilateral military exercises, Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) conducted 
several bilateral military exercises with the armies of many countries including 
Georgia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Britain, and Pakistan. However, despite the high level 
of involvement of Turkey and China in joint international military exercises, “the 
two countries have yet to hold any bilateral joint military exercises.”347 
     Third, military bases are a constant characteristic of the global power politics and 
they are considered quiet indispensable for the implementation of regional and 
international policies of great powers. For example, today, the US sustains a global 
network of military bases. The number of the US military bases of varying sizes was 
725 in 2002, 702 in 2003, 860 in 2004, and 737 in 2005.348 According to the latest 
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version of the Base Structure Report of the US Department of Defense, there are 823 
US military ‘sites’ overseas.349  
     In terms of bilateral military relations, a military base or bases located in the 
territory of the home state and allocated for the use of the host state have always 
constituted an essential part of the military relations between these two states.350 The 
presence of a military base or bases can become a concrete symbol of geostrategic 
alignment and military cooperation between the home and host states. Yet, it is not 
unlikely that different problems concerning the presence of the military bases in the 
host state become a source of friction and disturb the relations between the two 
states. Most recently, for example, the US had to evict all its military personnel from 
the Karsh-Khanabad air base in Uzbekistan in July 2005, “which Washington had 
used as a staging ground for combat, reconnaissance, and humanitarian missions in 
Afghanistan since late 2001.”351    
     China neither has any military base outside its frontiers nor hosts any military 
base of another state on its territory. Turkey, on the other hand, hosts several military 
installations appropriated for the use of the US military, exclusively or partially, the 
                                               
349
 “Base Structure Report: Fiscal Year 2007 Baseline,” The US Department of Defense, September 
30, 2006, p. 22, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/BSR_2007_Baseline.pdf. 
350
 Any attempt to investigate several aspects of ‘base politics’ would be beyond the scope of our 
inquiry. Several scholarly studies have examined different aspects of the establishment, maintenance, 
and termination of military bases worldwide. For the historical development of the US global basing 
structure, see, Anni P. Baker, American Soldiers Overseas: The Global Military Presence (Westport, 
CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004). For the current American basing strategy and current situation of the 
US military bases overseas, see, Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. 
Military Overseas (New York: Cornell University Press, 2008). For an examination of the US/NATO 
and Russian military bases in Eurasia, see, Zdzislaw Lachowski, “Foreign Military Bases in Eurasia,” 
SIPRI Policy Paper, No. 18 (June 2007), http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP18.pdf. 
351
 Alexander Cooley, “Base Politics,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 6 (November/December 2005), 
pp. 79-92, p. 79. “The government in Tashkent gave no official reason for the expulsion, but the order 
was issued soon after the UN airlifted 439 Uzbek refugees from Kyrgyzstan to Romania a move that 
Washington supported and Tashkent opposed…The showdown was the latest in a series of 
confrontations since a much-criticized crackdown on antigovernment demonstrators in the eastern city 
of Andijon last May.” Ibid. Likewise, there have been deliberations between Russia and Georgia to 
reach an agreement on the closure of two Russian bases in Georgia. See, for example, Nikolai Sokov, 
“The Withdrawal of Russian Military Bases from Georgia: Not Solving Anything,” PONARS Policy 
Memo, No. 363 (June 2005), http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pm_0363.pdf. 
 109 
paramount of which is Incirlik Air Base.352 Being active since 1955, the current legal 
status of the base was determined by the Defense and Economic Cooperation 
Agreement signed in 1980 between the governments of Turkey and the US.353 Even 
though “Incirlik Air Base is under the command of the 10th Tanker Base Command 
of Turkish Air Forces,”354 it has been exclusively assigned by Turkish authorities to 
the use of the US military. In 2007, 1565 US Air Force personnel including 1444 
military members, 121 civilian employees were active at Incirlik Air Base.355  In 
addition to Incirlik Air Base, the US Air Force has been active at Batman, Çiğli, and 
Muş Air Bases, without permanent military and civilian personnel though.356  
     Besides, Turkey has maintained its 11th Army Corps, which consists of more than 
40000 military personnel including two mechanized infantry divisions and one 
armored brigade, in various military compounds and installations in Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).357 General Yaşar Büyükanıt, Turkish Chief of 
the General Staff, has recently reaffirmed the Turkish policy of maintaining Turkish 
troops in TRNC and dismissed any withdrawal thereof.358      
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     In terms of bilateral military relations between Ankara and Beijing, any sort of 
cooperation in this particular realm of operational military relations seems extremely 
unlikely, even in the long run. 
 
5. 1. 3. Technical Military Relations 
     Bilateral military relations between two states that pertain to the military 
modernization of the armed forces of at least one of the two states constitute 
technical military relations. First of all, for the purposes of their military 
modernizations, states may opt for direct procurement of military equipment from 
foreign sources, unless they indigenously or collaboratively manufacture it. As a 
notable example, Chinese military modernization hinges on securing constant 
procurement of advanced weapon systems and technologies from external sources in 
addition to indigenous research and development. This seems to be the prime reason 
behind China’s insistence on the cancellation of arms embargo applied by the 
member states of the then European Community (EC) as a protest against the 
suppressive measures of the Chinese government taken in the Tiananmen Square 
Incident of June 1989.359   
     Interestingly enough, China was only the third largest arms importer in 2007, after 
Greece and South Korea, with an expenditure of $ 1424 million.360 Yet, in retrospect, 
Chinese military spending on arms imports surpasses all the largest arms importers in 
the world. The military expenditure of Beijing on arms imports in the 2000 to 2007 
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time period nearly doubled the second largest importer, India, with a total 
expenditure of $ 21207 million.361 The principal supplier of Chinese imports has 
been Russia as the imports from Russia constituted 93, 5 % of Chinese arms imports 
in 2000-2007.362 The other main suppliers are, in declining order of the value of 
imports, Ukraine, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Uzbekistan, Switzerland, 
Israel, and Italy. Moreover, the bulk of the Chinese expenditure on imports is 
allocated to aircraft (53, 5 %) and ships (17, 2 %), again in 2000-2007.363   
     More specifically, China has imported an array of advanced weapon systems from 
Russia. Russian weaponry whose delivery to the service of the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) of China was completed in 2007 include, for example, beyond-visual-
range-air-to-air-missiles (BVRAAM) (600 in total), Fregat air surface radars (6 in 
total), 30N6E1 multifunction radars (2 in total), 3M-54E1 Klub antiship missiles (90 
in total), 48N6 surface-to-air missiles (SAM) (150 in total), AL-31FN turbofans (90 
in total), FR-90 fire control radars (4 in total), RD-33 turbofans (45 in total), 48N6E2 
SAMs (80 in total), Mi-17 helicopters (24 in total), and Su-27SK FGA aircrafts 
(105).364 
     Turkey, on the other hand, was the 7th largest arms importer in 2007 with a 
military expenditure of $ 944 million.365 Turkey’s rank slightly decreases in the 2000 
to 2007 time period as Turkey ranks 8th with a total military expenditure of $ 5212 
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million. Among Turkey’s neighbors, only the spending of Greece on arms imports 
exceeds that of Turkey in 2000-2007. Greek military expenditure on imports is 72, 7 
% higher than that of Turkey.366 The principal supplier of Turkish imports has been 
Germany as the imports from Germany constituted 36, 4 % of Turkish arms imports 
in 2000-2007.367 The other main suppliers are, in declining order of the value of 
imports, the US, France, Israel, Spain, Italy, South Korea, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, China, and Norway. Furthermore, the bulk of the Turkish expenditure 
on imports is allocated to ships (38, 2 %), missiles (16, 7 %), and aircraft (14, 5 
%).368  
     More specifically, Turkey has imported a range of advanced weapon systems 
from the US. The US weaponry whose delivery to the service of the Turkish Armed 
Forces (TAF) was completed between 2004 and 2007 include, for example, Mk-46 
Mod-5 NEARTIP antisubmarine warfare (ASW) torpedoes (750 in total), Dragoon 
armored personnel carriers (APC) (140 in total),   AGM-114K HELLFIRE antitank 
missiles (144 in total), AN/MPQ-64 air surface radars (8 in total), I-HAWK surface-
to-air missile (SAM) systems (8 in total), S-70/UH-60L Blackhawk helicopters (2 in 
total), and Perry/FFG-7 frigate (1 only).369 
     Regarding bilateral military relations between Ankara and Beijing, there has not 
been any officially registered instance of direct procurement of weaponry between 
the two countries. However, Salih Şarman, former governor of Batman that is a 
prefecture in southeastern Turkey, asserts that, in order to arm the paramilitary force 
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he was trying to establish at that time with appropriate weapons and equipments in 
its fight against the PKK, some of the essential weapons, ammunition, and [military] 
material were unofficially imported from China within the knowledge of the Turkish 
Chief of Staff.370    
     Second, apart from direct procurement, states may prefer establishing due 
mechanisms to manufacture military hardware of common or individual need 
through cooperative projects with one another. To Ethan B. Kapstein, “collaborative 
arrangements for the production of complex weapons systems represent a second-
best solution to the problem of defense acquisition.”371 It is worth underlining that 
there are multiple types of international cooperation in the production of weapon 
systems including licensed production, codevelopment, and coproduction.372  
     Chinese defense industry has also preferred establishing joint ventures with other 
defense industries for the manufacturing of various weapon systems. For instance, in 
1986, China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC) 
“signed an agreement with Pakistan to jointly develop the K-8 [Karakorum-8] 
trainer, an aircraft model designed for training missions, such as take-offs, landings, 
acrobatics, night flying and spin flights, as well as armament operations training.”373 
The collaboration has yielded considerable success for China since, as of 2005, 249 
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K-8 trainers have been sold by CATIC to the armed forces of several states, notably 
that of Egypt.374  
     Another important codevelopment and coproduction project between Beijing and 
Islamabad is the production of JF-17 (Joint Fighter-17) Thunder combat aircraft. It is 
reported that “with its advanced design, state-of-the-art manufacturing technology, 
Mach 1.6 speed, advanced avionics and excellent handling capabilities, the JF-17 is 
on a par with the world's most advanced light fighter jets.”375 Most recently, after 
making its first public appearance in Islamabad on March 23, 2007, during a 
National Day Joint Services Parade flyover376 , “[serial] production of the JF-17 
Thunder combat aircraft started on 22 January [2008] at the Pakistan Aeronautical 
Complex (PAC) at Kamra near Islamabad.”377  
     Turkey has also engaged in collaborative projects with some states to manufacture 
weapon systems critical to the modernization objectives of Turkish Armed Forces 
(TAF). A prominent recent example is the Turkish participation in the F-35 Joint 
Strike Fighter (JSF) program led by the US. Signing the memorandum of 
understanding (MOU), Turkey has joined the production, sustainment, and follow-on 
development (PSFD) phase of the JSF program as a full partner on January 25, 
2007.378 Accordingly, “Turkey pledged $175 million toward this phase, and also 
promised to eventually 100 F-35A fighters. The deal could cost Turkey more than 
$10 billion over 20 years, the largest defence project in Turkish history.”379 On the 
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other hand, several Turkish defense companies, such as Alp Aviation, Aselsan, 
Ayesaş, Havelsan, Kale Kalıp, Mikes, Milsoft, TEI, and TAI, have secured contracts 
to manufacture components, hardware and software, for the aircraft.380 For instance, 
in line with the agreement signed with Northrop Grumman on February 6, 2007, TAI 
(Turkish Aerospace Industries, Inc.) has become a second source for the F-35 centre 
fuselage, which TAI is expected to produce a minimum of 400. The deal represents a 
potential value of around $ 3 billion.381  
     Another example is the Turkish participation in the Airbus A400M military 
transport consortium which signifies a growing Turkish interest in the European 
aerospace sector. Turkey is among the launch nations of the project along with 
Germany, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and Luxembourg, and 
has ordered 10 of this tactical and strategic airlifter.382  “Turkey’s participation is 
worth 5.56% of the program,” and Turkey’s main aerospace firm, Tusaş Aerospace 
Industries, Inc. (TAI), “will be given a production work share of around 7.15%” as 
the development and production of “the forward center fuselage, hatches, tail cone, 
ailerons, spoilers, lighting, and water/wastewater systems” is assigned to TAI.383 
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     Turkey has hitherto concluded two joint defense industry projects with China, 
both of which pertained to the development and production of Chinese missile 
systems in Turkey under license. The contracts of these projects were signed in the 
second half of the 1990s. According to Major General Armağan Kuloğlu (Ret.), there 
were two main reasons for the Turkish involvement in these two collaborative 
projects with China on missile systems.384 The first reason was the increasing missile 
threat around Turkey in the mid-1990s and the realization of the Turkish authorities 
that Turkey had severe deficiencies in missile defense systems. However, instead of 
developing anti-missile systems, Turkish authorities opted to develop indigenous 
missile systems so as to reinforce the deterrent capability of the Turkish Armed 
Forces (TAF). The second reason was the favorable response of the Chinese 
authorities. Turkey held consultations with several states about missile systems, and 
got a convenient response to its propositions from China, especially on the 
development of missile technology in Turkey through technology transfer.385   
     The first project was signed in 1997 for the WS-1 unguided multiple launch 
rocket system (MLRS). The deal was an important leap for both Turkey and China in 
their military relations as it marked their first cooperation in defense industry. 
Besides, it was an additional important step for the Chinese military-industrial 
complex as “this deal represents China’s first known export of this artillery 
system.”386 According to the agreement, “China [was to] supply Turkey with one 
battery of complete missiles and the materials, equipment, and technology to produce 
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five more batteries.”387 The first battery of WS-1 MLRS was delivered to the Turkish 
Land Forces (TLF) in December 1998 by the Chinese defense company Sichuan 
Aerospace Industry Corporation (SCAIC), which, according to Chinese sources, “is 
not only a key base for China’s launching rocket and missile but also one of the most 
important designers and manufacturers for Multiple Launch Rocket Weapon 
System.”388 The remaining five batteries, “after nationalization efforts, have been 
manufactured by Roketsan [Roketsan Missile Industries Inc.] through technology 
transfer” under the Turkish designation of Kasırga (Hurricane).389 The total cost of 
the project is reportedly around $ 250 million.390 The system was revealed to the 
Turkish public for the first time on August 30, 2006 in Ankara during the military 
parade at the Atatürk Cultural Center, and received widespread public attention.391 
As of October 2007, Turkey is in possession of 54 Kasırga launchers and more than 
1500 missiles.392 
     A single “Kasırga MLRS Battery comprises nine Rocket Launch Trucks [F-
302T], nine Transport and Loading Trucks and one Firing Command Truck,” and 
thus is composed of 19 trucks in total.393  One Kasırga battery can deliver four 
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302mm unguided rockets, in salvo or single, over a distance of 100 km.394 A single 
rocket is powered by a solid propellant rocket motor, is tipped with a conventional 
steel ball warhead, and it has a length of 4,7 m and a total weight of 524 kg.395 In 
addition, Roketsan reportedly possesses the technological infrastructure to improve 
the current system to manufacture more advanced models of Kasırga MLRS.396 
     The second joint defense industry project between Turkey and China was signed 
in 1999 for B611 short range ballistic missile (SRBM). The deal was the second, and 
thus far the last, important step for Turkey and China in their defense industry 
cooperation. According to the agreement, one B611 battery and over 200 missiles 
were to be customized and manufactured by Roketsan in Turkey under the Turkish 
designation Yıldırım (Lightning) in cooperation with the Chinese defense company 
China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC).397 The total cost 
of the project is reportedly around $ 300 million.398 When the first battery of B611 
SRBM was delivered to TAF is not known for certain but it is most probably in the 
late 2001.399 As of March 2007, according to 2006 UN Register of Conventional 
Arms, Turkey is in possession of six Yıldırım launchers and 97 missiles.400  The 
system was revealed to the Turkish public for the first time on August 30, 2007 in 
Ankara during the military parade at the Atatürk Cultural Center, and received 
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widespread public attention.401 On the other hand, China revealed its own system of 
B611 at Zhuhai Airshow three years earlier, in 2004.402 
     A single Yıldırım battery comprises six rocket launch trucks (F-600T), six 
transport and loading trucks and one battery command-post vehicle, and thus is 
composed of 13 vehicles in total.403 One Yıldırım battery can deliver one 600mm 
guided missile over a distance of 152 km.404 A single missile is powered by a solid 
propellant motor, can be tipped with a conventional high-explosive (HE) or cluster 
warhead, and it has a length of 6.1 m and a total weight of 480 kg.405 
     WS-1 unguided multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) or Kasırga and B611 
short range ballistic missile system (SRBM) or Yıldırım are not so advanced military 
systems compared to, for example, Shahab-3 medium range ballistic missiles 
(MRBM) developed by Iranian defense company Shahid Hammat Industrial 
Group.406 Nonetheless, operational missile systems appear to be important military 
assets for the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) as they boosts, albeit slightly, the 
deterrent capability of TAF. It is reported that during a meeting on the sidelines of 
the NATO Istanbul Summit of 2004, Spilios Spiliotopoulos, the then Greek Minister 
of National Defense, asked Vecdi Gönül, Turkish Minister of National Defense, for 
the removal of Kasırga systems from the Turkish Aegean island of Gökçeada/Imbros 
where they were previously located on.407  
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     In addition to these two completed projects, there are three potential defense 
industry projects between Turkey and China. Undersecretariat for Defense Industry 
(SSM), Turkey’s procurement agency, has recently announced three international 
tenders on three separate air defense missile systems, and the Chinese defense 
company China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) has 
received and responded to the Request for Information (RFI) on all three projects.408  
    The first project is the Turkish Low Altitude Air Defense Missile System (T-
LALADMIS) project. Turkey intends to procure 45 systems and 45 launchers 
together with missiles for the Turkish Land Forces (TLF) and 12 systems together 
with missiles for the Turkish Naval Forces (TNF).409 RFI was issued on April 18, 
2007 and CPMIEC responded to it on August 31, 2007.410 The Chinese defense 
company is contending with 17 companies for the project including Roketsan 
(Turkey), Raytheon (the US), Doosan (South Korea), Diehl (Germany), Denel (South 
Africa), and Thales (France).411 
     The second project is the Turkish Medium Altitude Air Defense Missile System 
(T-MALADMIS) project. Turkey intends to procure three systems for TLF and 
stipulates 50 % offset commitment. 412  RFI was issued on March 21, 2007 and 
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CPMIEC responded to it on June 31, 2007.413  The Chinese defense company is 
contending with 15 companies for the project including Aselsan (Turkey), Denel 
(South Africa), IAI (Israel), Rafael (Israel), Raytheon (the US), and Saab Bofors 
(Sweden).414 
     The third project is the Turkish Long Range Air and Missile Defence System (T-
LORAMIDS) project. Turkey intends to buy 4 (+4 optional) systems for the Turkish 
Air Force (TuAF).415 Request for Information (RFI) was issued on March 1, 2007 
and China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) responded to 
it on June 2, 2007.416 On April 18, 2008, Undersecretariat for Defense Industries 
(SSM) “released the names of the 13 companies that have declared their intention to 
respond” to RFI including Boeing (the US), Lockheed Martin (the US), Raytheon 
(the US), Israel Aerospace Industries (Israel), and Roketsan (Turkey).417 Still, it is 
generally acknowledged that the Chinese company is contending in the tender with 
its HQ-9 medium to long range, semi-active radar homing air defence missile mainly 
against Lockheed Martin’s (the US) Patriot PAC-3, Almaz Scientific Industrial 
Corporation’s (Russia) S-300PMU1/PMU2, and Israel Aerospace Industries’ (Israel) 
Arrow II.418  
 
5. 1. 4. Organizational Military Relations     
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     Organizational military relations have two aspects. There are relations of states 
with international organizations in military matters that are directly related to the 
states’ internal or external military affairs. In terms of internal military affairs, for 
example, integrated military structure of NATO has entailed considerable changes in 
the defense structures of new member states. So as to articulate prospective 
transformations in their armed forces in accordance with the requirements of NATO 
standards, the Bulgarian government endorsed in 2001 ‘Updated Plan for 
Organizational Structuring of the Bulgarian Armed Forces by the end of 2004’, while 
the Romanian government endorsed in 2000 a new ‘Military Strategy,’ which clearly 
states that “to be credible, the [Romanian] Armed Forces must become interoperable 
with NATO Armed Forces and have smaller, mobile, efficient and modern 
structures.”419  
     In terms of external military affairs, for example, NATO membership has paved 
the way for many member states to actively involve in NATO operations in several 
parts of the world, and thus engage in, and if possible reinforce, military relations 
with some states. For instance, Norway is currently an active participant of NATO-
led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and according to 
Norwegian State Secretary Espen Barth Eide “participation in ISAF is Norway’s 
primary international military commitment.”420 However, the Norwegian government 
considers its military presence in Afghanistan not only as a part of its relations with 
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NATO but also as a part of its relations with the Afghani government. 421 
Accordingly, even though Norwegian troops are under NATO command, their 
presence in Afghanistan can be regarded as a part of bilateral military relations 
between Norway and Afghanistan.422 In short, relations of a state with a specific 
international organization in military matters, which may have repercussions for the 
internal and external military affairs of that state, constitute organizational military 
relations of that state.  
     In terms of bilateral military relations, there are relations of states with other 
states in military matters under the aegis or within the framework of international 
organizations. With respect to the common membership of two states whose bilateral 
military relations are examined, international organizations taken into consideration 
may change. In other words, while for an analysis of Greek-Bulgarian military 
relations NATO can be taken into account, for Greek-Italian military relations 
Western European Union (WEU) can be taken into account in addition to NATO.  
     Common membership to an international organization has several implications for 
the military relations of two states. First of all, common membership could facilitate 
the dialogue between the two governments on military matters. For example, it 
provides the two states with an opportunity to discuss contentious issues within the 
framework of the organization. NATO officially proclaims that “a key function of 
NATO is to provide a forum in which member countries can consult together on 
security issues and mutual concerns and the Alliance will continue to assist member 
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countries in any such discussions.” 423  In fact, the confidence building measures 
(CBM) process between Turkey and Greece from 2000 to 2003 was carried out in 
two separate tracks, and one was the meetings within NATO.424 Three out of eleven 
CBMs were agreed upon between Ankara and Athens during the meetings at the 
NATO.425 The first one was about military exercise planning, the second one was 
about cooperation on military education, and the third one was about exchange of 
military personnel in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) training centers.426 
     Second, common membership to an international organization ensures regular 
continuation of military contacts between two states, which could diminish the 
likelihood of inadvertent conflicts due to misinformation, misperception, or 
misinterpretation. From 2000 to 2008, there have been 23 NATO ministerial 
meetings for the Ministers of Defense of member states during which they have 
found an opportunity to hold consultations with each other.427  Furthermore, two 
states could transcend regular military contacts and could engage in more substantive 
relations with each other within the framework of the international organization they 
are members of. For instance, China and Kyrgyzstan conducted an antiterrorism 
exercise in October 2002, which was the first bilateral joint military exercise within 
the framework of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).428  
     Turkey’s membership to NATO and China’s membership to SCO seem to be the 
main determinants of their organizational military relations. Still, since Turkey and 
China are not common members of any international organization, which is engaged 
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in military matters, apart from the UN, common membership to same international 
organizations have no effects on the bilateral military relations between Ankara and 
Beijing.429 
 
Table XIII: Turkish-Chinese Military Relations: A Typological Synopsis  
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 Military/Defense Attaché Offices (DAO) 
          Turkish DAO in Beijing since 1973 
          Chinese DAO in Ankara since 1977 
 Military Agreements 
          3 Agreements Signed 
          3 Agreements Under Discussion 
 Visits of Military Personnel 
          Moderate Level 
 Exchanges between Military Education Institutions 
          Low Level 
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5. 2. Bilateral Military Relations: The Analysis  
     Even though Turkey and China have been willing to advance military 
cooperation, Turkish-Chinese military relations have displayed a low level of 
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development due to several reasons. In this part, first, the factors that have induced 
Ankara and Beijing to sustain and to improve bilateral military relations are 
analyzed. Second, the factors that have precluded them from advancing their military 
relations are scrutinized. 
     Turkish and Chinese policymakers have understandably refrained from 
commenting on bilateral military relations between Turkey and China. On the other 
hand, on several occasions, high level military personnel from the two sides have 
repeatedly expressed their intention and eagerness to improve existing military 
relations and to forge additional ones. Most recently, for example, General Faruk 
Cömert, Commander of the Turkish Air Force, met with General Qiao Qingchen, 
Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) in Ankara on 
September 17-21, 2006. 430  At the press conference before the formal meeting, 
General Cömert stated that continuation of existing relations were to be beneficial to 
both states. According to General Cömert, “through these [military] relations, the 
existing friendship, affection, and brotherhood between the two nations” will be 
consolidated.431 The objective of the Turkish side, added General Cömert, was to 
further bilateral military relations to levels “congruous with existing affinity and 
interest between the two nations.”432  
     By the same token, Xu Caihou, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission 
(CMC) of the Communist Party of China (CPC), met with a Turkish delegation 
headed by Aydoğan Babaoğlu, the then Commander of the Turkish War Colleges, in 
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Beijing on July 12, 2006. 433  At the press conference after the formal meeting, 
displaying an interest to expand Turkish-Chinese military relations, Xu Caihou stated 
that “the Chinese armed forces value[d] its friendship with the Turkish army, and 
[was] ready to further expand channels and fields for bilateral military exchanges.”434 
     There seem to be two main motives behind Turkish interest to sustain and, if 
possible, to improve its military relations with China. The first is the ongoing 
inclination, if not policy, of Turkish authorities to diversify the countries with which 
Turkey establish military industrial relations. For instance, in its 2007-2011 Strategic 
Plan Turkish Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) proclaims that one of 
the four strategic goals is “to participate actively in multinational defense and 
security projects that promote the international cooperation.”435 Diversification of 
sources of supply for weapon systems is arguably an enduring concern for the 
Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) since every now and then Turkey faces restrictions on 
the supply of weapon systems. For instance, “in 1994 [the US] Congress decided to 
withhold sales of military equipment for Black Hawk helicopters (on the basis that 
they were used in operations against the Kurds) until Turkey showed progress 
concerning respect for human rights and Cyprus.”436 Another illustrative example is 
the Germany’s decision to refuse the complete delivery of Leopard tanks to Turkey 
in 1999 due to the resistance of the Green Party of the German coalition 
government.437 Because of the allegedly poor human rights record of Turkey, the 
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German government “eventually approved a smaller scale while tabling the larger 
contract.”438  
     Another cause that has induced the Turkish governments to seek new sources of 
supply is the reluctance, and sometimes refusal, of its traditional western sources to 
engage in joint projects which require military technology transfer to Turkey. The 
most recent example is the abstention of the US defense companies in the Turkish 
international tender for attack helicopters. “For the first time since they [Turkey and 
the US] began cooperating in arms sales, no U.S. companies bid for the contract 
because of strict Turkish regulations” which “stipulate that Turkey be given full 
access to the aircraft's specific software codes-which the U.S. considers a security 
risk.” 439  As far as Turkish-Chinese military relations are concerned, the first joint 
project between Turkey and China on the WS-1 unguided multiple launch rocket 
system (MLRS) was in part the consequence of the indisposition of the US, France, 
and Israel to transfer missile technology to Turkey.440 In other words, the refusal of 
Turkey’s traditional partners in defense industry cooperation in part paved the way 
for the advent of Turkish-Chinese cooperation in defense industry. In short, 
sustaining, and if possible, improving military cooperation with China evidently adds 
an additional option for the Turkish military modernization and serves the 
inclination, if not policy, of Turkish authorities to diversify the countries with which 
Turkey establish military industrial relations. 
     The second motive behind Turkish interest to sustain and, if possible, to improve 
its military relations with China is the Turkish desire to capitalize on the rapid 
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developments in Chinese military modernization. Implicitly belittling the level of 
Chinese military modernization, Hasret Çomak stated in 1996 that in order to 
improve military relations between Turkey and China “Turkey could sell advanced 
defense systems to China as well as it could buy light weapon systems and 
ammunition from China.”441 However, it is evident that thenceforth Chinese military 
modernization program has far surpassed that of Turkey in manufacturing advanced 
weapon systems. For example, while Turkey has been able to produce short range 
ballistic missiles (SRBM) with a range of around 150 km, “China has been one of 
very few nations to produce a full range of indigenously designed ballistic missiles, 
including ICBMs [Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles].”442 Most recently, on January 
11, 2007, displaying another breakthrough in its military modernization, “China 
became the third country, after the United States and Russia, to have performed an 
anti-satellite (ASAT) operation successfully by destroying an aging low-earth 
orbiting weather satellite through the launching of a ballistic missile into orbit.”443  
     Turkish military authorities on several occasions expressed the desire to capitalize 
on the developments in Chinese military modernization. For instance, before the 
meeting with General Qiao Qingchen, Commander of the People’s Liberation Army 
Air Force (PLAAF), in Ankara on September 18, 2006, General Faruk Cömert, 
Commander of the Turkish Air Force, stated at the press conference: “We all know 
that China has realized significant advances in some areas [wherein] especially our 
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Air Force is incompetent.”444 What General Cömert meant by ‘some areas wherein 
Turkish Air Force (TuAF) is incompetent’ was ‘space’ as he elaborated on his 
statement: “As you know, China is one of the rare countries of the world in the realm 
of space. In this regard, I believe that Turkey could get important benefits from any 
cooperation with China in this area.”445  
     On the other hand, there seem to be one main motive behind Chinese interest to 
sustain and, if possible, to improve its military relations with Turkey. Arms sales 
serve a broad range Chinese foreign policy purposes including strengthening states 
against other states that are China’s adversaries, improving relations with specific 
countries or regions, or maintaining close and cordial relations with particular states, 
such as those exporting oil. 446  China’s arms sales may also reflect commercial 
interests including generating additional revenues for Chinese defense industry, or 
augmenting foreign exchange earnings.447 Still, it can be argued, the endeavors of 
Chinese authorities to realize China’s political and commercial objectives have been 
hampered by the declining level of Chinese arms sales. Chinese activism in 
international arms market witnessed in the 1990s has gradually subsided. While 
China was the 6th largest arms exporter in 1990-2000, it ranked 9th in 2000-2007, and 
it was just the 10th largest arms exporter in 2007.448  
     Turkey is another market for the Chinese defense industry products. Accordingly, 
the Chinese defense company China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation 
(CPMIEC) has received and responded to the Request for Information (RFI) in three 
international tenders of the Turkey’s Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) 
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in 2007.449 Apparently, the Chinese defense industry intends to prolong its existence 
in the Turkish arms market which has recently ended with the completion of joint 
project between China and Turkey on B611 short range ballistic missile systems 
(SRBM) or Yıldırım in 2007. Furthermore, so as to seek new partnerships and also to 
promote their products, Chinese defense companies and high level military officers 
have participated in Turkish International Defense Industry Fair (IDEF).  
     In 2005, 6 Chinese officials were participants of IDEF including Lieutenant 
General Chu Hongyan, Vice Director of General Armaments Department (GAD) of 
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and Major General Lu Dingwen, Director of 
Armaments of Guangzhou Military Region of the PLA.450   Besides, revealing a 
strong Chinese interest, the number of visitors from China was the second highest 
after Germany.451 In 2007, with a perceptible increase, 18 Chinese officials were 
participants of IDEF including Guo Yanyan, Deputy Chief of Commission of 
Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), and Colonel 
Wang Shuming, Chief of Land Vehicles Department. Yet, the number of visitors 
from China declined to 55.452 
     Aforementioned factors that have induced Turkey and China to forge, to sustain 
and to improve their military relations notwithstanding, there seem to be three main 
countervailing factors that have precluded Turkey and China from advancing their 
military relations to higher levels. It should be stressed here that these factors are not 
peculiar to bilateral military relations between Turkey and China. Rather, they are 
structural factors that will most probably disrupt Turkey’s attempts to diversify its 
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defense industrial relations and to establish new military relations with states other 
than its traditional Western partners. 
     The first factor pertains to the vigorous domestic military modernization programs 
of Turkey and China. Through immense investments to bolster its military industrial 
complex, China is today capable of indigenously manufacturing sophisticated 
weapons systems, such as DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), Type 
093 nuclear powered attack submarines (SSN), Type 094 second generation ballistic 
missile nuclear powered submarines (SSBN), Type 052C guided missile destroyers, 
Type 054 frigates, J-10 fourth generation fighter aircrafts, JH-7 fighter bombers, and 
Z-10 attack helicopters.453   Turkey, on the other hand, has embarked on several 
defense industrial projects for the indigenous production of advanced weapon 
systems. For instance, Turkey’s Undersecretariat for Defense Industries launched 
‘Patrol and Anti-Submarine Warfare Ship Project’ (MİLGEM) in June 2004 to 
construct this sort of surface combatants “with maximum Turkish content.”454 In 
addition, Turkey initiated ‘Turkish National Main Battle Tank Project’ (MİMTÜ) in 
July 2004 to design, develop, and manufacture main battle tanks indigenously.455 
Turkey also has programs underway for the domestic development and production of 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). 456  It can be argued that extensive military 
modernization programs of Turkey and China focusing on developing and 
manufacturing modern weapon systems with the utmost indigenous contribution 
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have restricted the areas they could have cooperated in, and have limited their 
options to establish new links in these areas.  
     The second factor pertains to the fact that neither Turkey nor China is capable of 
manufacturing state-of-the-art weapon systems. Chinese military modernization is to 
a considerable extent dependent on Russia for a wide array of military weapons, 
equipment, and technology. For instance, the largest surface combatants of the 
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) are the four Sovremenny class destroyers 
purchased from Russia. 457  Moreover, “China continues to rely most heavily on 
foreign technologies includ[ing] guidance and control systems, turbine engine 
technology, and enabling technologies such as precision machine tools and advanced 
diagnostic and forensic equipment…” 458  Turkey, on the other hand, despite its 
incipient programs for domestic development and production of sophisticated 
weapon systems, is to a great extent dependent on foreign acquisitions almost 
exclusively from its traditional NATO partners. For instance, Turkey has purchased 
multiple weapon systems from Italy including beyond visual range air to air missiles 
(BVRAAM), close in weapon systems (CIWS), fire control radars, different sorts of 
naval guns, armored personnel carriers (APC), light helicopters, air surveillance 
radars, anti submarine warfare (ASW) aircrafts, and helicopters.459 In short, since 
neither Turkey nor China have been capable of manufacturing cutting-the-edge 
weapon systems both have been compelled to turn to those states capable of 
providing cutting-the-edge weapon systems. In other words, since both have been 
followers and none is a leading state in defense industry, there has been no 
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complementarity between their military modernization programs, and thus they have 
not been able to respond to the necessities of each other for state-of-the art weapon 
systems.460   
     Related to the second factor, the third factor pertains to the excessive dominance 
of weapon systems that have been procured from the Western sources, mainly the 
US, in the Turkish armed forces. Colonel (Ret.) Atilla Sandıklı points out that 
military relations between Turkey and China are not at desired levels. According to 
Sandıklı, one of the reasons of this situation is the fact that Turkey’s current military 
systems are favorable to promote relations for the most part with the West. 461 
Therefore, it seems to be no coincidence that one of the two completed joint projects 
between Turkey and China has been on the realm of ballistic missile development. In 
other words, in the realm of ballistic missile development Turkey had no cooperation 
with the West, and thus Western weapons systems had not prevailed this realm, and 
in turn Turkey could start military cooperation with China ex nihilo. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
     Bilateral military relations between two states are in general examined in two 
different ways; either an exclusive analysis directly related to military relations 
between two states is set forth or bilateral military relations is examined within a 
general framework employed to examine bilateral relations between two states. This 
analytical framework is composed of, and implicitly or explicitly divided into, four 
categories, i.e. political relations, economic relations, military relations, and social 
and cultural relations. In most of the studies, military relations between Turkey and 
China are examined within this analytical framework.  
     There are two main advantages of the traditional analytical framework for 
analyses of bilateral military relations. First, since it is composed of all realms of 
bilateral relations, the traditional analytical framework is appropriate to indicate the 
interplay among these realms, which is frequently influential in bilateral military 
relations between two states. Second, since it is composed of all realms of bilateral 
relations, the traditional analytical framework is suitable to reveal the imbalances 
between the levels of different sorts of relations. 
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    On the other hand, in general, a state engages in a myriad of relations of military 
nature with other states and, also with international organizations. Viewed in their 
entirety, these relations constitute a state’s foreign military relations. Another 
analytical framework for analyses of bilateral military relations can be devised by 
segregating the entirety of a state’s foreign military relations into four categories 
according to their distinctive subject matters. These four categories can be called as 
formal military relations, operational military relations, technical military relations, 
and organizational military relations.  
     Formal military relations constitute the general foundations of bilateral military 
relations and determine the contours of their official conduct. Defense attaché 
offices, military agreements, reciprocal visits of senior military personnel and 
military student exchanges can be considered as main constituents of formal military 
relations. Relations between two states that involve the employment of weapon 
systems constitute operational military relations. Port visits, joint military exercises, 
and military installations in each other’s territory can be considered as main 
constituents of operational military relations. Bilateral military relations between two 
states that pertain to the military modernization of the armed forces of at least one of 
the two states constitute technical military relations. Direct supply/procurement of 
weaponry, and cooperation in armaments production can be considered as main 
constituents of technical military relations. Finally, relations of states with 
international organizations in military matters that are directly related to the states’ 
internal or external military affairs constitute organizational military relations. 
     It is worth propounding this framework for analyses of bilateral military relations 
for three primary reasons. First, by segregating the entirety of a state’s foreign 
military relations and plainly identifying each and every possible realm of its 
 138 
bilateral military relations with another state, this analytical framework enables the 
researcher to define and describe each sort of existing military relations between two 
states, and thereby expose the exact nature of their bilateral military relations. 
Second, situating bilateral military relations in a state’s foreign military relations, this 
analytical framework provides the opportunity to discern the precise level of bilateral 
military relations of a state. Third, this analytical framework incorporates relations of 
a state in military matters with international organizations to analyses of a state’s 
foreign military relations. Therefore, it paves the way for detecting the effects of 
these relations on bilateral military relations between two states. 
     Since foreign military relations of a state are essentially embedded in its foreign 
policy, an analysis of Turkey’s military relations with China calls for an elucidation 
of the basic characteristics of Turkish foreign policy. First of all, although there are 
some harbingers of an assertive foreign policy seeking more than security, the 
ultimate objective of Turkish foreign policy, it seems, is the preservation of security 
through peace and stability both at home and in its vicinity. Second, the referent 
points of security, to which official Turkish documents and declarations of Turkish 
policymakers refer, are mainly the indivisible integrity of the country, national unity 
and integrity, unitary nature of the state, and independence. Turkey seems to consider 
regional and ethnic conflicts, religious fundamentalism, international terrorism, and 
political and economic instabilities as the principal threats to its security. Third, in 
general, geographic location, historical experiences, and dominant ideology among 
policy makers are considered as the basic parameters of Turkish foreign policy. 
Fourth, the Government, the President, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
National Security Council/Military, and the Turkish Assembly are the primary 
players in the Turkish foreign policy making and implementation. 
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     On the other hand, political relations between Turkey and China, which date back 
to the times of Ottoman and Qing Empires, ‘have spun more but moved less’. 
Relatively low level of interest to bilateral relations on both sides notwithstanding, 
there are mainly two factors that have facilitated the continuation of bilateral 
relations, that is, ‘spinning more’, between Ankara and Beijing since the inception of 
diplomatic relations on August 4, 1971. First, foreign policy principles endorsed by 
China in its relations with other states are almost identical to those of Turkey and, it 
can be argued, it is difficult to consider them inimical to Turkey’s security. Second, 
successive Turkish governments and Turkish statesmen have never expressed any 
desire or intention to recognize or support ‘Taiwanese independence,’ and announced 
on every occasion that they espouse one-China policy. 
     These two main factors that have facilitated the smooth continuation of Turkish-
Chinese relations notwithstanding, there are mainly three factors that seem to have 
hindered the development of bilateral relations to higher levels, that is, have caused 
relations ‘ to move less’. First, the issue of East Turkestan/Xinjiang is so delicate a 
common concern between Ankara and Beijing that different approaches to the issue 
have caused complications in bilateral relations especially in the first half of the 
1990s. Despite the two governments’ efforts and declarations to prevent the East 
Turkestan/Xinjiang issue from impairing bilateral relations, this issue of common 
concern, it seems,  will possibly continue to be a complicating factor in relations 
between Turkey and China. The second main factor that seems to have hindered the 
development of bilateral relations to higher levels pertains to history as diplomatic 
relations between Ankara and Beijing were established belatedly, history of the 
Turkish-Chinese relations has suffered from multiple setbacks, and historical 
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experiences of Turkey itself have a restraining effect on bilateral relations between 
Turkey and China.  
     The third main factor that seems to have hindered the development of bilateral 
relations to higher levels pertains to geography as due to the sheer geographical 
distance between Turkey and China, coupled with the relative inability or deliberate 
inaction of the two states to exert influence beyond their immediate vicinities, areas 
wherein the two states have been traditionally active have yet to intersect, and 
Turkey’s geographical location has been influential in shaping its foreign policy and 
causing Turkey to focus on its relations mainly with the West, not just because of 
Turkey’s own geopolitical calculations but also because of the geopolitical 
calculations of other states. 
     Economic relations between Turkey and China have developed to a considerable 
degree especially in the realm of trade. Still, bilateral commercial relations between 
the two countries have constantly been associated with a growing trade deficit for 
Turkey since 1995. Besides, despite unprecedented, albeit uneven, development of 
bilateral commercial relations, meager increase has been observed in bilateral direct 
investments. Then again, as a matter of fact, Turkish-Chinese economic relations 
have been characterized by a steady, modest development. However, there have been 
factors that seem to have adversely affected the development of economic relations 
between Turkey and China, which are to militate against the development of bilateral 
economic relations in the future if not dealt with in a proper manner. The first of 
these factors is the absence of a suitable economic environment for bilateral 
economic activities. The second factor is the existence of economic areas wherein the 
two sides compete. Turkish goods are in severe competition with the imported goods 
from China in the Turkish domestic market, and Turkish goods are in serious 
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competition with Chinese goods in world markets. The third factor pertains to 
structural problems observed in the Chinese domestic market. 
     Social and cultural relations between Turkey and China appear to be the least 
developed realm of bilateral relations. Still, precursory developments in social and 
cultural relations can be discerned, especially considering educational issues and 
tourism.  
     Military relations between Turkey and China yielded quite substantial results in 
the second half of the 1990s when Turkey signed million dollar agreements with 
China for advanced weapon systems. However, thereafter bilateral military relations 
between Turkey and China have not engendered additional substantial results despite 
several developments in other areas of military cooperation, such as signing new 
military cooperation agreements and several bilateral visits of high level military 
personnel.  
     Formal military relations between Turkey and China have displayed a good deal 
activism. Turkey established a military attaché office at its Beijing Embassy in 1973, 
and Chinese military attaché office at its Ankara Embassy has been active since 
1977. Turkey has so far signed three military agreements with China on defense 
industry cooperation in 1997, on military education in 1999, and on naval special 
warfare basic training in 2003. In addition, deliberations between Turkey and China 
to sign three more military agreements are underway. High level military visits 
between Ankara and Beijing have been sustained and recent reciprocal visits of 
Turkish and Chinese commanders seem to have brought about a moderate dynamism 
to bilateral military relations. With regard to bilateral military relations military 
students have been exchanged between the military institutions of the two states in 
line with the provisions of the aforesaid agreement signed in 1999. 
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     Operational military relations between Turkey and China have displayed almost 
no activism. There have been only 4 unofficial port visits in total between the two 
countries all requested for the recreation of the military personnel of respective 
warships. Besides, Turkey and China have not held any bilateral joint military 
exercises. And any sort of cooperation between the two states on military bases 
seems extremely unlikely, even in the long run. 
     Technical military relations between Turkey and China are another realm that has 
displayed some activism. There has not been any officially registered instance of 
direct procurement of weaponry between the two countries. Nonetheless, Turkey has 
hitherto concluded two joint defense industry projects with China, both of which 
pertained to the development and production of Chinese missile systems in Turkey 
under license. The first project joint industry project between Turkey and China was 
signed in 1997 for the WS-1 unguided multiple launch rocket system (MLRS). The 
second joint project was signed in 1999 for B611 short range ballistic missile 
(SRBM). The deal was thus far the last important step for Turkey and China in their 
defense industry cooperation. In addition to these two completed projects, there are 
three potential defense industry projects between Turkey and China as a Chinese 
defense company has received and responded to the Request for Information (RFI) 
on all three Turkish international tenders about air defense missile systems.  
     Organizational military relations of Turkey and China have no effects on their 
bilateral military relations since Turkey and China are not common members of any 
international organization that is deeply involved in military matters. 
     Even though Turkey and China have been willing to advance military 
cooperation, Turkish-Chinese military relations have displayed a low level of 
development due to several reasons. There seem to be two main motives behind 
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Turkish interest to sustain and, if possible, to improve its military relations with 
China. The first is the ongoing inclination, if not policy, of Turkish authorities to 
diversify the countries with which Turkey establish defense industrial relations. The 
second is the Turkish desire to capitalize on the rapid developments in Chinese 
military modernization. On the other hand, there seem to be one main motive behind 
Chinese interest to sustain and, if possible, to improve its military relations with 
Turkey. To put it simply, Turkey is another market for the Chinese defense industry 
products. 
     Aforementioned factors that have induced Turkey and China to forge, to sustain 
and to improve their military relations notwithstanding, there seem to be three main 
countervailing factors that have precluded Turkey and China from advancing their 
military relations to higher levels. It should be stressed that these factors are not 
peculiar to bilateral military relations between Turkey and China. Rather, they are 
structural factors that will most probably disrupt Turkey’s attempts to diversify its 
defense industrial relations and to establish new military relations with states other 
than its traditional Western partners. 
     The first factor pertains to the vigorous domestic military modernization programs 
of Turkey and China which have arguably restricted the areas they could have 
cooperated in, and have limited their options to establish new links in these areas. 
The second factor pertains to the fact that neither Turkey nor China is capable of 
manufacturing state-of-the-art weapon systems. Since both Turkey and China have 
been followers and none is a leading state in defense industry, there has been no 
complementarity between their military modernization programs, and thus they have 
not been able to respond the necessities of each other for state-of-the art weapon 
systems. The third factor pertains to the excessive dominance of weapon systems that 
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have been procured from the Western sources, mainly the US, in the Turkish armed 
forces. These systems are favorable to promote relations for the most part with the 
West. 
     Two general conclusions can be inferred from the preceding discussion. First, 
contrary to the inculpatory arguments of some commentators, mainly adherents of 
the conservative school of thought in the US foreign policy, that Chinese military 
modernization is precarious, at the very least ominous, for not only the American 
foreign policy interests but also for international peace, stability, and order, the 
transformation of the Chinese military industrial complex could be beneficial for the 
developing countries that are in the pursuit of more and varying options for their 
military modernization programs. 462  Needless to say, sustaining, and if possible, 
improving military cooperation with China evidently adds an additional option for 
the Turkish military modernization and could serve diversification efforts of the 
Turkish authorities when necessities arise. 
     Second, through the discussion of Turkish-Chinese political, economic, social and 
cultural, and military relations in separate and successive sections, this study reveals 
the fact that the dynamics of these four distinct realms of bilateral relations are 
independent from each other. The motives of the Turkish and Chinese policy makers 
to establish, to sustain, and to take initiatives to improve their relations in each realm 
of bilateral relations are different. More to the point, the setbacks they have 
encountered in each realm of their bilateral relations are also different. Accordingly, 
this study can plausibly challenge the arguments which presume that developments 
in one realm of relations inevitably engender positive developments in another realm. 
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Political, economic, military, and social and cultural relations between two states are 
quite independent from each other. Therefore, instead of devising general strategies 
for their relations, Turkish and Chinese policymakers can concentrate on formulating 
particular strategies for each realm of bilateral relations between Turkey and China.  
     It is a general conviction among Turkish scholars and commentators that Turkey’s 
relations with the Rest, specifically with China, should not be held hostage to its 
relations with the West. However, Westernization, as embodied by the prospective 
membership of Turkey to the EU, could be considered as one of the basic parameters 
of Turkish foreign policy explained in the second chapter as, for example, it is 
officially proclaimed on several occasions that “the pioneering project of European 
integration would be incomplete without Turkey’s membership.”463 Which of the 
main actors of foreign policy described in the second chapter will ‘liberate’ Turkish 
foreign policy is a crucial issue that is waiting to be clarified by Turkish scholars and 
policymakers. 
     It is a general tendency among some Turkish scholars and commentators, even 
some policymakers, to see geopolitics as ‘will and representation’. In other words, 
possessing the desire to be proactive and viewing Turkey and the world around it 
susceptible to the realization of certain foreign policy objectives is adequate to render 
Turkey a potent actor of geopolitics. It is today commonly conceded that this 
fallacious understanding of world politics was responsible for the failures observed 
in Turkish foreign policy towards the Central Asia in the 1990s, and for ‘thwarting 
ambitions’ of Turkish policy makers to make Turkey an influential player in regional 
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politics. 464  Geopolitics instead can be considered as ‘will, representation, and 
capability’. Will with zeal, and representation with expectation are not sufficient to 
effectively realize the foreign policy objectives of a country without ample 
capability. Accordingly, the future of Turkey’s relations with China seems to be 
inauspicious. First, Turkey is not in possession of adequate capability to be active, in 
cooperation with China or otherwise, in the vicinity of China. Second, Chinese 
inclination to employ its capabilities in the vicinity of Turkey is not encouraging for 
the future of bilateral relations between Ankara and Beijing. 
     Related to that point, diverging positions and policies of Turkey and China on 
issues of common concern could probably bedevil their relations in the future. For 
instance, Turkey is one of the first states that have officially recognized the 
independence of Kosovo while China continues to refuse to do so. China’s 
improving relations with Iraq, Armenia, Iran, Greek Cypriot Administration, and 
Greece have already attracted the attention of Turkish observers as they could easily 
be sources of intractable friction in Turkish-Chinese relations.465 Bearing in mind 
that states pursue their own interests and are not diffident to advance their interests to 
the detriment of other states if they are not restrained to do so, it would be in the 
interest of Turkey to observe vigilantly the relations of China with other states in the 
vicinity of Turkey while striving to develop its own relations with China. 
     Finally, it could be emphasized that states conduct their relations with specific 
states within their general regional strategies. In other words, the Chinese 
governments most probably formulate the relations of China with Turkey within the 
contours of their Middle East policies, the Central Asia policies, or East 
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Mediterranean policies. Likewise, it would be in the interest of Turkey to devise an 
East Asian policy, and to envisage and conduct its relations with China within 
Turkey’s East Asian policy. To that end, it would be vital for Turkey to bolster its 
somewhat dormant relations with South Korea and Japan with which Turkey has 
enjoyed traditional cordial relations. China, on the other hand, has intermittently 
experienced severe problems especially with Japan. Close relations with South Korea 
and Japan could strengthen the position of Turkey in its relations with China on the 
condition that Turkey does not alienate China. In short, Turkey’s future strategy in its 
relations with China could have three aspects. First, Turkey could strive to develop 
its relations with China. Second, Turkey could tackle the activities of China in 
Turkey’s vicinity that Turkey considers inimical to its interests. Third, Turkey could 
give an additional impetus to its relations with countries surrounding China.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
 
List of the Main Bilateral Agreements between Turkey and China466 
 
  
04 August 1971 Joint Declaration on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations 
 
14 September 1972 Civil Air Transport Agreement (amended in December 1986) 
 
16 July 1974  Trade Agreement 
 
18 May 1981  Trade Protocol 
 
19 December 1981 Agreement on Economic, Industrial and Technical  
Cooperation 
 
11 January 1984 Protocol on Cooperation between the Turkish Radio and  
Television Administration (TRT) and the PRC Ministry of 
Radio and Television 
 
04 June 1985  Protocol on Cooperation between Anatolian News Agency and  
Xinhua News Agency 
 
26 April 1988  Cultural Exchange Program for 1988-1990 
 
06 March 1989 Consular Agreement 
 
24 December 1989 Agreement on Visa Exemption of Official Passports Holders 
 
19 March 1990 Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Standardization  
 
14 October 1990 Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Health 
 
30 October 1990 Agreement on Cooperation in the Scientific and Technological  
Fields 
 
13 November 1990 Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of  
                                               
466
 “List of the Main Bilateral Agreements,” Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Beijing, April 18, 
2007, http://www.turkey.org.cn/news/news_view.asp?newsid=275. 
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Investments 
 
09 May 1991  Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Tourism 
 
28 September 1992 Agreement on Judicial Assistance in Civil, Commercial and  
Penal Matters 
 
10 October 1992 Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Health 
 
23 October 1992 Maritime Agreement 
 
09 November 1993 Cultural Agreement 
 
23 May 1995  Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention  
of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income 
 
15 April 1997  Protocol on Cooperation on the Development of Water  
Resources 
 
13 November 1997 Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of  
Political Consultation Mechanism Between the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs 
 
08 November 1998 Cultural Exchange Programme for 1998-2001 
 
14 February 2000 Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Trans-National  
Crimes 
 
4 April 2000  Agreement on Inspection Cooperation 
 
19 April 2000  The Joint Communiqué signed on the occasion of the visit of  
H.E. Mr. Jiang Zemin to Turkey 
 
19 April 2000  Framework Protocol on Cooperation in the Field of Energy 
 
14 December 2001 Memorandum of Understanding on the Implementation Plan  
for Organized Outbound Travel by Chinese Citizens to Turkey  
 
18 March 2002 Cultural Exchange Programme for 2002-2005 
 
16 April 2002  Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the  
Agricultural Field  
 
16 April 2002  Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Custom  
Matters 
 
16 April 2002 Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of 
Information Technology 
 
13 June 2002  Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Fields  
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of Public Administration and Human Resources Development  
 
27 June 2005  Protocol on the Establishment of the Consultation and  
Cooperation Mechanism on Quality and Safety of Industrial 
Products 
 
24 January 2006 Agreement on Cooperation in Animal Health and Quarantine 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
 
Turkish Ambassadors to Beijing since 1990467 
 
 
1. Osman Reşat ARIM   30.11.1990 - 01.06.1994 
 
2. Berhan EKİNCİ    01.06.1994 - 01.10.1996 
 
3. Ünal ÜNSAL    01.10.1996 - 16.11.1998 
 
4. Daryal BATIBAY    17.11.1998 - 01.08.2000 
 
5. Rafet AKGÜNAY    01.08.2000 - 01.12.2004 
 
6. Oktay ÖZÜYE    01.12.2004 -  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
467
 Source: Unit of Information Acquirement, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
 
 
Main Data on Bilateral Trade between Turkey and China from 1996 to 2000 (1.000 $)468 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
468
 Source: “Ülkelere Göre İhracat,” and “Ülkelere Göre İthalat,” Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu. 
Year Exports Imports 
Trade 
Volume 
Trade 
Deficit 
Ratio (%) 
(Trade 
Deficit / 
Trade 
Volume) 
1996 65.115 556.492 621.607 -491.377 79,05 
1997 44.375 787.457 831.832 -743.082 89,33 
1998 38.447 846.134 884.581 -807.687 91,31 
1999 36.649 894.813 931.462 -858.164 92,13 
2000 96.010 1.344.731 1.440.741 -1.248.721 86,67 
2001 199.373 925.620 1.124.993 -726.247 64,56 
2002 268.229 1.368.317 1.636.546 -1.100.088 67,22 
2003 504.626 2.610.298 3.114.924 -2.105.672 67,60 
2004 391.585 4.476.077 4.867.662 -4.084.492 83,91 
2005 549.764 6.885.400 7.435.164 -6.335.636 85,21 
2006 693.038 9.669.110 10.362.148 -8.976.072 86,62 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
 
 
The First Ten Countries in Turkish Foreign Trade (Million $)469 
 
 2001 
 Exports  Imports 
Rank Country Volume 
Portion 
(%) 
 Country Volume 
Portion 
(%) 
1 Germany 5.367 17,1   Germany 5.335 12,9 
2 The U.S. 3.126 10,0   Italy 3.484 8,4 
3 Italy 2.342 7,5   Russian Federation 3.436 8,3 
4 England 2.175 6,9   The U.S. 3.261 7,9 
5 France 1.895 6,0   France 2.284 5,5 
6 Spain 950 3,0   England 1.914 4,6 
7 Russian Federation 924 2,9   Japan 1.307 3,2 
8 The Netherlands 892 2,8   Switzerland 1.227 3,0 
9 N/A 851 2,7   Spain 1.066 2,6 
10 Israel 805 2,6   Algeria 1.064 2,6 
  Total 19.328 61,7   Total 24.379 58,9 
  Total in General 31.342 100,0   Total in General 41.399 100,0 
 
 
 2006 
 Exports  Imports 
Rank Country Volume 
Portion 
(%) 
 Country Volume 
Portion 
(%) 
                                               
469
 Source: Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı, 
http://www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmweb/index.cfm?action=detayrk&yayinID=1116&icerikID=1225&dil=TR. 
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1 Germany 9.673 11,4   Russian Federation 17.493 12,8 
2 England 6.811 8,0   Germany 14.554 10,6 
3 Italy 6.748 7,9   China 9.553 7,0 
4 The U.S. 4.995 5,9   Italy 8.568 6,3 
5 France 4.602 5,4   France 6.601 4,8 
6 Spain 3.679 4,3   The U.S. 5.920 4,3 
7 Russian Federation 3.226 3,8   Iran 5.623 4,1 
8 Iraq 2.567 3,0   England 5.081 3,7 
9 The Netherlands 2.536 3,0   Switzerland 3.997 2,9 
10 Romania 2.341 2,7   Spain 3.789 2,8 
  Total 47.178 55,4   Total 81.179 59,2 
  Total in General 85.141 100,0   Total in General 137.032 100,0 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
 
 
Kasırga Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) 
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APPENDIX 6 
 
 
 
Yıldırım Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
